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Chapter I 
 
Introduction 
The recent financial crisis has put executive compensation on the radar screen of the 
general public. Public commentators and politicians speculate that executive compensation 
fostered excess risk-taking and myopic behavior, and was therefore a main culprit of the 
financial meltdown. Concerns about flaws in compensation designs are not new. They 
typically reoccur during economic downturns when seemingly high payoffs to executives 
outrage the public. In response to public outrage, governments passed many reforms of 
executive compensation over the last decades.  
The public debate inspired the academic community. In a highly influential book, Bebchuk 
and Fried (2004) argue that managerial power can better explain observed compensation 
patterns than the “traditional” optimal contracting paradigm. Their managerial power view 
is quiet timely because it theoretically justifies regulations of executive compensation and 
reforms of corporate governance more generally. Bebchuk and Fried’s (2004) claims 
caused hot debates in the literature on whether executive compensation is efficient or not.  
While Bebchuk and Fried (2004) give an academic voice to proponents of regulatory 
intervention, there is almost no evidence whether regulations of executive compensation 
yield more efficient compensation designs and increase shareholder value. In particular, 
there is no evidence on the effect of stricter disclosure rules for executive compensation. 
Pay disclosures are at the heart of regulatory intervention because they facilitate public 
outrage and, hence, trigger ever more reforms and ever more disclosure requirements.  
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The current debate and recent regulations of executive compensation focus on bonus 
payments and equity incentives. However, executives receive substantial amounts in the 
form of pensions and deferred compensation. These compensation components provide 
debt-like incentives because they are unsecured claims in the event of bankruptcy. The 
debate therefore overlooks an important part of compensation practice for the assessment 
of existing incentive structures.  
This dissertation contributes to the debate on the costs and benefits of disclosure regulation 
and to the debate on incentives from executive compensation. In Chapter II, I analyze how 
stock prices react to the announcement of mandatory increases in pay disclosures. I find 
that stock prices react positively. This result supports prevalent calls for tighter disclosure 
requirements. However, the stock price reaction also depends on the quality of corporate 
governance. Positive abnormal returns are decreasing in shareholdings of institutional 
investors and become negative for large institutional ownership. This result supports 
skeptical views about “one size fits all” regulations.  
In Chapter III, I analyze differences in performance and corporate policies between firms 
that do and do not voluntarily disclose the costs of pensions for their incumbent executives. 
I find that shareholders value firms that hide pension costs at a discount. These firms have 
lower operating performance, pay their employees higher wages, and make worse 
acquisitions. I find evidence that hidden pensions costs are associated with weak boards 
and inefficient compensation designs. Stock prices of firms that hide pension costs react 
positively to the announcement of a corporate governance reform. The provisions of this 
reform address concerns about ineffective boards and inefficient compensation designs. 
These results support the view that stealth compensation indicates agency problems. 
In Chapter IV, I analyze how executive pensions and compensation deferrals are related to 
corporate risk-taking. I find that firms pursue more conservative investment and financing 
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policies when their CEOs have accumulated more wealth in the form of pensions and 
deferrals. These results should be of interest for policy makers who seek to reduce risk-
taking incentives in executive compensation.   
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Chapter II 
 
Is Disclosure of Executive Compensation Good or Bad? 
Evidence from a Natural Experiment 
 
1 Introduction 
Calls for reform of executive compensation typically reoccur during economic downturns 
when concerns about income inequality or seemingly high payouts for low perceived 
performance spark public outrage. In response to such calls, policy makers routinely 
expand disclosure requirements (see Conyon et al. (2011)). Despite their widespread use as 
a regulatory tool, the economic consequences of pay disclosures are not clear. In this 
paper, I analyze stock price reactions to the announcement of mandatory increases in pay 
disclosures. The main result is that mandatory pay disclosures are a two-edged sword: On 
average, stock prices react positively. However, the stock price reaction also depends on 
the quality of corporate governance. Abnormal returns are decreasing in shareholdings of 
institutional investors and become negative for large institutional shareholdings. 
The results bring together the contradicting views about the effect of pay disclosures. The 
literature suggests that disclosures can mitigate inefficiencies in compensation designs or 
distort efficient compensation designs. Under the managerial power view, disclosures are 
good. They allow outsiders to target inefficient compensation, which a powerful CEO 
designs in her own best interest. Disclosures increase shareholder value because the board 
agrees on more efficient compensation to minimize reputational costs from outrage (see 
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Bebchuk and Fried (2004)). Under the optimal contracting view, mandatory disclosures are 
bad. They allow outsiders to target efficient compensation, which the board agrees on in 
the best interest of shareholders. Disclosures destroy shareholder value because political or 
social forces pressure the board to reduce pay-performance sensitivities (see Jensen and 
Murphy (1990)).
1
 
Since pay disclosures facilitate public outrage, they also impact the governance 
environment more generally when public outrage triggers other governance reforms. These 
reforms include direct regulations of executive compensation, such as accounting and tax 
regulations, and indirect regulations that affect the interplay between shareholders and the 
board or between non-executive and executive directors. These regulations may 
themselves have unintended consequences.
2
 
While the costs and benefits of mandatory disclosures are well understood on theoretical 
grounds, an empirical analysis of the net effect is challenging for several reasons. First, 
Jensen and Murphy (1990) point out that it is difficult to identify the effect of any political 
costs since they are not directly measurable and disclosure requirements exist in the US 
since the 1930s. Second, corporate governance reforms commonly apply to all firms in the 
market. Therefore, it is challenging to find a control group of comparable firms, for which 
the reform does not apply (see, e.g., Leuz (2007) and Hochberg, Sapienza, and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2009)). Third, new disclosure requirements are often part of broader reforms. 
                                                 
1
 A third hypothesis about the impact of mandatory disclosures has become known as the Lake Wobegon 
Effect: Companies pay CEOs above average to signal that their CEOs are above average. Thus, disclosures 
may contribute to an ever ratcheting-up of executive compensation. See Hayes and Schaefer (2009) for a 
model. I assume that the costs from an inefficient incentive alignment far exceed the costs from increased pay 
levels (see also Bebchuk and Fried (2004)). Therefore, I attribute any wealth changes mainly to expected 
distortions of pay-performance sensitivities rather than being present value effects of expected increases in 
pay levels. 
2
 For single events that triggered public outrage and, in turn, pay regulations in several countries, see Conyon 
et al. (2011). See Murphy (2013) and for a general overview of pay regulation and their consequences for pay 
arrangements. See Aboody and Kasznik (2009) for the impact of accounting and tax regulations. Yermack 
(2010) surveys the literature about voting rights. For the requirement of board independence, see the 
contradicting evidence of Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) and Guthrie, Sokolowsky, and Wan (2012). 
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Therefore, it is challenging to disentangle the effect of mandatory pay disclosures from the 
effect of concurrent reforms. 
Probably for these reasons, prior research on the subject is rare. Weisbach (2007) provides 
a critical review of Bebchuk and Fried’s (2004) claims and their reform proposals, such as 
more transparent pay disclosures. He concludes that it is an open question whether such 
reforms result in an equilibrium that is closer to the efficient contracting view. In a similar 
vein, Dew-Becker (2009) surveys the literature on the impact of pay regulation in the US. 
He concludes that there is little direct evidence on the impact of mandatory disclosures and 
highlights the importance to study the experience in other countries. 
I exploit a regulatory change in Germany to analyze the net effect of mandatory pay 
disclosures. The regulatory environment in Germany provides a compelling set-up for 
dealing with all the challenges in such an analysis. First, disclosure rules did not emerge 
gradually. Norms of privacy and confidentiality, which dominated the debate about pay 
disclosures in the US until the 1930s (see Wells (2009)), were the dominating forces for 
disclosure legislation in Germany until 2005. Firms had to disclose total compensation for 
all executives jointly, and they could hide compensation completely if the aggregated sum 
allowed any inference about the compensation of individual executives. In the first half of 
2005, firms faced a sweeping change in disclosure legislation when the German parliament 
passed a law on the “Disclosure of management board compensation” (henceforth “the 
Law”). Since 2006, firms have to disclose the amount and composition of compensation 
for each executive separately. They can stick to the old rules for a period of five years if 
shareholders vote against the new rules with a three-quarters majority at the annual general 
meeting. After five years, a new shareholder vote is required. 
Second, the Law did not affect all firms equally. Some firms were not affected because 
they voluntarily disclosed pay for individual executives in line with the new rules already 
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before enactment of the Law. These early adopters form the control group. Ex ante, the 
Law principally affected all other firms that hid pay for individual executives. Ex-post, 
however, the Law affected only the subsample of firms that finally switched from hidden 
pay before Law enactment to observable pay afterwards. The Law did not affect the 
remaining firms that could stick to hidden pay because their shareholders voted against the 
new rules. 
Third, the Law is a compelling instrument to identify any efficiency gains or losses from 
higher disclosure requirements. The Law does only require more disclosures of executive 
compensation. It does not address any other governance characteristics. 
I analyze the effect of the Law on shareholder value for a sample of 312 German firms that 
complied with the highest transparency standards of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange during 
the year before Law enactment. The analysis has two parts. In the first part, I perform an 
event study to analyze the average effect. Using a difference-in-differences approach and 
controlling for common risk factors, I find that firms that hide pay of individual executives 
before Law enactment have abnormal returns of 1.51% on event days. Event days are days 
when shareholders receive news about the Law. This finding supports the managerial 
power view that mandatory pay disclosures are good.
3
 
In the second part, I run a cross-sectional regression to analyze heterogeneity in the effect 
of the Law. If positive abnormal returns reflect efficiency gains from the Law, firms that 
finally switch from hidden pay before Law enactment to observable pay afterwards should 
have a stronger stock price reaction than firms that stick to hidden pay.
4
 Furthermore, I 
                                                 
3
 This interpretation assumes that shareholders did not price in wrong expectations about the content of the 
Law before the events. Otherwise, a positive stock price reaction may suggest that the new disclosure rules 
are bad, but investors are happy about the rules being too lax. Similarly, negative abnormal returns may 
suggest that the new disclosure rules are good, but investors are unhappy about the rules being too lax. See 
Zhang (2007) and Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) for a similar argument. 
4
 Since this analysis uses ex-post information about the disclosure policy, the regression is likely to suffer 
from an omitted variable bias and, hence, does not estimate causal effects. Shareholders must be able to 
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hypothesize that abnormal returns are decreasing in institutional ownership. Prior research 
suggests that compensation conforms to the optimal contracting view in firms with large 
blockholders and institutional investors (see, e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000), 
Hartzell and Starks (2003), Kim and Lu (2011)). I find that only firms that switch from 
hidden to observable pay have significantly positive abnormal returns. For these firms, 
abnormal returns of 2.26% are decreasing in institutional ownership. This finding is 
consistent with the managerial power view. Efficiency gains from mandatory pay 
disclosures decrease in institutional ownership because institutional investors decrease the 
power of the CEO in the bargaining process (see also Bebchuk and Fried (2004)). For 
institutional ownership of around 30%, abnormal returns become negative. This finding is 
consistent with the optimal contracting view. Pay disclosures can have unintended 
consequences and exaggerate agency problems in well-governed firms. Negative abnormal 
returns indicate that large institutional investors are able to balance off the power of the 
CEO. However, they are not able to balance off political or social forces that enter the 
bargaining table once compensation is disclosed. 
This paper contributes to two strands of literature. The first strand exploits an exogenous 
shock to existing corporate governance structures to analyze the relationship between 
corporate governance and shareholder value. In this stream of research, my paper is close 
to studies that analyze announcement effects to reforms that partly address pay disclosures. 
Lo (2003) analyzes the effect of SEC’s mandated increase in pay disclosures in 1992. In an 
event window of eight months, he finds a positive stock price reaction of 6% for firms that 
lobby more against the reform relative to firms that did not lobby. Lo carefully notes that 
other events could contribute to these results. Indeed, the SEC reform combines disclosure 
rules with reforms of the proxy access more generally. Most notably, the SEC allowed 
                                                                                                                                                    
forecast which companies do and do not switch to observable pay. The forecast may depend on other 
variables that impact stock returns. 
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shareholders to vote on non-binding proposals about CEO pay.
5
 Greenestone, Oyer, and 
Vissing-Jorgensen (2006) study the Securities Acts Amendments from 1964 that extended 
disclosure requirements to firms traded over the counter. For firms that were most affected, 
they find positive abnormal returns up to 22.1 percent during the period until law 
enactment. The disclosure requirements did not only include executive compensation. 
Firms were also required to disclose balance sheets, income statements or insider trades.
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Thus, both studies study broader reforms and do not identify the causal effect of mandatory 
increases in pay disclosures.
7
 
The second strand of literature analyzes whether compensation conforms to the managerial 
power or optimal contracting view. In this stream of research, some studies relate the 
amount and composition of compensation to the governance environment of the company. 
However, the efficiency implications from such variations are not clear. My findings 
implicitly highlight the complementary nature of the managerial power and optimal 
contracting view and give an estimate for expected efficiency gains and losses resulting 
from mandatory increases in pay disclosures.
8
 
The paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2, I present the content of the Law and identify 
events and confounding events along the political process up to enactment of the Law. 
Section 3 develops hypotheses about the expected effect of the Law on shareholder value. 
                                                 
5
 Two unpublished papers, Johnson, Nelson, and Shackell (2001) and Prevost and Wagster (1999), also study 
the wealth effects of this reform. In contrast to Lo (2003), these studies find a negative impact on shareholder 
value. Both studies include more events and use other, notably smaller, samples. 
6
 Ferrell (2007) also finds a positive stock price reaction. Battalio, Hatch, and Loughran (2011) do not find a 
significant reaction. They argue that most OTC companies voluntarily provided financial information to 
investors before the Amendments. Bushee and Leuz (2005) find a negative stock price reaction to a 
regulatory change in 1999 that companies from the OTC bulletin board have to disclose financial 
information. The 1964 Securities Act Amendments did not apply to these smaller companies. 
7
 There are several other studies about the value effect of legislative intervention. Larcker, Ormazabal, and 
Taylor (2011) study the announcement effects of pay-related proposals between 2007 and 2009. For 
announcement effects of the Say-on-Pay Bill in the US, see Cai and Walkling (2011). For announcement 
effects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, see, among others, Li, Pincus, and Rego (2008), Jain and Rezaee (2006), 
Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007), and Iliev (2010). 
8
 See Bebchuk and Fried (2004) for a discussion of many controversial pay practices. See Core, Guay, and 
Thomas (2005) for a critique of Bebchuk and Fried’s (2004) claims. 
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Section 4 describes the sample and data. I report empirical results for the average effect in 
Section 5, and for heterogeneity in the effect in Section 6. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2 Institutional background 
Germany has a two-tier board system. Executive directors are members of the management 
board and manage the day-to-day operations. Non-executive directors are members of the 
supervisory board. The supervisory board advises and monitors the management board and 
is accountable for executive compensation. German legislation requires that 50% of all 
members of the supervisory board are worker representatives when the company has more 
than 2000 employees. For firms with more than 500 and less than 2000 employees, one 
third of the board seats are reserved for worker representatives. Some of the worker 
representatives must be union representatives. The chairman of the supervisory board is a 
shareholder representative. Her vote is pivotal in case of a tie ( see Dittmann, Maug, and 
Schneider (2010) for further details). 
Until 2005, German disclosure rules allowed secretive boards to hide details of executive 
compensation. In summer 2005, the German parliament passed the Law on the “Disclosure 
of management board compensation”, which greatly increased the disclosure requirements. 
The Law provides all ingredients of an experimental setting. The disclosure requirements 
assign firms to treatment and control groups. Political milestones until Law enactment 
represent events, which define the treatment periods.
9
 
 
                                                 
9
 The single event that triggered public outrage and ultimately enactment of the Law relates to the hostile 
takeover of Mannesmann by Vodafone in 2000. Several members of the management and supervisory board 
of Mannesmann got accused of embezzlement for approving bonus and severance payments worth € 60 
million to Mannesmann’s executives. While commentators criticized the amount of payments, it was a 
snapshot in court that fueled public outrage. Joseph Ackermann, former CEO of Deutsche Bank and member 
of Mannesmann’s supervisory board, showed the victory sign while waiting for judicial proceedings. The 
Mannesmann case caused hot debates about pay practice in German board rooms in general. 
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2.1 Old versus new disclosure rules 
Table II.1 contrasts the old disclosure rules before Law enactment with the new rules 
introduced by the Law. The Law addresses pay disclosures along five dimensions: 
(1) How to disclose: Under the old rules, firms had to disclose total compensation for all 
executives jointly. If such disclosures revealed the compensation of individual executives, 
firms did not have to disclose executive compensation at all. However, the German 
Corporate Governance Code already called for more transparency.
10
 The Code 
recommended disclosing fixed compensation, short-term incentives, and long-term 
incentives for individual executives. The Law made this recommendation legally binding, 
with one exception: Firms do not have to follow the new rules if shareholders vote against 
them with a three-quarters majority at the annual meeting. Executives who hold shares are 
not allowed to vote. A positive voting outcome is binding for at most five years, and new 
votes are allowed afterwards. If shareholders vote against the new rules, firms have to 
disclose total compensation for all executives jointly.
11
 
(2) What to disclose: Under the old rules, firms had to disclose total compensation as the 
sum of salary, short-term incentives, long-term incentives, and all other benefits, such as 
insurance premiums or perquisites. The Law adds three compensation components to this 
list. Firms have to disclose separation agreements (pensions, severance pay), benefits from 
third parties, and any other compensation arrangement stated in the financial statements. 
For separation agreements, the Law does not require firms to disclose compensation levels. 
                                                 
10
 The Corporate Governance Code supplements legally binding laws with recommendations for best market 
practice. Recommendations are not binding. If companies do not comply with a recommendation, they have 
to explain the reason in an official document on their website. 
11
 The opt-out clause is essentially designed for secretive family firms (see also Conyon et al. (2011)). Critics 
called the opt-out clause “Lex Wiedeking”. Wendelin Wiedeking, former CEO of Porsche AG, was 
considered as one of the best paid managers in Germany and was well connected to Chancellor Gerhard 
Schröder. Porsche AG has a high ownership concentration with two families as the largest shareholders. 
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Firms shall only describe qualitative details and outline significant differences between 
separation agreements for executives and other employees. 
(3) How to value long-term incentives: Since 2005, International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IRFS) require firms to report fair values at grant date for equity-based 
compensation. The Law makes clear that firms have to apply these valuation principles for 
disclosures of executive compensation. In addition, firms have to account for any value 
changes that result from changing the vesting conditions.  
(4) Compensation report: Before 2006, the Code recommended that firms describe the 
compensation system on the company’s website and in the annual report. While the Law 
does not make compensation reports mandatory, it underscores their importance by 
recommending compensation descriptions in the management report.  
(5) Where to disclose: Under the old rules, firms had to disclose total compensation in the 
notes of the financial statements. The Code also recommended that firms disclosed 
compensation for individual executives in the notes. The Law explicitly allows firms to 
make these disclosures as part of the compensation report. Such a disclosure policy was 
already common market practice among early adopters that followed the Code 
recommendation and disclosed pay for individual executives before enactment of the Law. 
 
The Law applies to all listed German firms for fiscal years after 2005. It does not apply to 
listed firms with a foreign headquarter, to firms traded over the counter, and to listed firms 
that are a mixture of a stock corporation and a limited partnership.
12
 
The sharp increase in disclosure requirements comes from the new rules of how to disclose 
executive compensation. Ex ante, the Law principally treats all listed German firms that 
hid the amount and composition of pay for individual executives before enactment of the 
                                                 
12
 Only a few German companies adopt such a legal form. In these companies, one partner is unlimited liable 
for the company’s debt. 
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Law (i.e. in fiscal year 2004). Ex-post, however, the Law does effectively not treat, at least 
for five years, the subsample of firms whose shareholders vote against the new rules. These 
firms can stick to hidden pay. The Law effectively treats the remaining firms that hid pay 
for individual executives before enactment of the Law and have to make pay observable 
afterwards. 
 
2.2 Events 
The left column of Table II.2 shows the timeline of events that are related to enactment of 
the Law. For the identification of events I compile an initial list of legal documents and 
press articles. For legal documents I search the websites of the Department of Justice and 
of the German parliament. For press articles I search LexisNexis and Factiva with all 
permutations of “Vergütung” (compensation), “Vorstand” (management board), and 
“Offenlegung” (disclosure). From the initial list of legal documents, I extract all documents 
that provide news about the content of the Law. The documents are the first draft bill, 
which the Attorney General presented on March 31, 2005, the revised draft bill, which the 
government presented on May 18, 2005, and the revised and final draft bill, which the 
German parliament approved on June 30, 2005. I supplement the three bills with press 
articles that report any content of a bill before the official presentation. Shareholders 
received news about Attorney General’s draft bill on March 11 and about the final draft 
bill on June 27. Finally, I add days when politicians officially debated about the Law. From 
political debates, investors may sense the disposition across political parties for bill 
revisions, and they may revise their probability estimates for Law enactment. Two official 
14 
 
debates took place on June 03 and on June 20. In total I identify seven events until 
enactment of the Law:
13
 
 
(1) Attorney General’s press conference: On March 11, the Attorney General presented the 
main content of her upcoming draft bill in a press conference. She specified how to 
disclose executive compensation and suggested that firms disclose any other compensation 
designs (“what to disclose”). 
(2) Attorney General’s draft bill: Three weeks later, on March 31, she presented the 
official bill. 
(3) Government’s draft bill: On May 18, the government presented a revised version of 
Attorney General’s bill. The government decided that executives who hold shares are not 
allowed to vote against the new disclosure rules. In addition, the government specified how 
to value long-term incentives, recommended a compensation report, and recommended 
where to disclose executive compensation. 
(4) Draft bill in parliament: On June 3, politicians discussed government’s bill in 
parliament. While a majority of politicians agreed on the bill content in general, some 
politicians called for experts to discuss details. 
(5) Discussion with experts: On June 20, the press reported that the discussion with experts 
had settled final disputes. 
(6) Final draft bill: On June 27, the press reported final revisions to government’s bill. The 
revisions specified what to disclose (separation agreements and benefits from third parties). 
(7) Vote in parliament: On June 30, 2005, the German parliament approved the final draft 
bill. 
 
                                                 
13
 If shareholders received news on a non-trading day, I define the next trading day as the event day.  
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2.3 Confounding macroeconomic and political events 
The seven events related to the Law may coincide with other events relevant for the pricing 
of stocks. The middle and the right column of Table II.2 show macroeconomic events and 
ex-post interpretations of the market development for each event day. I collect news about 
macroeconomic events from the Handelsblatt (the largest daily newspaper about business 
and finance news in Germany). Its section “Markets Today” summarizes upcoming events 
during the business day. Interpretations of developments in the stock market are from the 
Wall Street Journal Europe. Its section “European Stocks” summarizes and interprets the 
development of European stock markets on the prior trading day. As shown in Table II.2, 
shareholders received macroeconomic news such as news about consumer prices, labor 
market data, and broader economic indicators on each event day. The ex-post 
interpretations suggest that stock prices reacted to macroeconomic news. 
Besides these daily confounding events, the four events in June occur against a background 
of a broader political change, which has an indirect effect on the Law. Until the first half of 
2005, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder from the social-democratic party had promoted many 
economic reforms with liberal elements, which were highly controversial among social-
democratic representatives in parliament. Controversies peaked on May 22, when the 
social-democratic party lost a crucial regional election. One day later, Schröder announced 
that he sought early parliamentary elections. He paved the way for early elections when he 
lost a vote of confidence in parliament on July 1.
14
 Throughout June, commentators 
explained the robust market development and the positive market sentiment in Germany 
with the hope for early elections. Early elections increased the likelihood for a Christian-
democratic government, which is considered to be more business-friendly than the social-
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 Germany has a parliamentary system. The parliament appoints and can dismiss, by a vote of no confidence, 
the chancellor. 
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democratic party. After the elections in autumn, Christian-democrat Angela Merkel 
became chancellor. 
The indirect effect on the Law comes from Schröder’s call for a vote of confidence. The 
vote, scheduled on July 1, shortened the time frame for parliamentary procedures and, thus, 
made enactment of the Law uncertain. On the first three event days in June, articles about 
the Law speculated about whether the Law could be passed. The uncertainty was finally 
resolved when parliament approved the final draft bill on June 30, which is one day before 
parliament withdrew confidence from Chancellor Schröder. 
 
3 Hypothesis development 
3.1 Public outrage and executive compensation 
Disclosures of executive compensation make CEO pay observable not only for 
shareholders, but also for the general public with its distinct political and social forces. 
These forces get at least an indirect voice at the bargaining table because the board can 
bear financial and non-financial costs when observed compensation outrages outsiders (see 
Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Bebchuk and Fried (2004)). 
An example is negative press coverage. Each year after the proxy season, some 
commentators create an image of “greedy” CEOs by providing stories about huge payouts 
to CEOs (see Murphy (1996) and Core, Guay, and Larcker (2008)). Such embarrassments 
are non-financial costs for CEOs in their business and private communities (see Dyck and 
Zingales (2002)). Negative media coverage can also result in financial costs when it 
stimulates market forces. An example is reputational harm in the market for decision 
control (see Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983)). Outrage may depreciate human 
capital of directors in their role as control experts. Two studies show that the market for 
decision control punishes directors for approving compensation that stimulates outrage. 
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Ertimur, Ferri, and Maber (2012) find that directors are more likely to lose their board 
seats when they have served on compensation committees of firms that announce 
investigations in option backdating. Wernicke (2014) finds directors are more likely to lose 
their board seats when the media criticizes executive compensation in their firms. Such 
costs can explain associations between executive compensation and public outrage. 
Kuhnen and Niessen (2012) find that boards reduce option grants in response to negative 
press coverage of CEO pay. The reductions are increasing in the board’s reputational 
concerns. It is not clear, however, whether public outrage about executive compensation is 
justified and, hence, whether mandatory disclosures of executive compensation are good or 
bad.  
 
3.2 Disclosure of executive compensation is good 
Bebchuk and Fried (2004) argue that executive compensation is by and large inefficient. 
Under their managerial power view, the CEO can exert considerable power over directors, 
and she does so in the bargaining process to extract rents at the expense of shareholders. 
Directors do not bargain with the CEO in the best interest of shareholders because they 
have financial, psychological, and social motives to accept the compensation that the CEO 
proposes for herself.
15
 
In such a bargaining environment, outrage constrains what the CEO proposes and what 
directors will accept. To minimize outrage costs, the CEO tries to camouflage the amount 
of pay she extracts. Since the CEO chooses compensation forms for their camouflage value 
and not for their incentive effects, the compensation designs are likely to be inefficient. 
Thus, the managerial power view predicts that firms that do not voluntarily disclose 
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 I am agnostic about whether worker representatives are more or less captive than shareholder 
representatives. The general debate on whether worker representation on the board is efficient also remains 
inconclusive. See Kim, Maug, and Schneider (2014) for a brief summary of the main arguments for and 
against worker representation on the board. 
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compensation have inefficient compensation designs. Mandatory pay disclosures are good 
because they make the outrage constraint work. The CEO and the directors will agree on 
more efficient compensation in the first place. In addition, pay disclosures make 
complaints about inefficient compensation more likely since shareholders are better able to 
judge whether directors fulfill their duty and design compensation packages in the best 
interest of shareholders. Park, Nelson, and Huson (2001) show that Canadian firms 
increased pay-performance sensitivities after 1993 when stricter disclosure requirements 
for executive compensation were implemented. Similar to the new rules in Germany, 
Canadian firms had to switch from aggregated disclosures of total compensation to 
disclosures of compensation components for individual executives. 
More efficient compensation reduce agency costs between the CEO and shareholders 
(Jensen and Meckling (1976)). Bebchuk and Fried (2004) speculate that gains from a 
stronger incentive alignment far exceed any gains from reductions in pay levels. There is 
empirical evidence that the adoption of incentive plans is associated with positive changes 
in shareholder value.
16
 Thus, the managerial power view predicts that the stock price 
reaction to enactment of the Law is positive for firms that hide pay of individual 
executives: 
 
Hypothesis 1A: On event days, firms that hide pay before enactment of the Law have 
positive abnormal returns. 
 
This hypothesis describes an average effect across firms that do and do not switch from 
hidden pay before enactment of the Law to observable pay afterwards. However, firms can 
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 See DeFusco, Johnson, and Zorn (1990) and Kato et al. (2005) for the positive effect of stock option plans. 
See Core and Larcker (2002) for share ownership guidelines. See Morgan and Poulsen (2001) for manager-
sponsored proposals of compensation plans. 
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stick to hidden pay and, hence, do not enter treatment when their shareholders vote against 
the new rules. Thus, I predict that the effect of the Law is heterogeneous across firms with 
hidden pay: 
 
Hypothesis 2A: On event days, firms that hide pay before enactment of the Law and make 
pay observable afterwards have positive abnormal returns. Firms that stick to hidden pay 
are not affected. 
 
This hypothesis relies on two assumptions. First, investors are able to forecast whether 
shareholders vote against the new rules. Second, the disclosure policy is stable such that 
the assignment of firms to groups that do and do not switch to observable pay is likely to 
hold in the long-run.
17
 
Under the managerial power view, the opt-out clause is not necessarily a bad tool because 
the CEO does not have much power in firms with a controlling shareholder. The 
controlling shareholder may just vote against pay disclosures to protect the privacy of the 
CEO. For this reason, Bebchuk and Fried (2004) assume the Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
type of company with dispersed ownership for the most part of their discussion.
18
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 This assumption is not unreasonable. For a random subsample of companies from both groups, I find that 
the disclosure policy in the first year after Law enactment (i.e.in 2006) is almost a perfect predictor for the 
disclosure policy in later years. 
18
 An alternative view is that the CEO has more power because she is affiliated with the controlling 
shareholder. The controlling shareholder may decide against pay disclosures because she colludes with the 
CEO at the expense of minority shareholders. However, Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker (2002) argue that the 
CEO does not have strong incentives to extract rents through compensation in this situation. The controlling 
shareholder and the CEO have access to larger sources of rent extraction such as self-dealing. They may 
agree on reasonable pay levels to pretend to be loyal to minority shareholders. 
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3.3 Disclosure of executive compensation is bad 
It is not clear that existing compensation practice results in inefficient compensation 
designs. Under the optimal contracting view, directors bargain with the CEO in the best 
interest of shareholders. The resulting compensation design is efficient given any 
restrictions in the contracting environment.
19
 
In such a bargaining environment, outrage distorts efficient compensation. Jensen and 
Murphy (1990) argue that political forces target firms with high payout levels. To 
minimize outrage costs, boards truncate the upper tail of the payout distribution, and then, 
in equilibrium, also the lower tail. Jensen and Murphy (1990) relate the decline in pay-
performance sensitivities from the 1930s to the 1980s to the steady increase in disclosure 
requirements, which increased the pressure of political forces.
20
 
The board may also follow public opinion when approving or disapproving compensation 
components. Since boards from different firms are subject to the same norms and social 
evaluations, pay disclosures can result in a “one size fits all” compensation design. Such 
practice can be particularly harmful, on average, when all boards design contracts in line 
with common social evaluations irrespective of the individual contracting environment. 
Kuhnen and Niessen’s (2012) finding that boards reduce option grants in response to 
negative press coverage of CEO pay actually results in lower pay-performance 
sensitivities. 
To mitigate distortions from political and social forces, boards hide efficient compensation 
designs. Mandatory pay disclosures are bad because they invite such forces to the 
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 See Edmans and Gabaix (2009) for an overview of theoretical work that reconciles many features of 
controversial pay practices within the optimal contracting framework. 
20
 I am agnostic about whether worker representation on the board mitigates or strengthens the influence of 
political forces once pay is disclosed. Worker representation may shield companies from public outrage if 
worker representatives exert pressure to reduce pay-performance sensitivities before pay is disclosed. 
However, once pay is disclosed, public outrage may particularly motivate worker representatives to reduce 
wage differentials between the CEO and employees. 
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bargaining table. Thus, the optimal contracting view predicts that the stock price reaction is 
negative for firms that hide pay of individual executives:  
 
Hypothesis 1B: On event days, firms that hide pay before enactment of the Law have 
negative abnormal returns. 
Hypothesis 2B: On event days, firms that hide pay before enactment of the Law and have 
to make pay observable afterwards have negative abnormal returns. Firms that stick to 
hidden pay are not affected. 
 
Under the optimal contracting view, the opt-out clause is a good tool. However, the 
approval threshold of a three quarters majority creates a free-rider problem. While the Law 
allows shareholders to vote against the new rules, the high approval threshold effectively 
gives only firms with a high ownership concentration the opportunity to stick to hidden 
pay. 
 
3.4 The role of institutional investors 
Institutional investors actively monitor firms and they are more effective monitors the 
more shares they hold (see, e.g., Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Gillan and Starks (2007)). 
Institutional investors care strongly about executive compensation (see McCahery, 
Sautner, and Starks (2010)), and they use their influence to assure more efficient 
compensation designs. Several studies find that institutional investors lower CEO pay and 
increase pay-performance sensitivities (see David, Kochhar, and Levitas (1998), Bertrand 
and Mullainathan (2000), Hartzell and Starks (2003), and Brav et al. (2008)). These 
findings suggest that the managerial power view and the optimal contracting view 
complement each other. If institutional ownership is low, compensation practice conforms 
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to the managerial power view. If institutional ownership is high, compensation practice 
conforms to the optimal contracting view.  
Institutional ownership can be interpreted as an inverse proxy for CEO power (see 
Bebchuk and Fried (2004)). Thus, mandatory pay disclosures have a positive effect on 
firms that have no institutional shareholders. The positive effect should decrease in 
institutional ownership. As long as the overall effect remains positive, CEOs have some 
undue influence at the bargaining table consistent with the managerial power view. Under 
the optimal contracting view, the overall effect becomes negative because institutional 
investors are not able to balance off the negative influence of political and social forces: 
 
Hypothesis 3A: On event days, firms that hide pay before enactment of the Law and make 
pay observable afterwards have positive abnormal returns, which are decreasing in 
institutional ownership. The overall effect is not negative.  
Hypothesis 3B: On event days, firms that hide pay before enactment of the Law and make 
pay observable afterwards have negative abnormal returns when institutional ownership is 
large. 
 
These hypotheses assume that institutional investors have private access to compensation 
data through informal channels and negotiate with firms behind the scenes. There is 
empirical evidence for both. Sautner and Weber (2011) use compensation data from a large 
institutional investor in their study of stock option designs around Europe. They point out 
that this investor, one of the largest in Germany, could exert considerable power to get 
details of stock option plans granted in 2003. These data seem even more detailed than 
what firms have to disclose under the new Law. Becht et al. (2010) study the monitoring 
activities of Hermes, a U.K. pension fund. The fund managers rely mainly on private 
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negotiations behind the scenes. For example, they meet the chairmen of compensation 
committees to require changes in compensation designs. 
 
4 Sample and data  
The sample consists of 312 firms. I identify 374 firms, which were included in the Prime 
All Share index at some time between August 2004 and July 2005. The Prime All Share 
index tracks the performance of firms that comply with the highest transparency 
requirements of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange.
21
 The time period from August 2004 to July 
2005 forms the estimation period of 256 trading days. From this initial sample, I exclude 
(1) nine firms, which do not have common shares outstanding, (2) one company with 
missing stock prices in Compustat Global, (3) 12 firms whose stock prices trade below one 
Euro (penny stocks), and (4) 40 firms, which do not have to comply with the new 
disclosure rules: 35 firms have a foreign headquarter and five firms are a mixture of a stock 
corporation and a limited partnership. 
I exclude penny stocks because they are less likely to incorporate market information 
efficiently. Penny stocks tend to have low liquidity and low investor attention (see, e.g., 
Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007)).
22
 I do not use firms, which do not have to comply 
with the Law, as additional control group because the majority of these firms have a 
foreign headquarter. Foreign firms are not comparable to local firms in event studies 
because any confounding macroeconomic and political news, such as the hope for new 
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 These requirements follow international practice and are beyond legislative requirements. For example, 
companies have to provide quarterly reports and ad-hoc announcements in English, and they have to invite 
analysts to a conference call at least once a year. 
22
 The Federal Financial Supervisory Authority in Germany routinely cautions against manipulations of 
penny stocks. 
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elections in Germany, are likely to affect foreign firms differently than their local 
counterparts.
23
 
For the remaining 312 firms, I collect information on the disclosure policy from annual 
reports for fiscal years 2004 and 2006. I use this information to assign firms to treatment 
and control groups in two steps. In the first step, the assignment relies only on information 
from 2004 and, hence, on ex-ante information that was available to shareholders at the time 
of Law enactment. Ex-ante, the Law affects all firms that hide pay in 2004. In the second 
step, I refine this assignment rule using information about the disclosure policy in 2006, 
which is the first year under the new disclosure rules. Based on this ex-post information, I 
can identify firms that do actually not enter treatment because their shareholders vote 
against the new rules. 
Table II.3 shows the disclosure policy of the sample firms in 2004 and 2006. The 
disclosure policy in 2006 is not available for nine firms, which were acquired, and for four 
firms, which filed for bankruptcy. The dotted line separates treated firms from control 
firms according to the ex-ante assignment. Ex ante, the Law assigns 214 firms (69%) to the 
treatment group and 98 firms (31%) to the control group. The treatment group includes all 
firms, which hide pay for individual executives in 2004: six firms do not disclose any 
compensation; 201 firms disclose total compensation for all executives jointly; seven firms 
disclose only CEO compensation separately. The control group includes 98 early adopters, 
which voluntarily disclose pay for individual executives already in 2004. 
The shaded area highlights firms that are effectively treated according to the ex-post 
assignment. Among the 214 firms with hidden pay in 2004, the Law does effectively treat 
133 firms. These firms switch from hidden pay in 2004 to observable pay in 2006. The 
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 Leuz (2007) makes a similar point in his discussing of Zhang’s (2007) paper about the net effects of SOX. 
Zhang (2007) analyzes the stock price reaction to the enactment of SOX. Her control group includes foreign 
companies. 
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Law does effectively not treat the remaining 72 firms that stick to hidden pay in 2006. 
Note that from the early adopters, only shareholders of three firms vote against the new 
rules. 
I use several sources to compile the final data set. Fama-French industry groups come from 
Kenneth French’s website, daily stock returns and company financials from Compustat 
Global, data on ownership structure from Hoppenstedt company profiles (a periodical 
comparable to Moody’s manuals), data on executive compensation from 2004 annual 
reports, returns on the Prime All Share index from Datastream, and daily risk factors for 
Germany from Richard Stehle’s website.24 
Table II.4 reports descriptive statistics for the sample. Panel A shows the distribution of 
firms across Fama-French 12 industry groups. While the sample covers a broad range of 
economic activities, two industries dominate. Almost one third of the sample firms operate 
in the business equipment industry and 16% operate in the manufacturing industry. The 
second and the third column show that the industry distribution is quite similar between 
early adopters and firms with hidden pay in 2004. Two exceptions are the finance and 
manufacturing industries. Finance firms tend to be early adopters, while manufacturing 
firms tend to hide pay. The right two columns show the industry distribution across firms 
with hidden pay in 2004 that do and do not switch to observable pay in 2006. The industry 
distribution is quite similar. One exception is healthcare, medical equipment, and drugs. 
Firms from this industry tend to make pay observable in 2006. 
Panel B shows summary statistics for firm characteristics, executive compensation, stock 
returns, and risk factors. The sample firms have mean (median) market capitalization of € 
2.35 billion (€ 0.13 billion) between August 2004 and July 2005. Market capitalization 
varies considerably. On the lower tail, 5% of the observations fall below a market 
                                                 
24
 Risk factors are available at http://www.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/professuren/bwl/bb/data/fama-french-factors-
germany. 
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capitalization of € 13 million. On the upper tail, 5% of the observations are above € 12 
billion. The sample firms have mean (median) book-to-market of 0.69 (0.57). I calculate 
book-to-market as the book value of common equity for the last fiscal year divided by 
daily market capitalization. The calculation excludes observations with a negative book 
value. 
To capture the influence of institutional investors, I construct the variable Institutional 
ownership, which is the sum of shares owned by independent investment firms (hedge 
funds, private equity firms, general asset management firms) and wealthy private investors. 
I do not add shareholdings of banks. Banks may have financial motives to collude with the 
CEO, and their shareholdings do not represent their actual voting power. Dittmann, Maug, 
and Schneider (2010) study the role of bankers on German boards. They find that bankers 
promote their own business and do not monitor the CEO. They also point out that banks’ 
own shareholdings are a noisy proxy for their actual voting power since German law 
allows banks to vote the shares of their customers. Institutional investors have mean 
(median) shareholdings of 8% (0%). Institutional investors are present in 123 firms and 
have mean (median) shareholdings of 21% (14%) in these firms.  
To gain some insight into compensation levels, I collect compensation data from 2004 
annual reports. For firms that hide pay for individual executives in 2004 I collect data on 
the number of executives that served throughout the year to get an estimate for average 
total compensation per executive. The management board receives mean (median) total 
compensation of € 2.90 million (€ 1.14 million) in fiscal year 2004. The mean (median) 
total compensation per executive amounts to € 0.66 million (€ 0.39 million). The number 
of observations is 306 because six firms do not disclose executive compensation for fiscal 
year 2004. 
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Excess returns are daily stock returns minus the risk-free rate. The risk-free rate is derived 
from the one-month money market rate. During the estimation period, firms have mean 
(median) excess returns of 0.15% (-0.01%). Risk factors are the Fama and French (1993) 
factors RMRF, SMB, and HML, and the Carhart (1997) factor WML. RMRF is the market 
factor and measures return differences between the market portfolio and the risk-free rate, 
SMB is the size factor and measures return differences between small stocks and big 
stocks, HML is the book-to-market factor and measures return differences between high 
and low book-to-market stocks, and WML is the momentum factor and measures return 
differences between past winners and past losers. Mean and median factor returns are 
slightly positive except for SMB. Mean factor returns are estimates of daily risk premiums. 
Simple t-tests show that the risk premiums are significantly positive except for SMB, 
which is not significantly different from zero.
25
 
The left two columns of Panel C show mean values for early adopters and firms with 
hidden pay in 2004. Firms with hidden pay are smaller and have higher book-to-market. 
Higher book-to-market suggests that investors either value these firms with a discount or 
forecast lower growth opportunities for them. Institutional investors have mean 
shareholdings of around 8% in both subsamples. The management board receives 
significantly lower compensation in firms that hide pay for individual executives. Although 
the two subsamples differ in size and book-to-market, mean excess returns are similar 
during the estimation period. On event days, however, firms with hidden pay outperform 
early adopters. Firms with hidden pay have mean excess returns of 0.38% while early 
adopters have mean excess returns of 0.16%. A simple t-test suggests that the return 
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 Richard Stehle provides three data sets of daily risk factors. One data set includes only stocks that are 
traded on markets regulated by federal law (“top segment”). The other two data sets additionally include 
stocks that are traded on markets regulated by exchanges. See Brückner et al. (2014) for details. I use the risk 
factors calculated from the top segment. The estimation results are virtually identical for the other two data 
sets. 
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difference is statistically significant at the 10% level. This result provides preliminary 
evidence that disclosure of executive compensation is good. 
The right two columns of Panel C show mean values for firms with hidden pay in 2004 
that do and do not switch to observable pay in 2006. Firms that switch to observable pay 
are larger and have higher book-to-market. Mean institutional ownership and mean excess 
returns are similar between the subsamples.
26
 Firms that switch to observable pay have 
mean excess returns of 0.46% on event days while firms that stick to hidden pay have 
mean excess returns of 0.30%. This difference is not statistically significant. 
Finally, I compare excess returns on event days for the subsamples in the right two 
columns with excess returns of early adopters in the left column. Firms that do and do not 
switch to observable pay in 2006 have higher excess returns than early adopters, on 
average. Results from t-tests suggest that the difference is statistically significant only for 
firms that switch to observable pay. This result provides additional evidence that disclosure 
of executive compensation is good, and that firms with effective treatment benefit most. 
 
5 Average effect of the Law on shareholder value 
5.1 Methodology 
To test whether disclosure of executive compensation is good or bad, I perform an event 
study for early adopters and firms that hide pay in 2004. The event study measures the 
average effect of the Law on shareholder value because the treatment group consists of all 
firms with hidden pay in fiscal year 2004, no matter whether they switch to observable pay 
afterwards (Hypothesis 1A versus 1B). For the identification of the average effect, I 
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 Note that the subsamples have lower mean values for institutional ownership and higher mean values for 
excess returns than the respective group means in column 2. The reason is that the mean values in column 2 
include all companies with hidden pay in 2004 while the mean values in the last two columns exclude 
companies for which data on the disclosure policy are not available in 2006. 
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estimate difference-in-differences (diff-in-diff) in excess returns by adding dummy 
variables to Carhart’s (1997) four factor model: 
 
Excess returni,t = α  + β1 × Hidden payi + β2 × All eventst 
+ β3 × Hidden payi × All eventst 
+ β4 × RMRFt + β5 × SMBt + β6 × HMLt + β7 × WMLt + εi,t  (II.1) 
 
The four factor model attributes the daily Excess returni,t to the three Fama and French 
(1993) factors RMRFt, SMBt, and HMLt, and to Carhart’s (1997) momentum factor WMLt. 
The sample period is from August 2004 to July 2005. The dummy variables Hidden payi, 
All eventst, and the interaction term Hidden payi times All eventst establish the diff-in-diff 
approach. Hidden payi equals one if company i hides pay for individual executives in 2004. 
This dummy controls for time-invariant differences between firms with hidden pay and 
early adopters, such as differences in governance characteristics that may affect excess 
returns (see Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003)). All eventst equals one on the seven days 
when investors receive news about the Law. This dummy controls for confounding 
macroeconomic and political events that affect stock prices from both subsamples and are 
not fully captured by the market factor RMRFt.
27
 The interaction term Hidden payi times 
All eventst is the main variable of interest. Its coefficient β3 is the diff-in-diff estimate and 
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 This interpretation assumes that the Law does not create spill-over effects on early adopters, or that any 
spill-over effects average out. Positive spill-over effects may arise if companies with hidden pay create a 
negative externality in the competition for managerial talent before Law enactment. For example, companies 
with hidden pay may drive up the price for managerial talent if they allow the CEO to extract rents. Negative 
spill-over effects may arise if mandatory disclosures yield more efficient compensation designs in companies 
with hidden pay. Efficiency gains may be detrimental for early adopters. For example, companies that have 
to switch from hidden to observable pay may drive up competition in the product market if their CEOs are 
better incentivized after Law enactment. 
Positive spill-over effects on well-governed companies also arise in models, in which companies with good 
and poor corporate governance co-exist (see Acharya and Volpin (2010) and Dicks (2012)). Negative spill-
over effects do not arise in these models because corporate governance and incentive pay are substitutes. 
Poorly governed companies grant their CEOs higher incentive pay. In contrast, the managerial power view 
assumes that CEOs grants themselves lower incentive pay. 
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measures the average abnormal return for firms with hidden pay. The average abnormal 
return is the difference in excess returns between firms with hidden pay and early adopters 
on event days relative to non-event days. If β3 is positive, disclosure is good (Hypothesis 
1A). If β3 is negative, disclosure is bad (Hypothesis 1B). I calculate cumulative abnormal 
returns as 7 × β3 (number of event days times average abnormal return) to measure the 
average effect of the Law on shareholder value. 
To draw statistical inference, I perform two tests. The first test is the common two sided t-
test that β3 differs from zero. For this test, I cluster standard errors by day and company 
(see Petersen (2009)). Standard errors clustered by day allow for cross-sectional correlation 
of contemporaneous residuals. Standard errors clustered by company allow for serial 
correlation of residuals. The second test is a one-sided test that a positive estimate of β3 is 
higher or a negative estimate of β3 is lower than the average diff-in-diff estimate on non-
event days. Under the null of no effect of the Law, β3 comes from the same distribution as 
any diff-in-diff estimate on non-event days. Thus, if β3 measures the positive (negative) 
effect of the Law, it should be significantly higher (lower) than the average diff-in-diff 
estimate on non-event days. I assess the significance of β3 with a bootstrap p-value. I run 
the regression above 5000 times with placebo event dummies instead of the true event 
dummy and save the resulting diff-in-diff estimate. Each time, I randomly draw seven non-
event days from the estimation period to recalculate the placebo event dummy. The 
bootstrap p-value represents the fraction of the 5000 diff-in-diff estimates that are higher 
than β3 if β3 is positive, or that are lower than β3 if β3 is negative. Since I compare the diff-
in-diff estimate on event days with diff-in-diff estimates on non-event days, this test is a 
variant of a difference-in-difference-in-differences (diff-in-diff-in-diff) approach.
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 Thus, my motivation for bootstrap differs from prior work. Prior work motivates bootstrap to allow for 
serial correlation (see, e.g., Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004)) or cross-sectional correlation (see, 
e.g., Black and Kim (2012)) in diff-in-diff regressions with a low number of clusters. A low number of 
31 
 
The All events dummy is the sum of seven event dummies, each of which equals one on 
one event day. I re-estimate the regression with a vector of seven event dummies instead of 
the aggregated All events dummy to analyze whether certain events drive the overall effect. 
The seven diff-in-diff estimates indicate the abnormal return on each event day separately. 
Diff-in-diff estimates identify the average effect of the Law on shareholder value only if 
excess returns from the two subsamples follow parallel trends (see, e.g., Angrist and 
Pischke (2009)). To check for global trends, I graph trend lines for excess returns on the 
portfolio of firms with hidden pay and on the portfolio of early adopters. To check for local 
trends, I graph diff-in-diff estimates for event windows around each event day. If diff-in-
diff estimates on event days are not part of a local trend, they are local maxima or local 
minima. This identification strategy allows for stock price run-ups and post-announcement 
drifts as long as they are smaller in magnitude than the stock price reaction on the event 
day itself. Such a graphical identification, however, fails if an event coincides with the 
beginning or end of a trend. I therefore perform a more formal test that diff-in-diff 
estimates for pre-event and post-event periods are equal to zero. This test assumes that 
there are no price-run ups or post-announcement drifts related to an event. 
 
5.2 Results 
Table II.5 shows coefficient estimates in percentage terms from the regression with the All 
events dummy. The estimates suggest that disclosure of executive compensation is good. 
The interaction term, Hidden pay times All events, has a coefficient of 0.2152%, which is 
statistically significant at the 10% level. The p-value of the t-statistic is 5.02% and the 
bootstrap p-value, presented at the bottom, is 7.5%. The coefficient estimate suggests that 
                                                                                                                                                    
clusters cause problems since clustered standard errors rely on asymptotic theory. As a rule of thumb, 
consistent estimates require around 50 clusters (see, e.g., Angrist and Pischke (2009)). My panel consists of 
256 days and 312 companies. 
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firms with hidden pay have mean abnormal returns of 0.2152% per day when shareholders 
receive news about the Law. The cumulative abnormal return of 1.51% (7 times 0.2152%) 
implies that the average company with hidden pay experiences an increase in shareholder 
value of around € 17.5 million (1.51% times € 1.16 billion) on event days. The increase in 
value seems small. However, it is an estimate across firms that are and are not effectively 
treated. The stock price reaction reflects expected gains multiplied by both the probability 
that firms indeed switch to observable pay after Law enactment and, conditional on 
disclosure, that these firms adjust executive compensation. This interpretation indicates 
that expected gains cannot come from expected decreases in pay levels alone. The average 
company that hides pay for individual executives pays the management board an 
aggregated amount of € 2.33 million. Assuming a discount rate of 10%, the average 
company would have to decrease total compensation by around 75% to save € 17.5 
million.
29
 The stock price reaction is more consistent with Bebchuk and Fried’s (2004) 
claim that gains mainly come from a better incentive alignment and not from decreases in 
pay levels. 
The dummy variables All events and Hidden pay have coefficient estimates close to zero 
and are not statistically significant at conventional levels. For the All events dummy, this 
estimate suggests that early adopters do not experience significant stock price reactions on 
event days. Confounding events do not play a significant role. For the Hidden pay dummy, 
the estimate suggests that any time-invariant differences between the subsamples do not 
affect excess returns during the estimation period. The disclosure policy does not proxy for 
any omitted risk factors. 
Two of the four risk factors have a significant association with excess returns. The market 
factor RMRF has a coefficient estimate close to one and the size factor SMB has a 
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 75% times € 2.33 million divided by 0.1 equals € 17.5 million. 
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coefficient estimate of 40%, both of which are statistically significant at the 1% level. The 
book-to-market factor HML and the momentum factor WML are not significantly different 
from zero.  
Table II.6 shows coefficient estimates in percentage terms from the regression with 
individual event dummies. The table omits coefficient estimates and t-statistics for the 
Hidden pay dummy and the risk factors. These estimates are virtually identical to those 
presented in Table II.5. The left column shows coefficient estimates for event dummies 
interacted with the Hidden pay dummy. The estimates suggest that no single event drives 
the average effect of the Law on shareholder value. Six of the seven interaction dummies 
have a positive coefficient. Firms with hidden pay have positive abnormal returns of 0.43% 
on the day, when the Attorney General details plans for a draft bill in a press conference 
(March 11); of 0.51% on the day, when the Attorney General presents her bill (March 31); 
of 0.05% on the day, when the draft bill is first discussed in parliament (June 3); of 0.16% 
on the day, when politicians resolve final issues in discussions with experts (June 20); of 
0.30% on the day, when revisions to the draft bill get public (June 27); and of 0.40% on the 
day, when parliament approves the final draft bill (June 30). Firms with hidden pay have 
negative abnormal returns of -0.32% on the day, when shareholders receive news about 
government’s draft bill (May 18). Six of the seven abnormal returns have t-statistics, which 
are significant at the 1% level. However, single event dummies seem to produce quite 
noisy estimates. If the estimates are compared to the distribution of coefficients from non-
event days, only the abnormal return on March 31 remains statistically significant. The 
bootstrap p-value indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.  
The bottom of Table II.6 shows results from a Wald test that the sum of the coefficient 
estimates equals zero. The sum of 1.51% is the cumulative abnormal return and identical to 
the estimate derived from the aggregated All Events dummy. The cumulative abnormal 
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return has an F-statistic significant at the 1% level, and a bootstrap p-value significant at 
the 10% level.  
The right column of Table II.6 presents coefficient estimates for the event dummies. The 
estimates confirm the prior conclusion that confounding events do not play an important 
role, on average. While five coefficient estimates have t-statistics significant at the 5% 
level or better, only the coefficient estimate for June 03 has a bootstrap p-value, which is 
significant at conventional levels (4.40%). On June 03, early adopters experience a 
significant stock price increase of 0.62%. The Wald test, presented at the bottom of Table 
II.6, confirms that the sum of the coefficient estimates is close to zero and that both the F-
statistic and the bootstrap p-value are not significant.  
To check for local trends, Figure II.1 shows abnormal returns around each event day. 
Abnormal returns are coefficient estimates for interactions of pre-event dummies, event 
dummies, and post-event dummies with the Hidden pay dummy. Pre-event and post-event 
dummies are equal to one on five days before and after an event, except for the event 
windows between June 20 and June 27 (four days) and between June 27 and June 30 (two 
days). Abnormal returns on event days are similar to the estimates in the left column of 
Table II.6. For the first four events, the graphical pattern and the results from t-tests 
suggest that there are no local trends. For events on March 11 and March 31, abnormal 
returns are local maxima. For events on May 18 and June 3, abnormal returns are local 
minima. Abnormal returns in pre-event and post-event periods around the first four events 
are close to zero with t-statistics, which are not statistically significant at conventional 
levels.
30
 
For the last three events, the pattern is less clear. Abnormal returns are increasing from 
June 20 to June 27, are slightly lower between June 27 and June 30, and finally peak on 
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 The t-statistics are available from the author upon request. 
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June 30. On days between the event days, firms with hidden pay have abnormal returns of 
0.21% per day with t-statistics significant at the 5% level or better. The graphical pattern 
and the results from the t-tests are consistent with a local trend. However, the increase in 
abnormal returns could also reflect stock price run-ups related to enactment of the Law. 
Politicians resolved uncertainty about enactment of the Law during the last ten days in 
June, when they settled final disputes about the content of the Law. Moreover, the upward 
pattern suddenly ends on June 30. This is the day, when parliament approved the draft bill, 
and it is just one day before parliament gave Chancellor Schröder a vote of no confidence. 
Ultimately, it remains an open question whether the event on June 30 coincides with the 
end of a local trend unrelated to the Law or whether the upcoming enactment of the Law 
caused the upward pattern. Estimates from cross-sectional regressions below shed some 
light on the question which scenario is more plausible. 
To check for global trends, Figure II.2 shows trend lines for portfolio excess returns of the 
two subsamples. Since the trend lines are virtually identical, Figure II.2 does not indicate 
that excess returns from the two subsamples follow different global trends during the 
estimation period. 
 
5.3 Robustness tests 
Table II.7 shows estimation results for alternative model specifications with bootstrap p-
values at the bottom. The left two columns show results from regressions with portfolio 
returns. Portfolio returns implicitly control for heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional 
correlation of firm residuals. The first portfolio includes early adopters. The second 
portfolio includes firms with hidden pay in 2004. I regress portfolio returns on the four risk 
factors and the All events dummy. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity (see 
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White (1980)).
31
 The main conclusions remain unchanged. Coefficient estimates in the first 
column suggest that the portfolio of early adopters does not earn significant abnormal 
returns on event days. Coefficient estimates in the second column suggest that the portfolio 
of firms with hidden pay earns significant abnormal returns of 0.2% on event days. 
The right two columns show results from regressions that use market-adjusted returns at 
the company level as the dependent variables. Market-adjusted returns are stock returns 
minus the return on the Prime All Share index. Control variables are also measured at the 
company level. I include the logarithm of lagged market capitalization, the logarithm of 
lagged book-to-market, and lagged market-adjusted returns over the past six months to 
control for size, book-to-market, and momentum effects (see, e.g., Larcker, Ormazabal, 
and Taylor (2011) for such an approach). In the last column, I additionally include industry 
fixed effects based on the Fama-French 48 industry classification to control for industry 
differences in returns (see Fama and French (1997)). Standard errors are clustered by day 
and firm. In both specifications, the coefficient of the main variable of interest remains 
unchanged compared to the baseline result in Table II.5. The interaction term Hidden pay 
times All events has a coefficient estimate of 0.22% with a t-statistic significant at the 5% 
level and a bootstrap p-value significant at the 10% level.
32
 
 
                                                 
31
 See, for example, Greenestone, Oyer, and Vissing-Jorgensen (2006), Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007), 
and Cai and Walkling (2011) for such a portfolio approach. 
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 The results are virtually identical when I control for industry fixed effects based on Fama-French 12 
industry groups. 
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6 Heterogeneity in the effect of the Law 
6.1 Methodology 
To analyze heterogeneity in the effect of the Law, I run a cross-sectional regression that 
accounts for different effects across three groups and allows these effects to vary by 
institutional ownership: 
 
CARi = δ0 + δ1 × Hidden payi + δ2 × Forced disclosurei + δ3 × Institutional ownershipi 
+ δ4 × Hidden payi × Institutional ownershipi 
+ δ5 × Forced disclosurei × Institutional ownershipi + εi,t      (II.2) 
 
The dependent variable CARi is the cumulative abnormal return for company i on event 
days. For each company, I regress the time-series of excess returns on the Fama and 
French (1993) factors, Carhart’s (1997) momentum factor, and the seven event dummies. 
The sum of the coefficient estimates on the event dummies represents the cumulative 
abnormal return for company i. Independent variables are the dummy Hidden payi, the 
dummy Forced disclosurei, Institutional ownershipi, and interaction terms of Institutional 
ownershipi with each of the dummy variables. As in equation (II.1), Hidden payi equals 
one if company i hides pay for individual executives in 2004. Forced disclosurei equals 
one for the subsample of firms that have to switch from hidden pay in 2004 to observable 
pay for individual executives in 2006. The inclusion of the Forced disclosure dummy 
changes the interpretation of the coefficient on Hidden pay. The Hidden pay dummy now 
captures differences in cumulative abnormal returns between early adopters and firms that 
hide pay in 2004 and stick to hidden pay in 2006. The Forced disclosure dummy captures 
differences in cumulative abnormal returns between firms that have to switch to observable 
pay in 2006 and firms that stick to hidden pay in 2006. 
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Since the model relies on ex-post information about the disclosure policy, I assume that 
investors are able to forecast whether shareholders vote against the new rules. This 
assumption implies that the regression model estimates cross-sectional correlations and 
does not estimate causal effects. The coefficient estimates are likely to suffer from an 
endogeneity bias since the forecast can depend on variables that influence the magnitude of 
cumulative abnormal returns.  
To draw statistical inference, I perform two tests. The first test is the common two-sided t-
test based on heteroskedasticity robust standard errors (see White (1980)). To control for 
cross-sectional correlation, I perform a second test based on bootstrap p-values (see, e.g., 
Cai and Walkling (2011) and Lo (2003)). For each company, I calculate cumulative 
abnormal returns on seven non-event days, which I randomly draw from the estimation 
period. I run the cross-sectional regression with these cumulative abnormal returns and 
save the coefficient estimates. I re-do both steps 5000 times and receive empirical 
distributions of the coefficient estimates for the independent variables. The bootstrap p-
value is the fraction of positive (negative) coefficient estimates that are larger (smaller) 
than the coefficient estimate from the original regression. This test implicitly accounts for 
time-invariant group differences that affect cumulative abnormal returns. If the association 
between cumulative abnormal returns and the independent variables also holds for non-
event days, the independent variables are likely to proxy for other risk characteristics and 
do not capture a specific pattern related to the Law. Since the test compares cumulative 
abnormal returns on event days and non-event days for different groups, it is a variant of a 
diff-in-diff approach (see also Larcker, Ormazabal, and Taylor (2011)). 
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6.2 Results 
Panel A of Table II.8 shows coefficient estimates in percentage terms with Wald tests for 
linear combinations at the bottom. Wald tests are for institutional ownership of 14%, which 
represents the percentage holdings in the median company conditional on an investment. 
Since cumulative abnormal returns at the company level are noisy estimates, I winsorize 
their empirical distribution at the top and bottom 1% to mitigate the impact of outliers. 
The left column in Panel A of Table II.8 shows results from a regression that includes only 
the disclosure dummies as independent variables. The estimates confirm that disclosure is 
good. They further suggest that only firms with effective treatment benefit. The Hidden 
pay dummy has a coefficient estimate of 0.12%, which is not significant at conventional 
levels. The estimate indicates that the Law has no effect on firms that stick to hidden pay. 
These firms do not change their disclosure policy after enactment of the Law. The Forced 
disclosure dummy has a coefficient estimate of 1.34%. While the t-statistic misses 
significance (p-value of 18.4%), the bootstrap p-value is significant at the 10% level. The 
estimate suggests that firms that have to switch from hidden to observable pay outperform 
firms that stick to hidden pay by 1.34% on event days. The sum of the coefficient estimates 
amounts to 1.46% with an F-statistic from a Wald test and a bootstrap p-value, which are 
significant at the 10% level. The estimate indicates that firms that switch to observable pay 
outperform early adopters by 1.46%. 
The right column in Panel A of Table II.8 shows results from a regression that allows the 
effects to vary by institutional ownership. The estimates confirm that the Law has no effect 
on firms that stick to hidden pay. The Hidden pay dummy and its interaction with 
Institutional ownership have coefficient estimates of 0.07% and 0.79% with t-statistics and 
bootstrap p-values, which are not statistically significant. The second Wald test shows that 
the sum of these estimates amounts to 0.18% for institutional ownership of 14% (0.07% 
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plus (14% times 0.79%)). The F-statistic and the bootstrap p-value are not statistically 
significant at the 10% level. 
The estimates further confirm that the Law is beneficial for firms that have to switch to 
observable pay. The Forced disclosure dummy increases to 2.2% with a t-statistic and a 
bootstrap p-value, which are significant at the 5% level. The sum of the coefficients on 
Hidden pay and Forced Disclosure increases to 2.26% with an F-statistic from a Wald test 
and a bootstrap p-value, which are significant at the 5% level. The estimate indicates that 
firms that switch to observable pay have cumulative abnormal returns of 2.26% relative to 
early adopters. 
Cumulative abnormal returns of 2.26% imply that mandatory pay disclosures are 
associated with an increase in shareholder value of more than € 33 million (2.26% times € 
1.47 billion). This estimate provides additional evidence that expected gains are likely to 
come from a better incentive alignment. For example, assume that shareholders expect the 
average company to adjust compensation with a probability of 50%. Then, shareholder 
value would increase by another € 33 million when compensation adjustments are actually 
announced. Such gains can hardly be explained by present value effects from pay 
reductions since the management board receives € 2.7 million in the average company that 
switches to observable pay. Gains from a better incentive alignment could be of this order 
of magnitude. For a sample of S&P 500 firms, Morgan and Poulsen (2001) find that stock 
prices increase by 0.52% when shareholders receive news on proposals for executive 
incentive plans. The average company in their sample has a 1994 market capitalization of $ 
6.1 billion. The value increase thus amounts to $ 32 million. Assuming an inflation rate of 
3%, the effect equals $ 43 million in 2005 dollars or € 33 million.33 
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 On average, one Euro equals $ 1.286 during the first half of 2005. 
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The positive effect is decreasing in Institutional ownership. The interaction term, Forced 
disclosure times Institutional ownership, has a coefficient estimate of -10.3% with a t-
statistic significant at the 5% level and a bootstrap p-value significant at the 1% level. The 
coefficient estimate suggests that Institutional ownership of 14% is associated with a 
decrease in cumulative abnormal returns of 1.44% (-10.3% times 14%) for a company that 
switches to observable pay relative to a company that sticks to hidden pay. The effect is of 
similar size when the stock price reaction for early adopters is the benchmark. The third 
Wald test shows that the sum of the interaction terms of Hidden pay and Forced disclosure 
with Institutional ownership has a coefficient estimate of -1.33%. The t-statistic is 
significant at the 10% level and the bootstrap p-value is significant at the 5% level. The 
coefficient estimate indicates that Institutional ownership of 14% is associated with a 
decrease in cumulative abnormal returns of 1.33% for a company that switches to 
observable pay in 2006 relative to the average early adopter. 
The last two Wald tests show that the overall differences remain positive, but insignificant, 
for a company with institutional ownership of 14%. The difference in cumulative abnormal 
returns amounts to 0.75% between firms that do and do not switch to observable pay. The 
difference amounts to 0.93% between firms that switch to observable pay and early 
adopters. These results are consistent with the managerial power view. The efficiency 
gains from mandatory disclosures vanish because institutional investors discipline the CEO 
at the bargaining table behind the scenes. 
Panel B of Table II.8 shows results from Wald tests for differences in cumulative abnormal 
returns as a function of Institutional ownership. The first row shows differences between 
firms that stick to hidden pay in 2006 and early adopters. The difference is positive, but 
remains insignificant for the whole range of institutional ownership between 5% and 95%. 
The other two rows show differences between firms that have to switch to observable pay 
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and firms that stick to hidden pay (row 2), and early adopters (row 3). The difference is 
positive and significant for low institutional ownership of around 5%, and becomes 
negative and insignificant for institutional ownership of around 30%. The negative 
differences become significant for institutional ownership of around 50% when firms that 
stick to hidden pay are the benchmark. The differences become significant for institutional 
ownership of around 70% when early adopters are the benchmark. Negative cumulative 
abnormal returns are quite substantial. Firms that switch to observable pay lose 0.95% for 
every 10% increase in institutional ownership relative to early adopters. For institutional 
ownership of 70%, the underperformance amounts to -4.4%. 
Negative differences are consistent with the optimal contracting view. While mandatory 
pay disclosures are good in general, they can be costly for well-governed firms. It seems 
that institutional investors are not able to fully resist unwelcome guests that are invited to 
the bargaining table by mandatory pay disclosures. The estimates give some support for 
proponents of the opt-out clause. A loophole to vote against pay disclosures may save 
shareholder value if firms have a strong governance mechanism to ensure efficient 
contracting. Note, however, that the estimates for institutional ownership beyond 40% are 
almost an out-of-sample prediction. Institutional ownership of 41.5% is the 95% percentile 
of the sample distribution. In the German case, mandatory pay disclosures had a 
significantly negative effect only on a handful of firms.  
 
6.3 Robustness tests 
The first column of Table II.9 shows estimated coefficients from the Sefcik and Thompson 
(1986) approach. The approach relies on portfolio returns and, thus, implicitly accounts for 
heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional correlation of firm residuals. I construct six time 
series of portfolio returns for the five independent variables and the constant. For each 
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variable, the portfolio weights equal the OLS weights that identify the coefficient estimate 
in the cross-sectional regression. The portfolio returns are then regressed on the All events 
dummy and the four risk factors. The coefficient on the All events dummy indicates the 
association between the respective independent variable and the average abnormal return.
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Column 1 shows that the results are robust to this approach. The coefficient estimates are 
smaller because the portfolio approach estimates associations for average abnormal returns 
and not for cumulative abnormal returns. When I multiply the coefficient estimates by 
seven (since there are seven events), they are close to the estimates from the cross-
sectional regression (see column 2 in Panel A of Table II.8). 
The second column of Table II.9 shows results from a specification as in equation (II.2), 
except that the dependent variable now measures cumulative abnormal returns over the last 
three event days. The trend analysis indicates that the stock price reactions on these days 
may be part of a local trend and not related to the Law. The estimates reveal a pattern that 
is quite close to the heterogeneity identified across all events. While the difference in 
cumulative abnormal returns is not statistically significant between firms that do and do 
not switch to observable pay (bootstrap p-value of 13.4%), the difference is positive and 
significant between firms that switch to observable pay and early adopters. The sum of the 
coefficients on Hidden pay and Forced disclosure amounts to 1.41%. The F-statistic from 
the Wald test and the bootstrap p-value are significant at the 5% level. The positive effect 
is also decreasing in Institutional ownership. The sum of the interactions of the dummy 
variables with Institutional ownership has a coefficient estimate of -0.95%, which is also 
statistically significant at the 5% level. If cumulative abnormal returns on these days are 
just part of a local trend and not related to the Law, this trend is positive for firms that 
switch to observable pay and is decreasing in institutional ownership. 
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 See the Appendix at the end of this chapter for further details. 
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7 Conclusion 
This paper analyses how stock prices react to the announcement of mandatory pay 
disclosures. On average, mandatory pay disclosures have a positive effect on shareholder 
value. This result supports prevalent calls for tighter disclosure requirements. However, the 
results also indicate that mandatory pay disclosures can be costly. In cross-sectional 
regressions, I find that the effect is decreasing in institutional ownership and can become 
negative. This result supports long-standing skeptical views about “one size fits all” 
regulations (see, e.g., Leuz (2007)), and underscores the complementary nature of the 
managerial power and optimal contracting view.  
The analysis is informative for policy makers that plan mandatory pay disclosures 
elsewhere. In particular, the option to vote against pay disclosures, a specific feature of the 
German disclosure legislation and highly criticized in the press, may shield well-governed 
firms from unintended consequences of mandatory disclosures. 
The results must be interpreted with some caution. First, they do not reflect overall changes 
in social welfare. Changes in social welfare reflect the costs and benefits of all 
stakeholders. By contrast, this paper only analyzes changes in shareholder value, and these 
changes may partly reflect a wealth transfer between insiders and outsiders or between 
bondholders and stockholders. Second, the results reflect only shareholder expectations 
about the net effect of mandatory pay disclosures. The long-run effect on company 
performance is still an open question. Third, the option to vote against pay disclosures and 
the specific German rules about corporate governance, most notably the mandatory worker 
representation on a two-tier board system, raise questions about the role of family 
ownership and the external validity of the results. The option to vote against pay 
disclosures effectively gives secretive family firms with large shareholdings the 
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opportunity to self-select out of treatment. The value implications for this subset of firms 
are not clear, and my results for the role of institutional investors can at best give an 
indication for the association between family ownership and mandated pay disclosures. 
This association is important for our understanding of disclosure rules since family 
ownership is the prevalent ownership structure around the world (see La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, and Shleifer (1999)). It is also not clear whether a two-tier board system with 
worker representation is more or less captive than the typical Anglo-Saxon one-tier system 
with only shareholder representatives. While this difference may mitigate the external 
validity of the quantitative results, the qualitative results should still hold for the Anglo-
Saxon case since pay disclosures do not directly intervene in compensation designs and 
other governance choices of firms. Analyzing the effect on social welfare, on long-run 
performance and in countries where firms operate in a different legislative environment are 
fruitful avenues for future research. 
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Tables 
 
Table II.1: Old versus new disclosure rules 
The table summarizes disclosure rules for executive compensation in Germany along five dimensions. The 
left column describes disclosure rules which were effective until 2005. The right column describes disclosure 
rules which are effective since 2006. The new rules were announced in summer 2005 when the German 
parliament passed the Law on the “Disclosure of management board compensation”. 
 
  
Old disclosure rules (until 2005) New disclosure rules (since 2006)
(1) How to disclose?
Disclose total compensation for all executives jointly.
 
Code recommendation: You shall divide total compensation 
into fixed compensation, short-term incentives, and long-term 
incentives. You shall disclose these components for 
individual executives.
If disclosure of total compensation for all executives reveals 
the compensation of individual executives, you can opt out of 
any compensation disclosures.
Disclose total compensation for all executives jointly. 
Divide total compensation into fixed compensation, short-
term incentives, and long-term incentives. Disclose these 
components for individual executives.
Opt out of individualized disclosures for  five years if 
shareholders agree with a three-quarters majority at the 
annual meeting. If you opt out, disclose total compensation 
for all executives jointly. New votes are allowed afterwards. 
Executives are not allowed to vote.
(2) What to disclose?
Total compensation: salary, short-term incentives, long-term 
incentives, and all other benefits, such as insurance 
premiums, expense allowances, and perquisites
Total compensation: salary, short-term incentives, long-term 
incentives, and all other benefits, such as insurance 
premiums, expense allowances, and perquisites
Separation agreements (pensions and severance pay): 
Provide qualitative details and outline significant differences 
between the separation agreements for executives and other 
employees.
Benefits that an executive receives from third parties for 
fulfilling her duties for the company.
Any other compensation arrangements that you state in the 
financial statements.
(3) How to value long-term incentives?
For stock options and other equity-based compensation, 
disclose the number granted and the fair value at grant date. 
Account for any later changes in value that result from 
changing the vesting conditions.
(4) What about a compensation report?
Code recommendation: You shall detail the compensation 
system on the company's website and in the annual report.
You shall detail the compensation system in the 
management report.
(5) Where to disclose?
In the notes of the financial statements In the notes of the financial statements or in the management 
report
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Table II.2: Timeline of events and confounding events 
The table presents events related to enactment of the Law in the left column, confounding macroeconomic 
events in the middle column, and interpretations of the market development in the right column. Events are 
days when shareholders received news about the content of the Law, or when politicians officially debated 
about the Law. The list of events is compiled from legal documents and press articles. News about 
macroeconomic events are collected from the Handelsblatt, which is Germany’s largest daily newspaper 
about business and finance news. Interpretations of the market development come from the Wall Street 
Journal Europe. 
 
  
Events Macroeconomic events Ex-post interpretation of the market development
March 11, 2005
▪ The Attorney General presents 
key points of a draft bill in a 
press conference
▪
▪ 
▪  
Germany: consumer prices 
Euro zone: money supply M3
International: monthly oil market 
report
▪ "European stocks closed higher Friday, after three consecutive 
sessions of losses, as chip makers gained on Intel’s elevated 
sales outlook. (…) Frankfurt’s Xetra DAX Index gained 22.81 to 
4360.49." (from March 14) 
March 31, 2005
▪ The Attorney General presents a 
draft bill
▪ 
▪ 
Germany: labor market data
US: labor market data, NAPM-
Chicago purchasing managers' index
▪ "Shares in Europe were mixed Thursday, falling well off the day’s 
highs after a late-day spike in the price of crude oil. (…) The 
German DAX Xetra 30 index rose 0.03% to 4349, (...)." (from 
April 01)
May 18, 2005
▪ The government presents a draft 
bill
▪ US: consumer prices and real 
disposable personal income 
▪ "European shares made broad-based gains, helped by data that 
showed the underlying rate of U.S. inflation was unchanged in 
April. (…) In Frankfurt, the XETRA DAX Index rose 1.7%, or 
72.83 points, to 4324.6." (from May 19) 
June 3, 2005
▪ Parliament discusses 
government's draft bill
▪
▪ 
▪ 
Germany: non-manufacturing index
Euro zone: non-manufacturing index
US: labor market data and ISM index
▪ "Major European stock markets fell slightly Friday, after U.S. 
data showed the American jobs market slowed in May to its 
weakest level in nearly two years. (…) Frankfurt’s Xetra DAX 
Index fell 21.78 points to 4510.39." (from June 06) 
June 20, 2005
▪ The discussion with experts has 
settled final disputes
▪
▪  
Germany: central bank's monthly 
report
US: index of leading economic 
indicators
▪ "Most European markets ended lower as crude-oil prices 
touched record levels. (…) Germany’s XETRA DAX Index closed 
down 17.71 at 4586.86 (…)." (from June 21) 
June 27, 2005
▪ Final revisions to government's 
draft bill
▪ Germany: business climate index ▪ "European shares closed broadly lower yesterday as pressure 
from record crude-oil prices spread beyond traditionally oil-
sensitive airline and automotive stocks to depress general 
market sentiment. (...) At the close, Germany’s DAX Index shed 
0.9% to 4523.82 (...). In Germany, shares also traded against a 
background of economic news, as the Ifo Institute said German 
business sentiment improved in June. The Ifo index rose to 93.3 
from 92.9 in May, in line with economists’ forecasts." (from June 
28)
June 30, 2005
▪ Parliament approves final draft 
bill
▪
▪
▪   
Germany: labor market data, 
wholesale data
Euro zone: consumer confidence 
indicator, business climate indicator, 
consumer prices
US: NAPM-Chicago purchasing 
managers' index
▪ "European shares closed mixed Thursday, with investors 
focused on rate moves in the U.S. (…) At the close, Germany’s 
XETRA DAX Index inched up 0.06% to 4586.28 (…)." (from July 
01)
48 
 
Table II.3: Disclosure policy of the sample firms 
The table shows how the sample firms disclose executive compensation in 2004, i.e. before Law enactment, 
and in 2006, i.e. after Law enactment. Data on the disclosure policy come from annual reports. The dotted 
line in the left part separates treated firms from control firms according to the disclosure policy in 2004. 
Firms with hidden pay in 2004 represent the treatment group. Firms with observable pay in 2004 are early 
adopters and represent the control group. The shaded area in the right part includes firms that switch from 
hidden pay in 2004 to observable pay in 2006. These firms are effectively treated by the Law. 
 
  
Hidden pay Observable pay
# companies
Disclosure of total compensation 
for all executives jointly
Disclosure of compensation 
components for individual executives
n/a
Hidden pay
No disclosure at all 6 1 4 1
Disclosure of total compensation for 
all executives jointly
201 70 123 8
Disclosure of CEO compensation 
separately, but for other executives 
jointly
7 1 6 0
Observable pay (early adopters)
Disclosure of compensation 
components for individual executives
98 3 91 4
Total 312 75 224 13
Disclosure policy in 2006 (after Law enactment)Disclosure policy in 2004 (before Law enactment)
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Table II.4: Descriptive statistics 
The table presents descriptive statistics for the sample firms. Panel A shows the industry distribution across 
Fama-French 12 industry groups. The left column shows the industry distribution for all sample firms. The 
second and the third column show the industry distribution for the subsamples of firms that do and do not 
voluntarily disclose pay for individual executives in 2004, and the last two columns for firms with hidden pay 
in 2004 that do and do not switch to observable pay in 2006. Panel B shows summary statistics for all 
variables used in the analysis. Market cap is measured on a daily basis and calculated as daily share price 
times common shares outstanding. Book-to-market is the book value of common equity for the last fiscal year 
divided by Market cap. Institutional ownership is the percentage shareholdings of independent investment 
firms and wealthy private investors. Total compensation is the aggregate amount paid to the management 
board as reported in 2004 annual reports. Total compensation per executive is total compensation divided by 
the number of executives that were members of the management board in 2004. Excess returns are daily 
stock returns minus the risk-free rate. Market-adjusted returns are daily stock returns minus the return on the 
Prime All Share index. Return past 6 months is the market-adjusted return over the prior six months. Daily 
risk factors for Germany are the market factor RMRF, the size factor SMB, the book-to-market factor HML, 
and the momentum factor WML as proposed by Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997). The sample 
period is from August 2004 to July 2005. Panel C shows mean values of selected variables. In the left 
columns, mean values are for the subsamples of firms that do and do not voluntarily disclose pay for 
individual executives in 2004. In the right columns, mean values are for firms with hidden pay in 2004 that 
do and do not switch to observable pay in 2006. ***, **, and * denote statistically significant differences in 
mean values at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level according to t-tests.  
 
 
Panel A: Industry distribution 
  
Fama-French industry groups Sample
Observable 
(early adopters)
Hidden No Yes
1 Business Equipment 32% 31% 33% 35% 32%
2 Chemicals and Allied Products 4% 4% 4% 3% 5%
3 Consumer Durables 3% 2% 3% 0% 5%
4 Consumer NonDurables 2% 0% 3% 6% 2%
5 Energy 0% 0% 0% 1% 0%
6 Finance 10% 18% 6% 7% 6%
7 Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs 9% 11% 8% 4% 11%
8 Manufacturing 16% 8% 19% 17% 22%
9 Telephone and Television Transmission 4% 4% 4% 3% 2%
10 Utilities 1% 1% 0% 0% 1%
11 Wholesale, Retail, Laundries, Repair Shops 5% 7% 4% 7% 2%
12 Other 13% 13% 14% 18% 11%
Observations 312 98 214 72 133
Pay in 2004
Hidden pay in 2004:
Switch to observable pay in 2006
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Panel B: Summary statistics 
 
 
 
 
Panel C: Mean values of selected variables for subsamples 
  
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 5th Perc. Median 95th Perc.
Market cap (bn €) 75,052 2.3512 7.6188 0.0128 0.1283 12.0309
Book-to-market 74,100 0.6924 0.549 0.1481 0.5675 1.6073
Institutional ownership (%) 312 8.3568 16.341 0 0 41.5
Total compensation ('000 €) 306 2,896 5,417 291 1,136 11,376
Total compensation per executive ('000 €) 306 658 764 138 385 2,205
Excess returns (%) 75,052 0.1474 2.7193 -3.5602 -0.006 4.2402
Market-adjusted returns (%) 75,052 0.0515 2.708 -3.6423 -0.0741 4.1157
Return past 6 months (%) 73,254 5.5014 34.7021 -38.0595 1.3731 65.312
RMRF (%) 256 0.0864 0.5735 -0.951 0.114 0.95
SMB (%) 256 -0.0201 0.535 -0.898 -0.0045 0.849
HML (%) 256 0.0712 0.4337 -0.564 0.063 0.798
WML (%) 256 0.0542 0.4274 -0.735 0.0825 0.739
Variables
Observable 
(early adopters)
Hidden No Yes
Market cap (bn €) 4.9229 1.1605 *** 0.6977 1.4665 ***
Book-to-market 0.6279 0.7223 *** 0.7091 0.7429 ***
Institutional ownership (%) 7.9428 8.5463 7.7461 8.52
Total compensation ('000 €) 4,090 2,334 *** 1,797 2,698
Total compensation per executive ('000 €) 823 581 *** 511 630
Excess returns (%) 0.1452 0.1485 0.1619 0.1509
Event days: Excess returns (%) 0.1649 0.3847 *  0.3022 0.4598
Pay in 2004
Hidden pay in 2004:
Switch to observable pay in 2006
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Table II.5: Average effect of the Law on shareholder value 
The table presents results from a differences-in-differences regression with Excess returns as the dependent 
variable. The main variable of interest is the interaction term between Hidden pay and All events. Hidden pay 
is a dummy variable and equals one if the firm hides pay for individual executives in 2004. All events is a 
dummy variable and equals one on seven event days. Control variables are the market factor RMRF, the size 
factor SMB, the book-to-market factor HML, and the momentum factor WML. The sample period is from 
August 2004 to July 2005. Coefficient estimates are in percentage terms. t-statistics appear in parentheses. 
Standard errors are clustered by day and firm. At the bottom of the table, bootstrap p-values appear in 
brackets for the dummy variable ALL events and for the interaction term between Hidden pay and All events. 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
  
Variables                    
(1)    
Hidden pay -0.0123    
                    (-0.522)    
All events -0.0036    
                    (-0.030)    
Hidden pay × All events 0.2152 *  
                    (1.958)    
RMRF                92.2392 ***
                    (8.378)    
SMB                 40.2679 ***
                    (4.114)    
HML                 -4.949    
                    (-0.992)    
WML                 5.8686    
                    (0.990)    
Intercept           0.0405    
                    (1.393)    
Adjusted R
2      0.0204    
Observations        75,052    
Bootstrap p-values:
All events [0.487]
Hidden pay × All events [0.075] *
Excess returns
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Table II.6: Abnormal returns on individual event days 
The table presents results from a differences-in-differences regression with Excess returns as the dependent 
variable. Independent variables are Hidden pay, seven event dummies, interaction terms between Hidden pay 
and the event dummies, the market factor RMRF, the size factor SMB, the book-to-market factor HML, and 
the momentum factor WML. Hidden pay is a dummy variable and equals one if the firm hides pay for 
individual executives in 2004. Each of the event dummies equals one on one event day. The left column 
shows coefficient estimates for the interaction terms. The right column shows coefficient estimates for the 
event dummies. Results from Wald tests are presented at the bottom. The sample period is from August 2004 
to July 2005. Coefficient estimates are in percentage terms. Estimates on Hidden pay, the risk factors, and the 
intercept are omitted. t-statistics and F-statistics from Wald tests appear in parentheses. Standard errors are 
clustered by day and firm. Bootstrap p-values appear in brackets. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
  
Events
March 11: Attorney General's press conference            0.4305 -0.0452    
                    (16.643) *** (-0.763)    
[0.12] [0.410]
March 31: Attorney General's draft bill            0.5055 -0.075    
                    (12.025) *** (-0.907)    
[0.093] * [0.369]
May 18: Government's draft bill           -0.3245 -0.291
                    (-8.288) *** (-3.352) ***
[0.222] [0.201]
June 03: Draft bill in parliament           0.0497    0.6159
                    (1.388)    (10.000) ***
[0.416] [0.044] **
June 20: Discussion with experts         0.1554 0.1866
                    (3.455) *** (2.658) ***
[0.329] [0.299]
June 27: Final draft bill             0.2957 -0.2613
                    (22.046) *** (-4.762) ***
[0.245] [0.216]
June 30: Vote in parliament 0.4018 -0.1388
                    (10.901) *** (-2.091) ** 
[0.146] [0.336]
Wald test: Sum of the coefficients equals zero 1.5141 -0.0087
(21.052) *** (0.001)
[0.08] * [0.501]
Event dummy × 
Hidden pay
(test statistic)
[bootstrap p-value]
Event dummy
[bootstrap p-value]
(test statistic)
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Table II.7: Portfolio returns and market-adjusted returns 
The table presents results from alternative model specifications. In the left columns, the dependent variables 
are portfolio excess returns. In column 1, the portfolio includes firms that are early adopters and voluntarily 
disclose pay for individual executives in 2004. In column 2, the portfolio includes firms that hide pay in 
2004. Independent variables are the dummy All events, which equals one on seven event days, the market 
factor RMRF, the size factor SMB, the book-to-market factor HML, and the momentum factor WML. The 
right columns present results from differences-in-differences regressions with Market-adjusted returns as the 
dependent variables. Independent variables are Hidden pay, All events, the interaction term between Hidden 
pay and All events, the logarithm of lagged market cap, the logarithm of lagged book-to-market, and lagged 
market-adjusted returns over the past six months. The right column additionally includes industry fixed 
effects based on the Fama-French 48 industry classification. Market-adjusted returns are daily stock returns 
minus the return on the Prime All Share index. Hidden pay is a dummy variable and equals one if the firm 
hides pay for individual executives in 2004. The sample period is from August 2004 to July 2005. Coefficient 
estimates are in percentage terms. t-statistics appear in parentheses. Standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity in the portfolio regressions and clustered by day and firm in the differences-in-differences 
regressions. At the bottom of the table, bootstrap p-values appear in brackets for the dummy variable ALL 
events and for the interaction term between Hidden pay and All events. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
  
Variables                    
(1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    
Hidden pay -0.0147 -0.0067
                    (-0.644)    (-0.278)    
All events     0.052    0.2002 *  0.0511 0.0522
                    (0.401)    (1.711)    (0.280)    (0.286)    
Hidden pay × All events 0.2198 ** 0.2205 ** 
                    (2.137)    (2.141)    
RMRF                102.9101 *** 77.8315 ***
                    (12.346)    (7.455)    
SMB                 29.5694 *** 38.8325 ***
                    (3.492)    (3.839)    
HML                 -1.903    -7.7337    
                    (-0.293)    (-1.207)    
WML                 7.8603    3.2753    
(1.177)    (0.506)    
log(Market cap)t-1  -0.003 -0.0031
                    (-0.500)    (-0.425)    
log(Book-to-market)t-1 -0.0004 -0.0072
                    (-0.029)    (-0.500)    
Return past 6 monthst-1 -0.0391 -0.0688
                    (-0.622)    (-1.085)    
Intercept           0.0568 ** 0.086 *** 0.0047 -0.0324
                    (2.223)    (3.107)    (0.204)    (-0.305)    
Industry fixed effects No No No Yes
Adjusted R
2 0.6023    0.4135    0.0001    -0.0001    
Observations        256    256    72,124    72,124    
Bootstrap p-values:
All events [0.346] [0.075] * [0.371] [0.366]
Hidden pay × All events [0.072] * [0.071] *
Observable pay 
(early adopters)
Hidden pay
Portfolio returns - RF Market-adjusted returns
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Table II.8: Heterogeneity in the effect of the Law 
The table presents results from cross-sectional OLS regressions with cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) as 
the dependent variables. Cumulative abnormal returns are the sum of coefficient estimates on seven event 
dummies, estimated from regressions of Excess returns on the event dummies, the market factor RMRF, the 
size factor SMB, the book-to-market factor HML, and the momentum factor WML. Independent variables are 
the dummy Hidden pay, the dummy Forced disclosure, Institutional ownership, and interaction terms 
between the dummy variables and Institutional ownership. Hidden pay equals one if the firm hides pay for 
individual executives in 2004. Forced disclosure equals one if the firm switches from hidden pay in 2004 to 
observable pay in 2006. Institutional ownership measures the percentage shareholdings of independent 
investment firms and wealthy private investors. Panel A of the table presents regression results in the upper 
part and results from five different Wald tests in the lower part. These Wald tests assume institutional 
ownership of 14%. Panel B presents results from Wald tests for other percentage shareholdings of 
institutional investors. Cumulative abnormal returns are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Coefficient 
estimates are in percentage terms. t-statistics and F-statistics from Wald tests appear in parentheses. Standard 
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. Bootstrap p-values appear in brackets. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
 
Panel A: Regression results with Wald tests for institutional ownership of 14% 
 
  
Variables                    CARs CARs
(1) (2)
Hidden pay 0.1208 0.0667    
                    (0.121) (0.060)    
[0.464] [0.488]
Forced disclosure 1.3357 2.1968
                    (1.332) (2.012) ** 
[0.094] * [0.028] **
Institutional ownership 1.9834    
                                (0.572)    
[0.325]
Hidden pay ×             0.794    
Institutional ownership             (0.154)    
[0.445]
Forced disclosure × -10.3043
Institutional ownership             (-2.008) ** 
[0.008] ***
Intercept           0.4917 0.3276    
                    (0.865) (0.497)    
[0.283] [0.342]
Adjusted R
2 0.0053 0.0127    
Observations        293 293    
(1) H0: Hidden pay + Forced disclosure = 0 1.4565 2.2635
(3.224) * (6.225) **
[0.055] * [0.011] **
(2) H0: Hidden pay + Hidden pay × 0.1778
Institutional ownership × 14%  = 0 (0.030)
[0.441]
(3) H0: Hidden pay × Institutional ownership × 14% + -1.3315
Forced disclosure × Institutional ownership × 14%  = 0 (3.800) *
[0.029] **
(4) H0: Forced disclosure + Forced disclosure × 0.7542
Institutional ownership × 14% = 0 (0.529)
[0.226]
(5) H0: Hidden pay + Forced disclosure + 0.9321
Hidden pay × Institutional ownership × 14% + (1.198)
Forced disclosure × Institutional ownership × 14% = 0 [0.165]
Wald tests
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Table II.9: Robustness tests 
The table presents results from two robustness tests. The left column presents results from portfolio time-
series regressions as suggested by Sefcik and Thompson (1985). The Appendix at the end of this chapter 
details the estimation procedure. The right column shows results from a cross-sectional regression, specified 
as in equation (II.2) and described in Table II.8. The only difference is that cumulative abnormal returns are 
now measured over the last three events. Results from five different Wald tests are presented in the lower 
part of the table. Wald tests assume institutional ownership of 14%. Coefficient estimates are in percentage 
terms. t-statistics and F-statistics from Wald tests appear in parentheses. Standard errors account for cross-
sectional correlation and heteroskedasticity in the left column, and for heteroskedasticity in the right column. 
Bootstrap p-values appear in brackets. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level 
 
  
Variables                    
All events June 20 + 27 + 30
(1) (2)    
Hidden pay -0.0336 0.5679
                    (-0.389) (0.854)
[0.414] [0.235]
Forced disclosure 0.3426 0.8404
                    (2.262) ** (1.279)
[0.030] ** [0.134]
Institutional ownership 0.1742 2.9606
                    (0.454)    (1.466)
[0.387] [0.154]
Hidden pay × 0.0283 -3.8829
Institutional ownership (0.060)    (-1.566)
[0.481] [0.137]
Forced disclosure × -1.3773 -2.8695
Institutional ownership (-1.833) *  (-1.130)
[0.022] ** [0.177]
Intercept           0.0287 -0.2401
                    (0.186) (-0.610)
[0.407] [0.365]
Adjusted R
2 0.0083
Observations        256 292
(1) H0: Hidden pay + Forced disclosure = 0 0.3091 1.4083
(5.814) ** (6.625) **
[0.021] ** [0.015] **
(2) H0: Hidden pay + Hidden pay × -0.0296 0.0243
Institutional ownership × 14%  = 0 (0.298) (0.002)
[0.423] [0.480]
(3) H0: Hidden pay × Institutional ownership × 14% + -0.1889 -0.9453
Forced disclosure × Institutional ownership × 14%  = 0 (5.612) ** (5.387) **
[0.032] ** [0.024] **
(4) H0: Forced disclosure + Forced disclosure × 0.1498 0.4387
Institutional ownership × 14% = 0 (2.277) (0.588)
[0.166] [0.259]
(5) H0: Hidden pay + Forced disclosure + 0.1202 0.4630
Hidden pay × Institutional ownership × 14% + (1.947) (0.839)
Forced disclosure × Institutional ownership × 14% = 0 [0.192] [0.220]
Portfolio returns CARs
Wald tests
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Figures 
 
Figure II.1: Local trends 
The figure shows abnormal returns around event days for firms with hidden pay in 2004. Abnormal returns 
are coefficient estimates on interaction terms from a differences-and-differences regression. The dependent 
variable is Excess returns. Independent variables are Hidden pay, seven event dummies, pre-event dummies, 
post-event dummies, interaction terms between these dummies and Hidden pay, the market factor RMRF, the 
size factor SMB, the book-to-market factor HML, and the momentum factor WML. Hidden pay is a dummy 
variable and equals one if the firm hides pay for individual executives in 2004. Each of the event dummies 
equals one on one of the seven event days. Pre-event and post-event dummies are equal to one on five days 
before and after an event day. Two exceptions are dummies around June 27, which cover four days before 
June 27 and two days after June 27. The sample period is from August 2004 to July 2005. Standard errors are 
clustered by day and firm. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level 
according to t-tests. 
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Figure II.2: Global trends 
The figure shows daily excess returns for the portfolios of firms that do and do not hide pay in 2004. The 
dashed line shows portfolio returns for firms that hide pay in 2004. The dotted line shows portfolio returns 
for firms that are early adopters and voluntarily disclose pay for individual executives in 2004. The lighter 
solid line indicates the linear trend of portfolio returns for firms with hidden pay in 2004. The darker solid 
line indicates the linear trend of portfolio returns for early adopters. The time period is from August 2004 to 
July 2005. 
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Appendix 
 
The Sefcik and Thompson (1986) approach 
Sefcik and Thompson (1986) propose portfolio time series regressions to analyze the 
sensitivity of abnormal returns to firm characteristics. The portfolio weights are the 
weights from OLS cross-sectional regressions of abnormal returns. The portfolio approach 
implicitly accounts for heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional correlation of firm residuals. 
The portfolio return rp,t on day t for firm characteristic p is calculated in the following way: 
 
        
                             (II.3) 
where 
   [   ]      P×N weighting matrix from cross-sectional OLS      (II.4) 
  [         ] N×P data matrix of P-1 firm characteristics for N firms    (II.5) 
  
       p-th row of W identifies the portfolio weights for firm characteristic p 
         N×1 vector of firms’ excess stock returns on day t 
 
The approach results in P portfolios for P-1 firm characteristics and the constant. For each 
portfolio, I estimate the following time-series regression: 
 
rp,t = γ1p + γ2p × All eventst+ γ3p × RMRFt + γ4p × SMBt + γ5p × HMLt + γ6p × WMLt + εp,t
                             (II.6) 
 
The coefficient γ2p measures the association between company characteristic p and the 
average abnormal return on event days. For the results presented in Table II.9, I estimate 
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the equations jointly with the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) model introduced by 
Zellner (1962). The SUR model allows hypotheses tests across equations.  
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Chapter III 
 
Hidden Pensions, Agency Costs, and Firm Performance 
 
1 Introduction 
Executive pensions have long been considered as the ultimate form of stealth 
compensation that allows the CEO to extract rents at the expense of shareholders (see 
Murphy (1999)). In this paper I analyze differences in performance and sources of agency 
costs for a sample of German firms that do and do not voluntarily disclose the costs of 
pensions for their incumbent executives. Firms with hidden pension costs have lower firm 
values, lower operating performance, pay their employees higher wages, and make worse 
acquisitions. These firms experience positive abnormal returns at the announcement of a 
governance reform that mandates the disclosure of pension costs and makes the board 
more accountable for executive compensation in general.
35
 
The role of pensions in executive compensation is controversial and part of broader debate 
in the literature about whether executive compensation is efficient or not. Under the 
managerial power view, executive compensation is largely inefficient (see Bebchuk and 
Fried (2004)). Boards are weak and enable the CEO to set her own pay. To minimize 
outrage about excess pay, the CEO extracts rents through compensation forms that are not 
observable to outsiders. Since disclosure requirements for executive pensions were limited 
                                                 
35
 The term “board” refers to the supervisory board. Germany has a two-tier board system. Executive 
directors are members of the management board and manage the day-to-day operations. Non-executive 
directors are members of the supervisory board. The supervisory board monitors the management board, 
appoints and dismisses executives, and decides on executive compensation. See Dittmann, Maug, and 
Schneider (2010) for further details. 
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until recently, Bebchuk and Fried (2004) regard executive pensions as a suitable 
compensation form to camouflage the amount and the performance-insensitivity of CEO 
pay. The managerial power view thus predicts that hidden pension costs indicate weak 
boards and inefficient compensation designs.
36
 
Proponents of the efficient contracting view argue that executive compensation is largely 
efficient. Under this view, the board uses pensions as part of an efficient compensation 
arrangement that is in the best interest of shareholders. Firms may grant pensions (1) to 
reduce the tax burden for the CEO at no cost for the company (see Scholes et al. (2014)), 
(2) to time the retirement decision of the CEO (see Sundaram and Yermack (2007)), and 
(3) to mitigate the agency costs of debt if pension benefits are unsecured claims in the 
event of bankruptcy (see Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Edmans and Liu (2011)). Under 
an optimal contracting view, it is difficult to explain why firms hide pension costs (see 
Weisbach (2007)). Jensen and Murphy (1990) argue that pay disclosures invite political 
forces that are not primarily interested in the maximization of shareholder value to the 
bargain table. These forces may exert pressure on the board to deviate from efficient 
compensation designs. Under this view, hiding pension costs does not indicate agency 
problems, but is part of an optimal compensation and disclosure policy.
37
 
The managerial power view has become quite timely as many countries passed reforms of 
pay disclosures and corporate governance more generally in the aftermath of the financial 
crisis.
38
 There is, however, almost no empirical evidence that limited pay disclosures cause 
market failure or that they are associated with agency costs and low firm performance. 
                                                 
36
 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) increased the transparency of pension disclosures in 2007 
(see, e.g., Wei and Yermack (2011)). In Germany, pensions were not transparent until 2010. 
37
 That pension disclosures are costly for shareholders is difficult to explain if pensions are unsecured claims 
in the event of bankruptcy. If high pension grants are efficient, any reductions in response to public outrage 
may be costly for debtholders and beneficial for shareholders. Wei and Yermack (2011) find that bond prices 
rise and equity prices fall when companies disclose large pension values. In contrast to the US, executive 
pensions in Germany are secured claims in the event of bankruptcy. 
38
 For an overview of recent reforms in many countries, see Hill (2010) and Conyon et al. (2011). 
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Consequently, it is also an open question whether mandatory pay disclosures and related 
governance reforms produce more efficient compensation designs and increase shareholder 
value (see Weisbach (2007)).
39
 An analysis of the association between pay disclosures, 
agency costs, and firm performance is challenging because the notion of hidden pay is a 
vague concept (see Murphy (2002)). It is difficult to define when pay disclosures are 
actually transparent (see Bolton, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2006)). 
In this paper, I analyze the association between voluntary disclosures of pension costs, 
agency costs, and firm performance for a sample of German firms. The corporate 
governance environment in Germany provides an objective rule to assign firms to 
subsamples with more and less transparent disclosures of pension costs. German disclosure 
requirements are effectively a mixture of legally binding rules and non-binding 
recommendations. Recommendations are summarized in the Corporate Governance Code. 
If firms do not comply with a recommendation, they have to explain the reasons in an 
official document on their website. Since 2006, a new disclosure law requires firms to 
disclose salary (including perquisites), short-term incentives, and long-term incentives for 
individual executives. Disclosures of pension values or pension costs are not required, but 
firms have to provide descriptive details about the plans. The Corporate Governance Code 
tries to fill this gap and recommends that firms additionally disclose pension costs. Pension 
costs represent the yearly change in the present value of pensions and are thus highly 
correlated with the yearly compensation that the CEO earns in the form of pensions.
40
 The 
                                                 
39
 Theoretical work is also rare. Kuhnen and Zwiebel (2008) provide a model, in which a powerful CEO can 
hide part of her compensation. In the model, however, firm performance does not depend on effort. I am not 
aware of a model that relates hidden compensation to efficiency losses. 
40
 Compensation in the form of pensions is the present value of pension benefits that the CEO gains for an 
additional year of service (service costs). The yearly change in the present value of pensions is influenced by 
additional factors, such as changes in interest rates. 
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Code recommendation provides an objective assignment rule: Some firms follow the 
recommendation and make pension costs observable while other firms hide them.
41
 
The disclosure law includes a loophole which is designed for secretive family firms (see 
also Conyon et al. (2011)). The disclosure rules do not apply if shareholders vote against 
them with a three-quarters majority. In this case, firms have to disclose total compensation, 
without pension costs, for all executives jointly. Executives who hold shares are not 
allowed to participate in the vote. The loophole separates firms with high ownership 
concentration from firms with low ownership concentration. In the analysis I focus on 
those firms whose shareholders do not vote against disclosures of individual executive pay. 
The sample is thus biased towards the Jensen and Meckling (1976) type of firms with 
dispersed ownership. In these firms, agency problems are higher and the CEO, and not 
outside shareholders, decides about the transparency of pension disclosures.
42
 
The sample includes 138 non-financial firms that were included in the four main German 
stock market indexes, DAX, MDAX, SDAX, and TecDAX, at any point in time between 
2003 and 2009. The main independent variable is a pension disclosure dummy that equals 
one once the company discloses pension costs. I identify 97 firms that start disclosing 
pension costs during the sample period. This subsample includes 23 firms, which do not 
follow the Code recommendation just because they do not grant pensions.
43
  
                                                 
41
 One may argue that legally binding descriptions of pension plans enable shareholders to calculate the 
change in pension values for all companies. However, these calculations require sophisticated actuarial skills 
that are probably beyond the skills of most professional investors (see Wei and Yermack (2011)). Even if 
some investors are able to estimate pension values, the CEO does not bear any outrage costs as long as the 
amounts are hidden from a broader audience (see Bebchuk and Fried (2004)). 
42
 Companies whose shareholders vote against the disclosure rules are small, have high ownership 
concentration, and perform better. Bebchuk and Fried (2004) assume the Jensen and Meckling (1976) type of 
company with dispersed ownership in the discussion of the managerial power view. 
43
 Most companies initially disclose pension costs in 2006, which is the year when all sample companies have 
to disclose the composition of pay for individual executives. In Albrecht (2014) I find that stock prices react 
positively for poorly-governed companies when the disclosure law was announced. This finding suggests that 
any benefits from mandatory pay disclosures should bias the results against finding any significant 
performance differences between companies with hidden and observable pensions. 
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The analysis has three parts. In the first part, I analyze differences in firm value and 
operating performance. I find that firms with hidden pensions have a 3.3% lower Tobin’s 
Q and a 1.12 percentage point lower operating profit margin than firms with observable 
pensions. 
In the second part, I explore the nature of any agency costs. I analyze corporate policies 
that may reflect managerial preferences rather than the maximization of shareholder value. 
One view suggests that uncontrolled CEOs enjoy a quiet life and pay employees higher 
wages to maintain a peaceful working environment (see Bertrand and Mullainathan 
(2003)). Consistent with the quiet-life hypothesis I find that employee wages are 8.8% 
higher in firms with hidden pensions. An alternative view suggests that uncontrolled CEOs 
make value-destroying acquisitions to build their own empires. Consistent with the empire-
building hypothesis I find that firms with hidden pensions have a 1.91 percentage point 
lower cumulative abnormal return around acquisition announcements than firms with 
observable pensions.  
In the third part, I analyze the stock price reaction to the announcement of a governance 
reform, which the German parliament passed in 2009. The reform was motivated by 
perceptions that existing compensation practice fostered myopic behavior and excessive 
risk-taking, and was therefore a main culprit in the financial crisis (see also Maug and 
Albrecht (2011)). The reform mandates disclosures of pension costs and includes 
provisions, which make the board more accountable for executive compensation in 
general.
44
 On announcement days, firms with hidden pensions experience cumulative 
abnormal returns of 4.95% consistent with the view that hidden pensions indicate weak 
                                                 
44
 The reform includes a say-on-pay provision, increases the board’s attention to set pay for long-term 
performance, suggests the use of caps and clawback provisions, makes deductibles in D&O insurances 
mandatory, and introduces cooling-off periods for the appointment to the supervisory board. 
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boards and inefficient compensation designs. For firms with observable pensions, the stock 
price reaction is also positive, but not significantly different from zero. 
Part of the performance differences between firms with hidden and observable pensions 
could be explained under the assumption that high firm performance insulates the CEO 
from public outrage about her compensation. The implication is that the CEO is more 
willing to disclose pension costs when she forecasts good performance for her company 
(see Murphy (1996)). I do not find any evidence for this asymmetric information story. An 
investment strategy that buys stocks of firms with observable pensions and sells stocks of 
firms with hidden pensions does not earn significantly abnormal returns. In addition, I do 
not find a significant pattern of abnormal stock returns around the year of initial 
disclosures. 
This paper contributes to three streams of research within the large literature on executive 
compensation.
45
 First, the paper contributes to the growing literature that studies the role of 
pensions in executive compensation. Bebchuk and Jackson (2005) provide descriptive 
statistics about executive pensions in the US. They argue that the sheer size of pension 
values indicates managerial rent extraction. Sundaram and Yermack (2007) find that the 
distance to default is larger for firms whose CEOs have large pension claims. This result is 
consistent with the view that US firms use pensions to mitigate the agency costs of debt 
(see Jensen and Meckling (1976)). Wei and Yermack (2011) find that bond prices rise and 
stock prices fall for firms that disclose large CEO pensions. Total firm value decreases 
consistent with the view that CEOs hold too much debt-like incentives. My analysis differs 
from these studies because I relate theories about pensions to the disclosure decision and 
not to actual grant levels. Moreover, I analyze the implications for firm performance and 
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 See Frydman and Jenter (2010) for a recent survey. 
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corporate policies in a governance environment, in which pensions do not mitigate the 
agency costs of debt. 
Second, the paper contributes to the literature about opportunistic disclosure decisions. 
Yermack (1997), Aboody and Kasznik (2000), and Bebchuk, Grinstein, and Peyer (2010) 
find that CEOs time the disclosure of good news around option grant dates to increase the 
value of their option packages. My paper contributes to this literature because I assume 
that the CEO decides against pension disclosures for opportunistic reasons. 
Third, the paper contributes to the literature about the relation between corporate 
governance mechanisms and executive compensation. Several papers produce evidence 
that compensation is efficient in well-governed firms and inefficient in poorly-governed 
firms (see Gerakos (2010), Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000, 2001), Kim and Lu (2011)). I 
analyze performance differences under the assumption that hidden pensions indicate weak 
boards and inefficient compensation designs. 
The paper also contributes to the literature that studies how corporate governance 
characteristics are related to firm performance and corporate polices. Starting with 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), several papers analyze differences between firms that 
adopt fewer antitakeover provisions (“democracies”) and firms that adopt more 
antitakeover provisions (“dictatorships”).46 My paper adds to this literature because the 
pension disclosure dummy can be interpreted as an indicator for democracies. In the 
language of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), firms with observable pensions are 
democracies that allow voters (shareholders) to observe the yearly increase in pension 
values of bureaucrats (managers). 
                                                 
46
 See Cremers and Nair (2005), Bebchuk and Cohen (2005), Core, Guay, and Rusticus (2006), Masulis, 
Wang, and Xie (2007), Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009), Giroud and Mueller (2011), and Bebchuk, 
Cohen, and Wang (2013). 
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Finally, the paper contributes to the literature that studies stock price reactions to the 
announcement of corporate governance reforms. Event studies mitigate endogeneity 
concerns since reforms represent an exogenous shock to existing corporate governance 
practices. Greenestone, Oyer, and Vissing-Jorgensen (2006) find a positive stock price 
reaction to the passage of the 1964 Securities Acts Amendments, which include provisions 
for pay disclosures. Cai and Walkling (2011) find that a positive stock price reaction for 
weakly governed firms when the House of Representatives passed the Say-on-Pay bill in 
April 2007. Larcker, Ormazabal, and Taylor (2011) find a negative stock price reaction to 
several governance changes proposed between 2007 and 2009.
47
 My finding that firms 
with hidden pensions experience a positive stock price reaction to Germany’s corporate 
governance reform from 2009 adds to this literature. 
The paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2, I outline the main features of the institutional 
environment. In Section 3, I develop hypotheses about the association between pension 
disclosures, agency costs, and firm performance. Section 4 describes the sample and data. I 
report empirical results in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2 Institutional background 
2.1 Disclosure requirements for executive compensation  
The rules for pay disclosures come from three sources: German law, International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IAS/IFRS), and the German Corporate Governance Code.
48
 
Norms of privacy and confidentially dominated the disclosure legislation until 2006. Firms 
had to disclose the amount of total compensation for all executives jointly. If the 
                                                 
47
 Other work studies stock price reactions to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act from 2002. See, e.g., Chhaochharia and 
Grinstein (2007), Li, Pincus, and Rego (2008), and Iliev (2010). 
48
 Current and prior versions of the Corporate Governance Code are available at 
http://www.dcgk.de/en/code.html. International Financial Reporting Standards that were adopted by the 
European Union are available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/accounting. The standard, which 
regulates pay disclosures, is IAS 24. 
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compensation of individual executives could be inferred from the aggregated amount, 
firms did not have to disclose executive compensation at all. Total compensation included 
fixed compensation, short-term incentives, and long-term incentives. Pensions were not 
part of total compensation. 
Since the beginning of 2005, listed German firms are required to report their consolidated 
financial statements according to IFRS. Under IFRS, firms have to disclose short-term 
benefits, post-employment benefits, other long-term benefits, termination benefits, and 
share-based payments for all members of the management and supervisory board jointly. 
German law, however, explicitly states that the adoption of IFRS does not exempt firms 
from the disclosure of executive compensation according to German rules. Probably for 
this reason, firms do generally not disclose executive compensation according to IFRS, but 
stick only to the German rules. 
The Corporate Governance Code from 2003 called for more transparency. The Code 
recommended disclosing fixed compensation, short-term incentives, and long-term 
incentives for individual executives. In 2005, the German parliament passed a law on the 
“Disclosure of management board compensation”, which made this recommendation 
legally binding for fiscal years after 2005.
49
 However, the disclosure law provides a 
loophole. If shareholders vote against the new disclosure rules with a three-quarters 
majority at the annual meeting, firms can stick to the old rules and have to disclose only 
the amount of total compensation for all executives jointly. Opt-out votes are binding for 
                                                 
49
 Demands for more disclosures often follow public outrage about perceived compensation excesses in 
single events. The single event in Germany relates to the hostile takeover of Mannesmann by Vodafone in 
2000. Several members of the management and supervisory board of Mannesmann got accused of 
embezzlement for approving bonus and severance payments worth € 60 million to Mannesmann’s executives. 
While commentators criticized the size of the pay package, it was a snapshot in court that fueled public 
outrage: Joseph Ackermann, former CEO of Deutsche Bank and member of Mannesmann’s supervisory 
board, showed the victory sign while waiting for judicial proceedings. The Mannesmann case caused hot 
debates about the governance practice in German board rooms and ultimately triggered the disclosure law. 
For single events triggering higher disclosure requirements in other European countries, see Conyon et al. 
(2011). 
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five years and new votes are allowed afterwards. Executives who hold shares are not 
allowed to vote. The new rules apply to all listed German stock firms. They do not apply to 
listed firms with a foreign headquarter and to some listed German firms with a special 
legal form.
50
 
The new rules do not require firms to disclose pension values. Instead, firms shall describe 
the main features of the pension plans and outline any significant differences between the 
pension plans for executives and other employees. The Corporate Governance Code in its 
revised version from June 2006 encourages firms to voluntarily overcome this opaqueness. 
The Code recommends that firms disclose allocations to pension provisions or pension 
funds for individual executives. 
 
2.2 Executive pensions 
Executive pensions in Germany are classified as defined benefit plans under IFRS. For 
these plans, the investment risk falls on the company and not on the CEO. The company 
guarantees fixed annual benefits after retirement and not fixed contributions to plan assets 
(defined contribution plans). The benefits are often defined as a fraction of salary, and the 
fraction increases with the years of service. To finance pension claims, the company 
accrues pension provisions or pays contributions to an external fund, which settles the 
pension claims on behalf of the company.  
Most firms in Germany accrue pension provisions. The allocations to pension provisions 
consist of service costs plus interest on the liability minus interest on plan assets plus net 
amortizations of actuarial gains or losses.
51
 Service costs are the pension analog of other 
                                                 
50
 Some German companies are a mixture of a stock corporation and a limited partnership. One partner is 
unlimited liable for the company’s debt. 
51
 This composition was required by the old version of IAS 19, which companies had to comply with since 
2005. Under the revised version, which companies have to comply with since 2013, allocations to pension 
provisions include net changes in the actuarial value of liabilities and plan assets and not net amortizations. 
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flow compensation that the CEO receives for her service in the company. Total allocations 
to pension provisions are the pension analog of changes in the equity portfolio that the 
CEO holds (see Sundaram and Yermack (2007)). Total allocations can be negative if, for 
example, the CEO agrees on a salary cut, if interest rates change, or if the company 
changes the terms of the pension agreement. 
Executive pensions are secured claims. German law requires firms to pay premiums to an 
insurance company that settles the pension claims if the company files for bankruptcy. The 
insurance is also mandatory if the company pays contributions to an external fund. If the 
external fund files for bankruptcy, the company becomes liable for the pension claims. 
Executive pensions receive a beneficial tax treatment. Allocations to pension provisions or 
external funds are immediately tax deductible for the company. The CEO does not have to 
pay taxes until pension benefits are paid out. 
The treatment of executive pensions is quite different in the US. US firms commonly grant 
executive pensions through supplemental executive retirement plans (SERPs), which are 
also mainly defined benefit plans. However, pension benefits are unsecured claims that 
receive the same treatment as the claims of other creditors in the event of bankruptcy. 
Moreover, US firms enjoy the tax deductibility at the time when executive pensions are 
paid out. A reduction of the joint tax burden thus depends on the current and future 
marginal tax rates that apply to the income of the company and the CEO (see Bebchuk and 
Jackson (2005) and Sundaram and Yermack (2007)). 
 
2.3 The corporate governance reform from 2009 
The recent financial crisis brought executive compensation under the public’s radar screen. 
Politicians and commentators hypothesized that executive compensation induced myopic 
behavior and excessive risk-taking and was therefore a main culprit in the crisis. In 
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response to such concerns, several governments passed reforms of executive compensation 
and corporate governance (see Hill (2010) and Conyon et al. (2011)). In Germany, the 
parliament passed a law on the “Adequacy of management board compensation” in 
summer 2009. The provisions provide guidelines for adequate compensation levels and 
adequate compensation structures, make the supervisory board more accountable for 
executive compensation, and regulate the composition of the supervisory board: 
 
(1) Disclosure of pensions and severance pay: The law makes the Code recommendation 
on the disclosure of pension costs legally binding. For fiscal years after 2009, firms have to 
disclose the yearly allocations to pension provisions or pension funds. In addition, firms 
have to disclose the present value of pensions for individual executives and have to report 
any value changes that result from changing the pension agreements. The same rules apply 
to separation agreements in the event of early termination (severance pay). 
(2) Say-on-pay: The law gives shareholders a non-binding vote to approve the 
compensation system at the annual meeting. 
(3) Adequate compensation levels: Under the old rules, the supervisory board had to 
consider the tasks of the executive and the financial situation of the company to determine 
adequate compensation levels. The new rules add two criteria. The supervisory board shall 
consider the performance of the executive and shall use the compensation in peer firms as 
a benchmark for “common” compensation levels. 
(4) Adequate duration of executive compensation: The law clarifies that the supervisory 
board has to design executive compensation in a way that supports a sustainable corporate 
development. The law increases the minimum vesting period from two to four years for 
equity-based plans that are settled in equity from contingent capital. The four-year vesting 
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period provides a reference value for other variable compensation components. In general, 
all variable compensation shall be based on performance measured over several years.  
(5) Adequate risk-taking incentives: The compensation agreement shall include caps and 
clawback provisions to account for extremely positive and negative developments. If the 
company takes out a directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (D&O), the insurance for 
executives has to include a deductible of at least 10% of the loss up to a minimum amount 
of 150% of fixed compensation.  
(6) Responsibility of the supervisory board: The law clarifies that the supervisory board as 
a whole – and not any of its committees – sets executive compensation. The law further 
underscores that supervisory board members are personally liable if executive 
compensation is not adequate. 
(7) Composition of the supervisory board: Executives can be appointed to the supervisory 
board no earlier than two years after they left the management board. The cooling-off 
period is not binding if shareholders support the proposal for appointment with 25% of the 
voting rights. 
 
The shock to existing governance and compensation practice mainly comes from the 
mandatory increase in disclosures of pensions and severance pay, from say-on-pay, from 
mandatory deductibles in D&O insurances, and from mandatory cooling-off periods. 
Statements about caps, clawback provisions, and long-term performance benchmarks are 
unspecific and ultimately remain recommendations that were already covered by the 
Corporate Governance Code before the law. While four-year vesting periods become 
mandatory for equity claims on contingent capital, firms can easily circumvent this rule by 
granting virtual equity instruments, such as phantom stocks and stock appreciation rights. 
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3 Hypothesis development 
3.1 Theories about pensions and implications for the disclosure policy 
The different roles of pensions in executive compensation follow from the two dominating 
views about whether executive compensation is efficient or not. Under the managerial 
power view, executive compensation is largely inefficient. This hypothesis relies on three 
assumptions (see Bebchuk and Fried (2004)). First, the CEO prefers more compensation to 
less compensation (non-satiation). Second, the CEO has captured the board and sets her 
own pay. Third, excess pay attracts public outrage, which imposes financial and non-
financial costs on the CEO and the board. 
The first and the second assumption imply that CEOs grant themselves more pay than they 
would receive under arm’s length bargaining. The second assumption implies that internal 
governance mechanisms, such as blockholders and independent boards, and external 
governance mechanisms, such as product market competition and the market for corporate 
control, are not strong enough to prevent the CEO from extracting excess pay.
52
 The 
second and the third assumption imply that the CEO and the board have an incentive to 
hide or camouflage the amount of excess pay to mitigate public outrage. The notion of 
outrage and the costs it entails are the critical assumptions. The fear from outrage 
stimulates the CEO to deviate from optimal incentive levels because the CEO adopts 
compensation components for their camouflage value and not for their incentive effects 
(see also Murphy (2002)). Bebchuk and Fried (2004) speculate that the losses from an 
inefficient incentive design far exceed the losses from excess pay. 
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 See Shleifer and Vishny (1997) for an overview of corporate governance mechanisms. 
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To provide empirical evidence for the managerial power view, Bebchuk and Fried (2004) 
and Bebchuk and Jackson (2005) discuss, among others, the role of pensions.
53
 They argue 
that pensions have long been a suitable candidate to hide pay. Until 2006, US firms had to 
provide only descriptive details about executive pensions. While it was principally possible 
to estimate the present value of pensions from the descriptions, the calculations required 
sophisticated actuarial skills which were probably beyond the skills of most investors (see 
Sundaram and Yermack (2007)). A broader audience was unaware of the magnitude of 
pension values until Bebchuk and Jackson (2005) provided a descriptive analysis for a 
subsample of S&P 500 firms.
54
 According to their calculations, the present value of 
pensions is worth around 30% of total compensation that the CEO receives throughout her 
tenure. They conclude that pension grants enable the CEO to understate the actual 
compensation level and to overstate compensation paid for performance. 
Bebchuk and Fried’s (2004) claims about the role of executive pensions have been 
challenged on theoretical and empirical grounds. Proponents of the efficient contracting 
view put forward three reasons for the use of pensions.
55
 First, firms grant pensions 
because they reduce the tax burden for the CEO at no cost for the company (see Scholes et 
al. (2014)). This is true for Germany where the CEO pays income taxes at the time when 
pensions are paid out while the company immediately enjoys the tax deduction for 
allocations to pension funds and pension provisions. 
Second, Sundaram and Yermack (2007) argue that pension grants enable firms to time the 
retirement decision of the CEO. The CEO has an incentive to stay with the company until 
the age, at which she is entitled to the full amount of her pensions. Sundaram and Yermack 
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 Bebchuk and Fried (2004) doubt the efficiency of many pay components. For a summary of their 
arguments, see Bebchuk and Fried (2005). 
54
 Sundaram and Yermack (2007) is the first article with a systematic treatment of pensions. 
55
 For an overview of models that reconcile many controversial pay patterns with the optimal contracting 
view, see Edmans and Gabaix (2009). For empirical evidence against the managerial power view in general, 
see Murphy (2002) and Core, Guay, and Thomas (2005). 
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(2007) estimate that voluntary CEO turnover increases by around 4 percentage points once 
pensions are fully payable.  
Third, Edmans and Liu (2011) formalize Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) claim that pensions 
mitigate the agency costs of debt. Since equity is an option on the company’s cash flows, 
the CEO who holds only equity sub-optimally increases the riskiness of the cash flows at 
the expense of debtholders. Pensions can mitigate the risk-shifting problem because they 
align the interests of the CEO with those of debt holders. This hypothesis, however, relies 
on the assumption that executive pensions are unsecured claims in the case of bankruptcy 
and is therefore not applicable to the German case. 
There is empirical evidence that the two views, managerial power and optimal contracting, 
are complementary and that the quality of corporate governance determines which view is 
more appropriate. Gerakos (2010) finds that strong boards grant their CEOs one dollar of 
pensions in exchange for one dollar of other compensation while weak boards grant their 
CEOs one dollar of pensions in addition to other forms of compensation.
56
  
The complementary nature of the theories can explain why some firms hide pensions while 
other firms make pensions observable. Hidden pensions indicate weak boards, in which 
uncontrolled CEOs extract excess pay in the form of pensions as part of an inefficient 
compensation arrangement. If firms grant pensions as part of an efficient contract, they 
have nothing to hide. Observable pensions thus indicate strong boards that grant pensions 
as part of an efficient compensation arrangement. There is empirical evidence that firms 
with strong boards provide more detailed disclosures of executive compensation in general. 
Laksmana (2008) develops a transparency index for pay disclosures. She finds that pay 
disclosures are more detailed if board members are independent, serve on fewer other 
boards, and were not appointed by the CEO. 
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 Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000, 2001) and Kim and Lu (2011) provide further evidence that contracting 
is efficient in companies with strong internal and external governance mechanisms. 
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The derived implications for the disclosure policy assume that pay disclosures are not 
costly for shareholders. Jensen and Murphy (1990), however, argue that pay disclosures 
give a voice to political forces, which raise concerns about fairness or income inequality 
and care less about the maximization of shareholder value. To minimize the costs from 
outrage, boards may deviate from efficient compensation designs at the expense of 
shareholders. Under this view, hidden pensions do not indicate weak boards and inefficient 
compensation designs. Rather, firms hide pensions to prevent deviations from efficient 
arrangements. 
 
3.2 Empirical predictions 
I derive empirical predictions under Bebchuk and Fried’s (2004) assumption that hidden 
pensions indicate weak boards and inefficient compensation designs. Prior studies produce 
evidence that weakly governed firms have lower firm values and lower operating 
performance.
57
 If Bebchuk and Fried’s (2004) assumption holds, we should observe similar 
differences between firms with observable and hidden pensions:  
 
Hypothesis 1: Firms with hidden pensions have lower firm values than firms with 
observable pensions. 
Hypothesis 2: Firms with hidden pensions have lower operating performance than firms 
with observable pensions.  
 
To explore the nature of any agency costs I analyze corporate policies that may reflect 
managerial preferences rather than the maximization of shareholder value. One hypothesis 
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 For the influence of board size, see Yermack (1996). For staggered boards, see Bebchuk and Cohen 
(2005). For shareholder rights, see Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) and Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell 
(2009). For powerful CEOs relative to other executives, see Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2011). 
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is that CEOs prefer to live the quiet life, and that uncontrolled CEOs can do so. Bertrand 
and Mullainathan (1999, 2003) find that employee wages rise after the passage of 
antitakeover laws while productive efficiency does not. They argue that antitakeover laws 
reduce the disciplining effect of the market for corporate control. CEOs have more 
discretion to avoid stressful tasks, such as bargaining with unions, and higher employee 
wages create a peaceful atmosphere in the company consistent with the quiet life 
hypothesis. 
Another hypothesis is that CEOs prefer to run larger firms (Jensen (1986)), and that 
uncontrolled CEOs can pursue this goal by making value-destroying acquisitions. 
Consistent with the empire-building hypothesis, Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) find 
that firms with more antitakeover provisions are more acquisitive. Masulis, Wang, and Xie 
(2007) find that bidder returns around acquisition announcements are lower if the bidder 
has more antitakeover provisions, operates in industries with lower product market 
competition, or has a CEO who is also the chairman of the board. 
If the disclosure policy for pensions indicates the magnitude of agency problems, we 
should observe similar differences between firms with observable and hidden pensions:  
 
Hypothesis 3: Firms with hidden pensions pay higher wages than firms with observable 
pensions. 
Hypothesis 4: Firms with hidden pensions are more acquisitive and make worse 
acquisitions than firms with observable pensions.  
 
The four hypotheses state associations between the disclosure policy for pensions, firm 
performance, and agency costs. To address causality, I analyze announcement returns to 
the corporate governance reform, which the German parliament passed in summer 2009. 
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The law represents an exogenous shock to corporate governance structures, which firms 
have determined endogenously in equilibrium. Thus, the law serves as a natural instrument 
that mitigates endogeneity concerns and allows us to identify causal effects of changes in 
the governance structure.  
The law includes many provisions that mirror Bebchuk and Fried’s (2004) suggestions to 
improve the quality of board decision-making.
58
 If existing board structures are indeed 
ineffective and enable the CEO to pursue her own interests rather than shareholders’ 
interests, stock prices should react positively to the announcement of the law. If board 
structures are effective and push the CEO to act in the best interest of shareholders, stock 
prices should react negatively to the announcement of the law (see also Larcker, 
Ormazabal, and Taylor (2011)). For some of the provisions included in the law, there 
exists empirical evidence consistent with both views. Provisions are beneficial for firms 
with weak corporate governance, but costly for firms with strong corporate governance. 
For other provisions, the literature provides at least theoretical arguments for potential 
costs and benefits.  
In Albrecht (2014) I find that stock prices react positively to mandatory increases in pay 
disclosures. Abnormal returns are decreasing in institutional ownership and become 
negative for large institutional ownership. This result suggests that mandatory pension 
disclosures are beneficial for poorly governed firms and may be costly for well-governed 
firms. 
For a sample of large US firms, Cai and Walkling (2011) find that weakly governed firms 
with inefficient compensation designs had positive abnormal returns when the House 
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 Bebchuk and Fried (2004) support pension disclosures, say-on-pay, payouts for long-term performance, 
clawback provisions, and rules for board independence, among others. Lucian A. Bebchuk lists his advisory 
services for politicians on his website at http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/policy.shtml. 
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passed the Say-on-Pay Bill. They also find that say-on-pay is costly for other firms because 
they get targeted by groups for reasons other than the maximization of shareholder value.  
For a sample of Canadian firms, Lin et al. (2013) find that executives that are covered by 
D&O insurances make value-increasing investments in well-governed firms and value-
destroying investments in poorly governed firms. The majority of these D&O insurances 
do not require personal deductibles (see Lin, Officer, and Zou (2011) and Core (2000)). 
The results suggest that a mandatory personal deductible is beneficial in poorly governed 
firms because deductibles mitigate moral hazard and reduce costly overinvestments by 
uncontrolled CEOs. In well-governed firms, however, a mandatory personal deductible is 
costly because the company must compensate the CEO for the additional risk of litigation 
costs. Otherwise, the risk-averse CEO may forgo risky investment projects with a positive 
net present value (see Core (1997)).  
A similar reasoning can be applied to the norms that the board should follow for the design 
of compensation designs. The introduction of caps for extremely good states and clawback 
provisions for extremely bad states makes the relation between payouts and performance 
more concave at the upper and lower tails of the payout distribution. Hence, caps and 
clawback provisions may mitigate excessive risk-taking in poorly governed firms, but may 
result in insufficient risk-taking in well-governed firms.
59
 Similarly, tying pay to long-term 
performance mitigates myopic behavior or gives the CEO excessive equity incentives, 
which she cannot unwind (see Core and Guay (2010)).  
The introduction of cooling-off periods can make board monitoring more or less effective. 
Cooling-off periods can be beneficial because personal connections between current and 
former executives can create conflicts of interest, for example, when current executives 
would like to revoke wrong strategic decisions of their former colleagues. Cooling-off 
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 See Dittmann, Maug, and Zhang (2011) for caps, and Babenko et al. (2012) for clawback provisions. 
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periods can be costly because current executives can benefit from the advice of former 
executives who have acquired firm-specific human capital during their tenure (see Andres, 
Fernau, and Theissen (2013)). 
If the disclosure policy for pensions indicates the effectiveness of boards and the efficiency 
of compensation designs, I expect that the benefits of the provisions outweigh the costs in 
firms with hidden pensions, while the costs outweigh the benefits in firms with observable 
pensions: 
 
Hypothesis 5: For firms with hidden pensions, stock prices react positively to the 
announcement of the law. 
Hypothesis 6: For firms with observable pensions, stock prices react negatively to the 
announcement of the law. 
 
Hypotheses 5 and 6 take into account the benefits and costs of the law for each company in 
isolation. However, proponents of legislative intervention often point to negative 
externalities as the main source for welfare increases (see, e.g., Hermalin and Weisbach 
(2006)). Under this view, the law creates positive spill-over effects because it mitigates 
negative externalities, which poorly governed firms impose on well-governed firms. For 
example, a negative externality could arise if poorly and well-governed firms compete for 
managerial talent in the labor market. Excess pay for CEOs of poorly governed firms 
increases the value of outside options for CEOs of well-governed firms. The law may 
benefit well-governed firms because any pay reductions in poorly governed firms 
simultaneously reduce the participation constraint of CEOs of well-governed firms. Such 
positive spill-over effects arise in models, in which corporate governance and executive 
compensation are substitutes (see Acharya and Volpin (2010) and Dicks (2012)). 
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Positive spill-over effects imply that stock prices of well-governed firms react positively to 
the announcement of the law. This implication is at odds with Hypothesis 6, which predicts 
a negative stock price reaction. To reconcile Hypothesis 6 with the notion of spill-over 
effects, I assume that the law also creates negative spill-over effects. Negative effects 
could arise if the law mitigates inefficiencies in compensation designs of poorly governed 
firms. Assume, for example, that poorly and well-governed firms compete in product 
markets. If more efficient compensation increases the competitiveness of poorly governed 
firms, the performance margins of well-governed firms may diminish. It is therefore not 
clear that the law creates positive spill-over effects in total. Note that negative spill-over 
effects do not arise in models, in which corporate governance and executive compensation 
are substitutes. In these models, it is efficient for poorly governed firms to compensate the 
CEO with more pay for performance. In contrast, I assume that poorly governed firms have 
inefficient compensation designs consistent with the managerial power view. 
 
4 Data 
4.1 Sample construction and data sources 
I identify 248 firms, which were included in the four main German stock market indexes, 
DAX, MDAX, SDAX, and TecDAX, at any point in time between March 24, 2003 and 
December 31, 2009. On March 24, 2003, Deutsche Börse launched its new index structure 
with these main indexes. The indexes include the largest 160 firms with stocks traded on 
the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. The sample period ends in 2009 because the corporate 
governance reform from 2009 mandates the disclosure of pension costs for later fiscal 
years. From the initial sample I exclude four firms with a special legal form and 22 firms 
with a foreign headquarter. These firms do not have to comply with the disclosure law. I 
exclude 39 firms from the financial industry (SIC codes from 6000 to 6999) because some 
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financial characteristics, such as leverage, are not comparable between financial and non-
financial firms (see Fama and French (1992)). Finally, I exclude 45 firms whose 
shareholders exploited the loophole of the disclosure law and voted against pay disclosures 
for individual executives. I exclude these firms because my interest is in those cases, in 
which the CEO decides about the transparency of pay disclosures. The final sample 
includes 138 non-financial firms, which have to disclose pay for individual executives 
under the disclosure law.
60
 
The exclusion of firms whose shareholders vote against pay disclosures induces a selection 
bias. The final sample is arguably biased towards firms with smaller blockholders and, 
thus, more agency problems Firms should be more likely to receive a three-quarters 
majority against pay disclosures if large blockholders are present. Agency costs are lower 
in firms with large blockholders because large blockholders are more effective monitors 
(see Shleifer and Vishny (1986)). For this reason, Bebchuk and Fried (2004) assume the 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) type of company with dispersed ownership for the most part 
of the discussion of the managerial power view. 
I collect data from several sources. Data on the disclosure policy and executive 
compensation come from annual reports, company financials and stock returns from 
Computat Global, data on ownership structure from Hoppenstedt company profiles (a 
periodical comparable to Moody’s manuals), data on firm age from company websites, 
data on CEO age from BoardEx, Hoppenstedt company profiles, and annual reports, data 
on mergers and acquisitions from the Securities Data Corporation’s database (SDC), daily 
risk factors for Germany from Richard Stehle’s website, monthly risk factors for Germany 
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 The final sample includes ten companies, which delisted before 2006. It is not observable whether their 
shareholders are against pay disclosures for individual executives. The results are robust to the exclusion of 
these companies. 
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from the Centre for Financial Research in Cologne, and index returns from Datastream.
61
 
Table III.1 outlines the construction and the source of all variables. Tables III.2 to III.5 
report descriptive statistics. 
 
4.2 Disclosure policy and pension costs 
I identify 97 firms, which voluntarily disclose pension costs at some time during the 
sample period: 71 firms disclose allocations to pension provisions, three firms disclose 
allocations to pension funds, and 23 firms do not have any pension costs because they do 
not grant pensions. The disclosure of allocations to pension provisions is not uniform: 75% 
disclose total allocations, 18% disclose only service costs, and 7% disclose service costs 
and interest costs. 
Panel A of Table III.2 shows the number of firms that start disclosing pension costs in each 
year. The number of firms with initial disclosures sharply increases in 2006, which is the 
year when the sample firms have to comply with the disclosure law for the first time, and 
when the Corporate Governance Code recommends disclosures of pension costs for the 
first time. The Code recommendation seems to be quite effective. Among the 97 firms, 55 
firms voluntarily disclosed compensation components for individual executives before 
2006, but only ten of those firms additionally disclosed pension costs. Among the 41 firms 
that did not voluntarily disclose pension costs during the sample period, 19 firms 
voluntarily disclosed other compensation components for individual executives before 
2006. 
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 Daily risk factors are available at http://www.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/professuren/bwl/bb/data/fama-french-
factors-germany. I use daily risk factors calculated from the “top segment”. The top segment includes only 
stocks that are traded on markets regulated by federal law. See Brückner et al. (2014) for details on the 
construction of daily risk factors. Monthly risk factors are available at http://www.cfr-cologne.de. See 
Artmann et al. (2012) for details. 
85 
 
To gain some insight into the magnitude of pension costs I collect data on executive 
compensation for fiscal year 2006 for all but four firms, which initially disclosed pension 
costs in 2008. For these four firms I collect compensation data for 2007, which is disclosed 
in the annual reports from 2008, and normalize them to 2006 Euros.
62
 To qualify for 
inclusion in the compensation sample, executives must serve for the full fiscal year. Panel 
B of Table III.2 shows descriptive statistics for compensation variables. Executives receive 
mean (median) total compensation of € 1.4 million (€ 1 million). The mean (median) 
fraction of short-term incentives is 40% (41%), and the mean (median) fraction of long-
term incentives is 15% (4%). Total compensation excludes pension costs. For firms that 
disclose pension costs, the mean (median) costs per executive amount to € 215 thousand (€ 
73 thousand). Pension costs increase total compensation by 15% for the mean executive 
and by 7% for the median executive. The fraction of pension costs is quite similar in the 
US. For a subsample of firms from the S&P 500, Sundaram and Yermack (2007) find that 
total pension costs for CEOs amount to 11% of total compensation including service costs, 
on average. 
The right columns in Panel B of Table III.2 show mean values of compensation variables 
for firms that do and do not disclose pension costs. Total compensation and the fraction of 
short-term and long-term incentives are significantly lower in firms with hidden pensions. 
In these firms, executives receive mean total compensation of € 0.8 million, with 35% in 
the form of short-term incentives and 10% in the form of long-term incentives. In firms 
with observable pensions, executives receive mean total compensation of € 1.5 million, 
with 41% in the form of short-term incentives and 17% in the form of long-term 
incentives.  
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 For 16 companies, which disclosed pension costs for the first time in 2007, I use compensation data for 
2006 from the 2007 annual reports. 
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4.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table III.3 shows the industry distribution of the sample, classified by Fama-French 12 
industry groups. Firms from the manufacturing (25%) and business equipment (20%) 
industries are overrepresented. Energy firms are not included, and financial firms are 
missing by construction. The industry distribution is quite similar between firms with 
observable and hidden pensions. Two exceptions are the business equipment industry and 
the chemicals and allied products industry. Firms in the business equipment industry tend 
to hide pensions while firms in the chemicals and allied products industry tend to disclose 
pensions. 
Table III.4 reports descriptive statistics for all variables used in the regression analysis. 
Panel A of Table III.4 shows descriptive statistics for firm and executive characteristics. 
The variables cover the fiscal years 2002 to 2009. I add observations for 2002 because 
some of the variables enter the regressions with a lag of one year. The main independent 
variable in most of the analysis is the dummy variable Pension disclosurei,t, which equals 
one if company i discloses pension costs for individual executives in year t. The dummy 
has a mean value of 0.37, which indicates that pension costs are observable for 37% of all 
firm-year observations. The sample firms have mean (median) market value of equity of € 
4.82 billion (€ 0.54 billion), mean (median) total assets of € 11.14 billion (€ 0.74 billion), 
and mean (median) sales of € 7.48 billion (€ 0.77 billion). Sales are normalized to 2002 
Euros with the consumer price index from the Federal Statistical Office of Germany. 
For the analysis of performance differences I use Tobin’s Q, return on assets (ROA), and 
operating profit margin (OPM) to proxy for firm value and operating performance. Tobin’s 
Q is the market value of total assets scaled by the book value of total assets. The market 
value of total assets equals the book value of total assets minus the book value of common 
equity and deferred taxes plus the market value of common equity (see, e.g., Kaplan and 
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Zingales (1997)). ROA and OPM are calculated as operating income before depreciation 
divided by total assets and sales, respectively (see, e.g., Core, Guay, and Rusticus (2006)). 
The sample firms have mean (median) Tobin’s Q of 1.52 (1.25), mean (median) ROA of 
9.4% (10.6%), and mean (median) OPM of -7.4% (10.4%). 
For the analysis of wage differences I calculate the average employee wage as staff 
expenses divided by the number of employees (Wages). Staff expenses include salaries, 
wages, profit sharing, incentive compensation, pension costs, other benefit plans, and 
payroll taxes, and are normalized to 2002 Euros. The mean (median) company pays 
employees € 45 thousand (€ 46 thousand) per year. 
For the analysis of acquisition activities I construct an acquisition sample from SDC. I 
identify 358 acquisitions made by 91 firms that meet three selection rules (see, e.g., 
Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007)). First, the sample firms are bidders and completed the 
acquisition between March 25, 2003 and December 31, 2009 (met by 533 acquisitions). 
Second, the bidder owns less than 50% of the target’s shares before the announcement and 
owns 100%, when the deal is completed (met by 380 acquisitions). Third, bidder 
characteristics are available in Compustat Global, and deal characteristics are available in 
SDC. I do not exclude cross-border deals and deals below a certain threshold value to 
maintain sample size. Almost two thirds (234) of all deals are cross-border acquisitions, 
and SDC does not report the deal value for around 70% of the acquisitions.
63
 
Panel B of Table III.4 shows descriptive statistics for the acquisition sample. Proxies for 
acquisitiveness are the variables Acquisition count and Acquisition likelihood (see, e.g., 
Giroud and Mueller (2011)). Acquisition count indicates all acquisitions that a company 
made during the fiscal year. Acquisition likelihood is a dummy and equals one if a 
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 These additional selection rules are quite common in studies of mergers and acquisitions in the US. Typical 
thresholds for deal values are $ 1 million and 1% of the bidder’s market value (see Netter, Stegemoller, and 
Wintoki (2011)). 
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company makes at least one acquisition during the fiscal year. Their mean values of 0.37 
and 0.23 suggest that the average company makes 0.37 acquisitions per year, and that the 
likelihood for making at least one acquisition per year amounts to 23%. My proxy for the 
quality of acquisitions is the variable CAR(-2, +2), which measures the cumulative 
abnormal return for the bidder in the 5-day event window around the acquisition 
announcement (see, e.g., Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007)). Abnormal returns are residuals 
from the market model. To estimate the parameters of the market model, I regress the 
bidder’s daily returns on CDAX returns during the estimation period from day -211 to day 
-11 before the announcement. The CDAX index represents a value weighted portfolio that 
includes all German firms listed on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. The mean (median) 
cumulative abnormal return is 0.2% (-0.1%). 
Panel C of Table III.4 shows descriptive statistics for stock returns. For the event study of 
the corporate governance reform from 2009, I use daily excess and daily market-adjusted 
returns from October 1, 2008 to July 31, 2009. Excess returns are stock returns minus the 
risk-free rate. Market-adjusted returns are stock returns minus the return on the CDAX 
index. The mean and median daily excess return is zero. The mean and median daily 
market-adjusted return is 0.1% and -0.1%.  
The right columns of Table III.4 show mean values of the variables for subsamples 
separated by Pension Disclosure. Simple t-tests indicate several significant differences. 
Firms with hidden pensions are smaller, have higher book-to-market ratios, more fixed 
assets (PPE/Total assets), lower capital expenditures (CAPEX/PPE), invest more in 
research and development (R&D/Sales), have lower sales per employee (Labor 
productivity), are younger (Firm age), and their executives hold a larger fraction of 
common stock (Executive ownership). Differences in performance are partly evident. 
While Tobin’s Q and ROA are not significantly lower, the difference in OPM is striking. 
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The average OPM is -16% for firms with hidden pensions and 7.2% for firms with 
observable pensions. Firms with hidden pensions pay higher wages. Activities in the 
market for corporate control and daily returns are similar between the subsamples. 
The exclusion of firms whose shareholders vote against pay disclosures for individual 
executives induces a selection bias. Table III.5 reports mean values of selected variables 
for the sample firms and excluded firms. The t-tests indicate several significant differences. 
The sample firms are much larger. Their average market value of equity is more than three 
times higher, total assets are more than six times higher, and sales are almost four times 
higher. External blockholders hold a significantly lower fraction of common stock in the 
sample firms. Finally, the sample firms perform significantly worse. Tobin’s Q, ROA, and 
OPM are significantly lower. The differences are consistent with the view that the final 
sample is biased towards firms with more agency problems. 
 
5 Empirical analysis 
5.1 Pension disclosures and firm performance 
5.1.1 Pension disclosures and firm value 
I use the following regression model to analyze the association between pension 
disclosures and firm value:  
 
Qi,t = a+ b × Pi,t + c’ × Ci,t + d ×Qi,t-1 + ej + ft +εi,t            (III.1) 
 
The dependent variable, Qi,t, is the logarithm of Tobin’s Q for company i in year t (t = 
2003,...,2009), Pi,t is the dummy variable Pension disclosure, Ci,t is a vector of time-
varying controls, Qi,t-1 is the logarithm of lagged Tobin’s Q, ej are industry fixed effects 
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based on the Fama-French 48 industry classification, and ft are year fixed effects. I do not 
adjust Qi,t by industry means or medians consistent with studies about Tobin’s Q and 
managerial ownership (see the influential work by Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988)), 
but inconsistent with studies about Tobin’s Q and shareholder rights (see the influential 
work by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003)). Gormley and Matsa (2014) show that 
industry adjustments of dependent variables are likely to produce inconsistent estimates.
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The vector Ci,t includes control variables that have a significant association with Tobin’s Q 
in studies for the US (see Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999) and Kim and Lu 
(2011)). The first set of controls proxies for the scope for managerial discretion and, thus, 
may also be related to Pension disclosure. I include the logarithm of sales and its square 
because larger firms may be more difficult to monitor for the supervisory board up to the 
point where external monitors, such as rating agencies, provide additional monitoring 
services. I include fixed assets scaled by sales (PPE/Sales) and its square because 
operations with fixed assets are easier to monitor for the board, capital expenditures scaled 
by fixed assets (CAPEX/PPE) to control for the scope for discretionary investments in 
tangible assets, R&D expenditures scaled by sales (R&D/Sales) to control for the scope for 
discretionary investments in intangible assets, and the standard error of residuals from the 
market model (Sigma) because higher idiosyncratic firm risk may be associated with more 
managerial discretion (see Demsetz and Lehn (1985)). To maintain sample size, I set 
R&D/Sales and Sigma to zero if they are missing, and include two dummy variables for 
missing observations.
65
 The second set of controls includes Executive ownership and its 
square to control for incentive and entrenchment effects from holding stock, the logarithm 
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 The bias comes from an omitted variable problem. Regressions with industry-adjusted dependent variables 
typically fail to control for industry means or medians of the independent variables. 
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 I do not control for advertising expenditures because Compustat Global does not cover them. Himmelberg, 
Hubbard, and Palia (1999) use advertising expenditures in addition to R&D expenditures to control for the 
scope for discretionary investments in intangible assets. 
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of CEO age because older CEOs may be more entrenched (see Cronqvist et al. (2009)), 
and the logarithm of firm age because firm age may be related to board structure (see 
Linck, Netter, and Yang (2008)). All variables are winsorized at the 5% and 95% levels to 
mitigate the influence of outliers. 
The inclusion of lagged Q mitigates concerns that unobserved factors, which have a similar 
effect on current and lagged Q, strongly drive the results because Tobin’s Q is highly 
persistent (see, e.g., Dittmann, Maug, and Schneider (2010) and Bebchuk, Cremers, and 
Peyer (2011)). The specification with lagged Q and industry fixed effects explores within-
firm and between-firm variation in the disclosure policy for pensions. I do not estimate the 
model with firm fixed effects, which would explore within-firm variation only (see 
Arellano and Bond (1991)). Within-firm identification is consistent with the view that the 
majority of firms voluntarily disclosed pension costs once they were well governed. This 
view, however, seems to be too strict. The clustering of initial disclosures in 2006 would 
imply that almost all firms in the sample were poorly governed before 2006. In contrast, 
the regression without firm fixed effects may identify differences in Q even if many firms 
were well governed before their initial disclosure year. 
Column 1 of Table III.6 shows the estimated coefficients with t-statistics, which are based 
on standard errors clustered at the company level. The regression identifies a significant 
difference in Q between firms with observable and hidden pensions. The Pension 
disclosure dummy has a coefficient of 0.033 with a t-statistic, which is significant at the 
10% level. The estimate indicates that firms with hidden pensions have a 3.3% lower Q 
than firms with observable pensions.  
Most control variables are not significant. Notable exceptions are lagged Q and Executive 
ownership. For lagged Q, the significant coefficient of 0.699 confirms that Tobin’s Q is 
highly persistent. For Executive ownership, the signs of the coefficients indicate a hump-
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shaped association as in Kim and Lu (2011). However, the coefficient on the square term is 
not significantly different from zero. 
 
5.1.2 Pension disclosures and operating performance 
To analyze the association between pension disclosures and operating performance, I 
estimate regressions with the same vector of time-varying controls as in equation (III.1). 
The dependent variable is now either ROA or OPM. The regressions include lags of the 
dependent variables, industry fixed effects, and year fixed effects. All variables are 
winsorized at the 5% and 95% levels to mitigate the influence of outliers. Standard errors 
are clustered at the company level.  
The middle and the right column of Table III.6 show the estimated coefficients. The 
estimates provide some evidence that firms with hidden pensions have a lower operating 
performance. In column 2, which shows results from the ROA regression, the disclosure 
dummy has a coefficient of 0.007. The estimate indicates that firms with hidden pensions 
have a 0.7 percentage point lower return on assets than firms with observable pensions. 
However, the economic significance is quite low given a sample mean of 9.4%, and the t-
statistic misses significance (p-value of 14%). These results suggest that return on assets 
does not significantly differ between firms with hidden and observable pensions.  
Column 3 shows results from the OPM regression. The disclosure dummy has a coefficient 
of 0.012 with a t-statistic significant at the 10% level. The estimate indicates that firms 
with hidden pensions have a 1.2 percentage point lower operating profit margin than firms 
with observable pensions. The economic significance is also quite large given a sample 
mean of -7.4%. 
Among the control variables, the statistical and economic significance of the lagged 
dependent variables is again striking. Lagged ROA has a coefficient of 0.606 with a t-
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statistic significant at the 1% level. Lagged OPM has a coefficient of 0.667, which is also 
significant at the 1% level. The estimates imply that both dependent variables are highly 
persistent.  
 
5.2 Pension disclosures and agency costs 
The results so far indicate that firms with hidden pensions are sold at a discount and have 
lower operating profit margins. To gain some insight into the underlying drivers of these 
differences, I present results from my analysis of wage policies and acquisition activity. 
Prior literature has identified these polices as sources for agency costs (see, e.g., Bertrand 
and Mullainathan (1999, 2003) and Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003)). 
 
5.2.1 Pension disclosures and employee wages 
To analyze the association between pension disclosures and wage policy, I estimate 
regressions with the logarithm of Wages as the dependent variable. Time-varying control 
variables are drawn from prior literature about wage determinants. I include the logarithm 
of firm age because Brown and Medoff (2003) find that older firms pay higher wages. I 
include the logarithm of sales because Oi and Idson (1999) find that larger firms pay 
higher wages. I also control for leverage and capital intensity. Berk, Stanton, and Zechner 
(2010) argue that firms with higher leverage and capital-intensive firms pay higher wages 
to compensate employees for the increased risk of wage cuts or layoffs in the case of 
financial distress. Leverage is the book value of short-term and long-term debt divided by 
the market value of total assets. I define capital intensity as the ratio of fixed assets to total 
assets (PPE/Total assets). To control for growth opportunities and risk characteristics, I 
include R&D expenditures scaled by sales (R&D/Sales). I set R&D/Sales to zero if it is 
missing, and include a dummy for missing observations to maintain sample size (see, e.g., 
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Kim and Ouimet (2014)). I also include the logarithm of current and lagged Labor 
productivity. The effect of lagged Labor productivity is ambiguous. High past productivity 
can have a positive effect on wages because high productivity allows unions to bargain 
more aggressively with the CEO. The effect can be negative if HR professionals respond to 
high productivity by increasing the benchmark for 100% target achievement in bonus 
plans.
66
 Finally, I add three corporate governance variables. Cronqvist et al. (2009) find 
that wages in Sweden are increasing in CEO’s voting rights and decreasing in CEO’s cash 
flow rights and in external blockholdings. I therefore include the fraction of shares held by 
the management board and by all external blockholders (Executive ownership and External 
blockholders).
67
 Cronqvist et al. (2009) also test, but find no evidence that CEO age is 
positively associated with higher wages. They hypothesize that older CEOs are more 
entrenched and have lower incentives to resist demands for higher wages. I test their 
hypothesis for the German case and include the logarithm of CEO age.  
Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999) also use wage data from Compustat in their study of 
wage changes around the passage of antitakeover laws in the US.
68
 They point out that 
these data are very spotty. While some firms do not report wages at all, others report wages 
only from time to time. Moreover, Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999) observe some 
unreasonably high growth rates in wages and exclude firms with such outliers from their 
sample. A closer inspection of my wage data for Germany suggests that Bertrand and 
Mullainathan’s (1999) concerns are also valid in my sample. I therefore apply their 
thresholds for outliers and exclude consecutive observations, for which the ratio of wages 
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 There is some evidence that CEO compensation is negatively related to past performance (see Core, Guay, 
and Larcker (2008)). 
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 Accordingly, I only test whether the entrenchment effect from the voting right of common stock or the 
incentive effect from the cash flow right of common stock dominates the association between executive 
ownership and wages. 
68
 Other studies that use wage data from Compustat for the US include Hanka (1998), Giroud and Mueller 
(2011), and Chemmanur, Cheng, and Zhang (2013). 
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exceeds 7/4 or falls below 4/7. These thresholds are equivalent to a positive wage change 
of +75% and a negative wage change of -44%. All variables are winsorized at the 5% and 
95% levels to mitigate the influence of outliers. Standard errors are clustered at the 
company level.  
The results, presented in Table III.7, are consistent with the view that CEOs enjoy the quiet 
life in firms with hidden pensions. Column 1 of Table III.7 shows coefficient estimates 
from the regression that excludes the corporate governance variables as controls. The 
disclosure dummy has a coefficient of -0.088 with a t-statistic significant at the 5% level. 
The estimate indicates that firms with hidden pensions pay their employees an 8.8% higher 
wage than firms with observable pensions. 
Most control variables have coefficients with the expected signs. Employees receive higher 
wages in older firms and in firms with more R&D expenditures. Wages are also increasing 
in current labor productivity consistent with findings for Sweden and the US (see 
Cronqvist et al. (2009) and Chemmanur, Cheng, and Zhang (2013)). There is only weak 
evidence that past productivity ratchets up current performance benchmarks. The 
coefficient on lagged Labor productivity is negative but insignificant. Surprisingly, sales 
are negatively associated with wages. For German wage data at the establishment level, 
Kim, Maug, and Schneider (2014) find a negative association between establishment size 
and wages. The coefficient on leverage is positive, as expected, but the t-statistic is not 
significant. Chemmanur, Cheng, and Zhang (2013) find a significantly positive association 
between wages and leverage. The ratio of fixed assets to total assets is not significantly 
associated with wages consistent with findings for the US (see Chemmanur, Cheng, and 
Zhang (2013)).  
Column 2 of Table III.7 shows that the results are robust to the inclusion of corporate 
governance variables. The coefficient on the disclosure dummy is virtually identical to the 
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first specification, and the coefficients on the other variables only change slightly. The 
associations between the corporate governance variables and wages differ from findings 
for Sweden (see Cronqvist et al. (2009)). The ownership variables are not significantly 
associated with wages. Instead, there is a positive and significant association between CEO 
age and wages. 
In untabulated analysis, I use other thresholds than 7/4 and 4/7 to define outliers in the 
distribution of wage changes. I find similar results for thresholds of 6/4 (wage change of 
+50%), 5/4 (+25%), 4.4/4 (+10%), and their respective reciprocal. The results do also hold 
if I apply Bertrand and Mullainathan’s (1999) selection rule and exclude all firms for 
which there exists at least one outlier based on thresholds of 7/4 and 4/7. 
 
5.2.2 Pension disclosures and acquisition activity 
To analyze the association between pension disclosures and acquisition activity, I use the 
acquisition sample compiled from SDC. Firms with hidden pensions make 190 (53%) of 
all acquisitions. This fact suggests that firms with hidden pensions are not significantly 
more acquisitive than firms with observable pensions. To provide a more formal test, I run 
a poisson and a logit regression. In the poisson regression, the dependent variable is 
Acquisition count. In the logit regression, the dependent variable is Acquisition likelihood. 
Since both regressions estimate the likelihood for making large investments, I include 
standard controls from the investment literature starting with Fazzari, Hubbard, and 
Petersen (1988). I include the logarithm of lagged total assets to control for firm size, 
lagged Tobin’s Q to control for investment opportunities, and a proxy for cash flow to 
control for internal funds available for investment. I measure cash flow as earnings before 
extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization scaled by lagged total assets. 
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Control variables are winsorized at the 5% and 95% levels to mitigate the influence of 
outliers. Standard errors are clustered at the company level. 
The estimation results, presented in Table III.8, confirm that firms with hidden pensions 
are not more acquisitive than firms with observable pensions. The coefficient estimates for 
Pension disclosure are negative but not statistically significant at conventional levels. 
Coefficient estimates for the control variables indicate that larger firms and firms with 
higher cash flow make more acquisitions consistent with existing research for the US (see, 
e.g., Harford (1999)). Tobin’s Q has a significantly negative association with Acquisition 
likelihood. Endogenous investment opportunities seem to substitute for exogenous growth 
through acquisitions (see also Malmendier and Tate (2008)). 
What ultimately matters for shareholders is not the number but the quality of acquisitions. 
If CEOs of firms with hidden pensions make acquisitions to build empires for their own 
best interest and not in the interest of shareholders, we should observe that firms with 
hidden pensions make less valuable acquisitions. To test this prediction, I analyze how 
stock prices react to acquisition announcements. In the baseline regression, the dependent 
variable is the cumulative abnormal return from day -2 to day +2 around the announcement 
day (CAR(-2, +2)). Control variables are bidder and deal characteristics. Bidder 
characteristics are the logarithm of total assets, Tobin’s Q, free cash flow, and leverage. 
Their values are measured at fiscal year-ends prior to the announcement day. I include total 
assets to control for bidder size because Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) find that 
larger bidders have lower announcement returns. I include Tobin’s Q because there is some 
evidence that firms with higher Tobin’s Q make better acquisitions (see Servaes (1991)). I 
control for free cash flow because Jensen (1986) argues that firms with excess cash may 
engage in empire building. An alternative view is that free cash flow proxies for talented 
CEOs who make better acquisitions (see Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007)). For tender 
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offers, Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1991) find that bidder returns are decreasing in free cash 
flow. Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007) find the opposite effect in some specifications. I 
control for leverage because Maloney, McCormick, and Mitchell (1993) find that bidder 
returns are increasing in leverage consistent with the disciplining effect of debt (see Jensen 
(1986)). 
Deal characteristics are measured with five dummy variables. Fuller, Netter, and 
Stegemoller (2002) find that bidder returns are negative if the target is a public company 
and positive if the target is a private or subsidiary company. I therefore include three 
dummies to control for public, private, and subsidiary targets. Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1990) find that bidder returns are lower if the target operates in a different industry than 
the bidder. I therefore include a dummy for diversifying acquisitions. The dummy equals 
one if the bidder and the target operate in different Fama-French industries. Moeller and 
Schlingemann (2005) find that bidder returns are lower in cross-border acquisitions than in 
domestic acquisitions. I therefore include a dummy for cross-border acquisitions.
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Continuous variables are winsorized at the 5% and 95% levels to mitigate the influence of 
outliers. Standard errors are clustered at the company level. 
The estimation results, presented in Table III.9, suggest that firms with hidden pensions 
make less valuable acquisitions. The left column of Table III.9 shows coefficient estimates 
for the baseline regression. The disclosure dummy has a coefficient of 0.019 with a t-
statistic significant at the 5% level. The estimate indicates that firms with hidden pensions 
have a 1.91 percentage point lower cumulative abnormal return than firms with observable 
pensions. The economic significance is substantial relative to the sample mean of 0.2%. 
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 Announcement returns are associated with other deal characteristics, such as relative deal values (see 
Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins (1983)) and the method of payment (see Travlos (1987)). I do not control for 
these characteristics because their coverage in SDC is poor. Deal values are missing for around 70% of the 
deals, and the method of payment is missing for around 90% of the deals.  
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Coefficient estimates for the control variables are only partly in line with findings for the 
US. I find a significantly negative coefficient for bidder size consistent with findings by 
Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004). The coefficient on Tobin’s Q is also 
significantly negative, which is again consistent with Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz 
(2004) but inconsistent with Servaes (1991). The coefficient on free cash flow is 
significantly positive consistent with some results in Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007). The 
coefficients on leverage and all deal characteristics are not significant. 
The other columns of Table III.9 show coefficient estimates for robustness tests. In column 
2, I estimate the regression with variables that are not winsorized. The economic 
significance increases. The disclosure dummy has a coefficient estimate of 3.1%. In 
column 3, the dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return for an event window 
of three days. The coefficient estimate of 1.3% remains statistically significant and is 
economically meaningful. In Column 4, I estimate a logit regression for the likelihood that 
stock prices react positively to the acquisition announcements (see, e.g., Bebchuk, 
Cremers, and Peyer (2011)). The dependent variable equals one if the 5-day cumulative 
abnormal return is positive. The estimates indicate that firms with hidden pensions are less 
likely to make acquisitions that benefit shareholders. The coefficient on Pension disclosure 
is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. The coefficient is also economically 
meaningful. The coefficient equates to an average marginal effect of 0.17. The likelihood 
that the company makes a valuable acquisition increases by 17 percentage points when the 
disclosure dummy switches from zero to one. 
 
5.3 The market reaction to the corporate governance reform 
The empirical relationship between pension disclosures, firm performance, and agency 
costs does not imply a causal role by boards and executive compensation. The disclosure 
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dummy may proxy for other unobserved factors that are related to firm performance and 
agency costs. To facilitate the interpretation of the results, I analyze how stock prices react 
to the announcement of the corporate governance reform from 2009. The reform is a 
compelling instrument for identification because the provisions address concerns about 
ineffective boards and inefficient compensation designs. If the disclosure dummy proxies 
for the quality of board decision-making and the efficiency of compensation designs, we 
should observe positive abnormal returns for firms with hidden pensions (Hypotheses 5) 
and negative abnormal returns for firms with observable pensions (Hypothesis 6). 
 
5.3.1 Identification of events 
In summer 2008, the German government appointed the task force “Executive 
compensation”. The task force should develop suggestions for provisions that would 
improve compensation practice. The suggestions provided the basis for the law on the 
“Adequacy of management board compensation”, which the German parliament approved 
in summer 2009. For the identification of events related to the law, I use three sources. 
First, I search the website of the German parliament for legal documents. Second, I search 
LexisNexis for newspaper articles that contain the keywords “Angemessenheit” 
(adequacy) or “Arbeitsgruppe” (task force) in combination with “Vorstandsvergütung” 
(executive compensation). Third, I download official press releases of the task force. I keep 
all documents that provide news about the content of the law or describe political 
milestones that increase the likelihood for law enactment. I identify eleven events that meet 
these criteria. 
Table III.10 summarizes the events. On January 22, 2009, the task force announces 
preliminary suggestions for a draft bill. The task force underlines the responsibilities of the 
supervisory board for setting executive compensation, supports clawback provisions, and 
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suggests vesting periods of four years for equity plans. On January 29, the task force 
officially presents these suggestions. In addition, the task force supports higher 
transparency standards for pension disclosures. On March 5, the press reports that political 
leaders have decided to draft a bill, which will be based on the suggestions made by the 
task force. Some politicians call for say-on-pay at annual meetings of shareholders. On 
March 11, the government outlines the main content of the upcoming draft bill. The draft 
bill specifies the suggestions made by the task force, and details criteria for adequate 
compensation levels and for the adequate duration of executive compensation. On March 
17, the government officially presents the draft bill. On March 20, politicians discuss the 
draft bill in parliament. Political leaders are confident that the task force will agree on 
additional provisions, such as say-on-pay. On April 23 and on May 7, the task force 
announces further suggestions. D&O insurances shall include deductibles and the 
appointment to the supervisory board shall require a cooling-off period. On May 25, 
politicians discuss the content of the draft bill with experts. On May 29, the press reports 
final adjustments to the draft bill. The deductible in D&O insurances amounts to 150% of 
fixed compensation, compensation agreements shall include caps, shareholders get a say-
on-pay vote, and the cooling-off period is not binding if the proposal for appointment 
achieves a 25% quorum. On June 18, the German parliament approves the draft bill. 
 
5.3.2 Event study evidence 
To estimate the impact of the law on shareholder value, I add dummy variables to 
Carhart’s (1997) four factor model: 
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Excess returni,t = α  + β1 × Pension disclosurei,t + β2 × Eventst 
+ β3 × Pension disclosurei,t × Eventst 
+ β4 × RMRFt + β5 × SMBt + β6 × HMLt + β7 × WMLt + εi,t (III.2) 
 
The dependent variable, Excess returni,t, is the stock return for company i on day t minus 
the risk free rate, Pension disclosurei,t is a dummy variable and equals one if the company 
disclosed pension costs for individual executives in the prior fiscal year, Eventst is a 
dummy variable and equals one on the eleven event days, RMRFt, SMBt, and HMLt are the 
Fama and French (1993) factors, and WMLt is Carhart’s (1997) momentum factor. RMRFt 
is the return on the market portfolio minus the risk free rate, SMBt is the size factor and 
measures the return difference between small stocks and big stocks, HMLt is the book-to-
market factor and measures the return difference between high and low book-to-market 
stocks, and WMLt measures the return difference between past winners and past losers. 
The regression pools all observations from firms with observable and hidden pensions to 
increase the power of the statistical tests. Pooling all observations gives a statistical model, 
which is used in differences-in-differences (diff-in-diff) analysis. In a typical diff-in-diff 
regression, the coefficient on the interaction term, β3, measures the average effect of the 
law (see, e.g., Angrist and Pischke (2009)). The economic interpretation, however, does 
not follow the diff-in-diff logic here because Pension disclosure does not separate a 
treatment group from a control group. The coefficient β3 measures the difference in 
average abnormal returns between firms with observable and hidden pensions, both of 
which are treated by the law. The coefficient β2 measures the average effect of the law on 
firms with hidden pensions, and the sum of β2 and β3 measures the average effect on firms 
with observable pensions. This interpretation assumes that any confounding effects 
average out across the eleven event days.  
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The sample period covers 210 trading days from October 1, 2008 to July 31, 2009. The 
sample period starts around two weeks after Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy to allow 
for the possibility that market betas changed around the announcement of the bankruptcy 
(see also Fernando, May, and Megginson (2012)). Stocks with prices below one Euro are 
excluded because they tend to be less liquid and are less likely to reflect public information 
efficiently (see, e.g., Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007)). The final sample includes 122 
firms. By the time the law was approved, 29 firms had not disclosed their pension costs. 
Standard errors are clustered by day to account for cross-sectional correlation and by 
company to account for time-series correlation (see Petersen (2009)). 
The left column of Table III.11 shows the estimated coefficients. The estimates suggest 
that firms with hidden pensions benefit from the law. The Events dummy has a coefficient 
of 0.0045 with a t-statistic significant at the 10% level. The estimate indicates that firms 
with hidden pensions have average abnormal returns of 0.45% per day when shareholders 
receive news about the law. The cumulative abnormal return amounts to 4.95% (0.45% 
times eleven event days). An increase in the stock price by 4.95% is worth around € 170 
million given that the average company with hidden pensions has a market capitalization 
of more than € 3.4 billion at the beginning of 2009. The economic significance is 
substantial relative to observable pay levels. The management board of the average 
company with hidden pensions receives around € 2.2 million in 2006. Although this sum 
excludes pension costs, it is unrealistic that gains of € 170 million can come from expected 
decreases in pay levels alone. The magnitude of the effect seems more consistent with the 
view that the provisions of the law lead to compensation structures with a better incentive 
alignment between executives and shareholders (see also Bebchuk and Fried (2004)). 
The economic significance is also substantial relative to estimated gains from the passage 
of specific corporate governance provisions. For example, Cai and Walkling (2011) 
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analyze how stock prices react to the passage of the Say-on-Pay Bill in the US. They find 
that the average company with excess compensation gains $ 54 million or around € 40 
million in value. In Albrecht (2014) I analyze how stock prices react to the announcement 
of the disclosure law. Firms that are most affected gain € 33 million in value. Given these 
estimates, expected gains of € 170 million indicate that the different corporate governance 
provisions of the law complement each other. 
The results further suggest that abnormal returns are significantly higher for firms with 
hidden pensions than for firms with observable pensions. The interaction dummy, Pension 
disclosure times Events, has a coefficient of -0.0044 with a t-statistic significant at the 10% 
level. The estimate implies that the difference in average abnormal returns amounts to 
0.44% between firms with hidden and observable pensions. In total, the law does not have 
a significant effect on firms with observable pensions. The average abnormal return is 
0.01% (0.45% minus 0.44%). The bottom of Table III.11 shows that the F-statistic from a 
Wald test is not statistically different from zero. This result is inconsistent with Hypothesis 
6, which predicts a negative stock price reaction for firms with observable pensions. There 
are least two potential explanations. First, some of the provisions are beneficial because 
boards are not fully effective in firms with observable pensions. Second, the law generates 
positive spill-over effects. While I cannot disentangle these explanations, the positive 
abnormal returns for firms with hidden pensions support the assumption that hidden 
pensions indicate weak boards and inefficient compensation designs.  
The middle and the right column of Table III.11 show results from two alternative model 
specifications. The dependent variable is the daily market-adjusted return. In the middle 
column, the control variables are firm-specific characteristics to account for size, book-to-
market, and momentum effects (see, e.g., Larcker, Ormazabal, and Taylor (2011)). Size is 
the logarithm of lagged daily market value of equity, book-to-market is the logarithm of 
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last year’s book value of equity divided by lagged daily market value of equity, and 
momentum is the market-adjusted return over the past six months. Coefficient estimates 
are economically stronger than those reported in the left column. Abnormal returns for 
firms with hidden pensions increase to 0.65% per day with a t-statistic significant at the 5% 
level. Abnormal returns for firms with observable pensions increase to 0.22% per day, but 
the effect remains insignificant. The difference in abnormal returns amounts to 0.43%, and 
the t-statistic just misses significance (p-value of 11%). In the right column, the regression 
additionally includes industry fixed effects because there is some evidence that returns 
have an industry-specific component after controlling for size, book-to-market, and 
momentum (see, e.g., Hou and Robinson (2006)). The inclusion of industry fixed effects 
does not change the coefficients of interest. The specifications confirm that abnormal 
returns are positive and significant for firms with hidden pensions, and positive and 
insignificant for firms with observable pensions. 
 
5.4 Alternative explanations 
The event study results are consistent with the assumption that hidden pensions are 
associated with weak boards and inefficient compensation designs. This association can 
explain differences in firm performance, wage policy, and acquisition activity between 
firms with observable and hidden pensions. However, such differences could also arise 
under the alternative assumption that firms hide pensions to prevent deviations from 
efficient compensation designs. Under this view, CEOs are just more willing to disclose 
pensions because they perform better. Murphy (1996) derives such a hypothesis under 
three assumptions. First, high perceived compensation attracts public scrutiny. Second, 
public scrutiny imposes political costs on executives. Third, political costs are decreasing 
in firm performance because high firm performance insulates executives from public 
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criticism. The first and the second assumption imply that executives have an incentive to 
lower the perceived level of compensation. The third assumption implies that this incentive 
is lower if the company performs well. 
The first and the second assumption are similar to the assumptions under the managerial 
power view. Murphy (1996), however, does not assume that CEOs are uncontrolled. The 
CEO camouflages efficient compensation designs to protect her privacy. Camouflage 
activities do not distort efficient compensation designs. The third assumption is crucial 
because it leads to the hypothesis that CEOs from better-performing firms are more willing 
to disclose compensation. Empirical evidence for this assumption and the hypothesis is at 
best mixed. Core, Guay, and Larcker (2008) find that negative press coverage about CEO 
compensation is lower for both high performing and low performing firms. Murphy (1996) 
analyzes disclosures of option values. He does not find any evidence that firms with high 
past performance are more willing to disclose actual grant values. He hypothesizes that the 
disclosure policy may be related to future performance: CEOs are more willing to disclose 
compensation if they forecast good performance.
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To test this hypothesis I analyze the profits from a trading strategy that buys stocks from 
firms with observable pensions and sells stocks from firms with hidden pensions. If the 
disclosure policy for pensions indicates CEO’s inside information about the future 
performance of the company, trading on differences in the disclosure policy should earn 
abnormal profits. I construct two portfolios. The portfolio of firms with observable 
pensions includes monthly stock returns after the third month of a fiscal-year end, for 
which the company discloses pension costs. I use returns after the third month to ensure 
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 The hypothesis that companies with high past performance are more likely to disclose pension costs would 
bias my results against finding any performance differences. The disclosure dummy is time-varying and 
equals one once the company discloses pension costs. Murphy’s (1996) hypothesis about the association 
between pay disclosures and future performance is therefore more relevant for my analysis. Gompers, Ishii, 
and Metrick (2003) develop a similar hypothesis about the adoption of antitakeover provisions and future 
performance. 
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that information about the disclosure decision is publicly available. Most firms publish 
their annual reports within three months after the fiscal-year end. The portfolio of firms 
with hidden pensions includes monthly stock returns for all other months. The difference in 
monthly returns between these portfolios is then regressed on the common risk factors. The 
intercept (alpha) indicates the abnormal return to a hedge portfolio that is long in firms 
with observable pensions and short in firms with hidden pensions. The sample period is the 
pre-event period from April 2004 to December 2008. Stock price observations below one 
Euro are excluded from the calculations. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity. 
The left column of Table III.12 shows the estimated coefficients. The alpha coefficient has 
an estimate of -0.003 with a t-statistic, which is not statistically significant at conventional 
levels. The estimate implies that a trading strategy based on the disclosure policy for 
pensions does not earn abnormal returns. The second and third column of Table III.12 
show coefficient estimates from regressions that use monthly excess returns on the 
individual portfolios as the dependent variables. The alpha coefficients are positive, but 
not statistically different from zero. The estimates imply that neither an investment in the 
portfolio of firms with observable pensions nor an investment in the portfolio of firms with 
hidden pensions earns abnormal returns. 
Since only a few firms disclose pension costs before March 2007, their stock returns have 
an undue influence on the regression estimates. I therefore add a dummy for the time 
period from April 2007 to December 2008. The coefficient on the dummy indicates 
differential abnormal returns between the period before and after April 2007. The results, 
presented in the last three columns of Table III.12, remain stable. The alpha coefficients, 
which indicate monthly abnormal returns until March 2007, are insignificant. Monthly 
abnormal returns are not significantly higher in the period afterwards. Wald tests at the 
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bottom of Table III.12 confirm that abnormal returns are not statistically different from 
zero for the whole sample period. 
Firms with observable pensions could only temporarily outperform firms with hidden 
pensions. In this case, we should observe a pattern of positive abnormal returns around the 
year, for which pension costs are initially disclosed. To test this prediction, I run a pooled 
cross-sectional time-series regression. The dependent variable is the monthly excess return 
for company i in month m. The main independent variables are eleven dummy variables. 
Each dummy indicates the year relative to the initial disclosure year, which is denoted by 
“t = 0”. Control variables are the four risk factors. The sample period is the pre-event 
period from April 2003 to December 2008. Stock prices below one Euro are excluded from 
the calculations. Standard errors are clustered by month and firm.
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Figure III.1 shows coefficient estimates for the year dummies with t-statistics in 
parentheses. I focus on the three years before and after the initial disclosure year because 
the sample period covers earlier and later years for only a few firms. Figure III.1 does not 
reveal a clear pattern. In the initial disclosure year, average monthly abnormal returns are 
close to zero. In the three years after, abnormal returns are positive but insignificant. In the 
three years before, abnormal returns are also insignificant. The estimates provide 
additional evidence that the disclosure dummy does not indicate asymmetric information. 
The finding that trading on differences in the disclosure policy for pensions does not earn 
abnormal profits has two more important implications. First, the disclosure dummy is not 
strongly correlated with an omitted risk factor. Such a risk factor could influence not only 
returns, but also other performance measures, such as Tobin’s Q. Second, shareholders 
appreciate the differences in performance and agency costs between firms with observable 
and hidden pensions. Otherwise, stock prices would not incorporate these differences. This 
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 Yermack (2006) uses a similar approach to analyze the return pattern around the initial disclosures of 
personal CEO aircraft use. 
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implication gives confidence in the interpretation of the results from the event study. The 
event study assumes that abnormal returns reflect expected efficiency changes that 
shareholders infer from expected changes in the corporate governance structure as required 
by the law. The assumption requires that shareholders appreciate the differences in 
performance and agency costs between firms with observable and hidden pensions. 
Otherwise, the estimated efficiency gains would be bad estimates at best and not related to 
enactment of the law at worst.
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6 Conclusion 
The notion of camouflage is the key concept of the managerial power view. Camouflage 
activities distort incentives and thereby weaken firm performance. I find consistent 
evidence for this association. Firms that hide costs of executive pensions are valued at a 
discount and have lower operating profit margins. I explore two potential sources for 
agency costs. Firms that hide pensions pay their employees higher wages and make worse 
acquisitions. I also find evidence that hidden pensions are associated with weak boards and 
inefficient compensation designs. Stock prices of firms with hidden pensions react 
positively to the announcement of a corporate governance reform that addresses the 
compensation practice in German board rooms. 
The results have important policy implications. The positive market reaction to the reform 
suggests that policy efforts were successful in Germany. However, the results must be 
interpreted with some caution. First, German rules effectively give large blockholders the 
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 Bebchuk, Cohen, and Wang (2013) find that the association between returns and the corporate governance 
index from Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) existed only during the 1990s and disappeared during the 
2000s. They attribute the disappearance to shareholders’ learning to appreciate the performance implications 
of differences in corporate governance. Consistent with the learning hypothesis, they find that market players 
have paid much more attention to corporate governance since the early 2000s. Attention to corporate 
governance sharply increased in Germany around the same time. The first Corporate Governance Code was 
published in Germany in February 2002. Since my sample period includes the years after 2002, it seems 
likely that shareholders appreciated the differences between companies with observable and hidden pensions.  
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opportunity to hide the compensation for individual executives. The sample is therefore 
biased towards firms with more agency problems. This selection bias mitigates the external 
validity of the results. Second, the positive market reaction may reflect a wealth transfer 
from executives, employees, and bondholders to shareholders and does not imply an 
overall increase in social welfare.  
The analysis of camouflage activities is a fruitful area of further research. On the 
theoretical side, research should be devoted to the development of models that relate the 
notion of camouflage to efficiency losses. On the empirical side, research should analyze 
the implications of camouflage activities in other countries where boards operate in a 
different institutional environment. The results for the German case give rise to many open 
questions. One area is the association between camouflage activities and say-on-pay: Do 
say-on-pay voting outcomes differ between firms with observable and hidden pensions? 
Do shareholders raise concerns about pensions? How do stock and bond prices react to the 
voting outcomes? Do boards respond differently to the voting outcomes? Another area is 
the association between camouflage activities and board characteristics: How do board 
characteristics differ between firms with hidden and observable pensions? Are there 
differences in the composition of compensation committees? A third area is the analysis of 
policy interventions: Has the corporate governance reform alleviated the performance gap 
between the subsamples? Have employee wages and the composition and level of 
executive compensation changed? Research about these questions will increase our 
understanding of the association between camouflage activities, firm performance, and 
agency costs. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) Carhart (1997)  
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Tables 
 
Table III.1: Variable definitions 
The table defines all variables used in the analysis and reports their sources. Panel A defines firm and 
executive characteristics, Panel B defines M&A characteristics, and Panel C defines stock market data. 
Richard Stehle provides daily risk factors for Germany at http://www.wiwi.hu-
berlin.de/professuren/bwl/bb/data/fama-french-factors-germany. The Centre for Financial Research Cologne 
(CFR) provides monthly risk factors for Germany at http://www.cfr-cologne.de. 
 
 
Panel A: Firm and executive characteristics  
 
  
Variables Description Source
Pension disclosure A dummy variable equal to one if the firm discloses pension costs for 
individual executives in a given fiscal year, and zero otherwise
Annual reports
Market value (yearly) (bn €) Market value of common equity at fiscal year-end (prccd × cshoc) Compustat Global
Total assets (bn €) Total assets (at) Compustat Global
Sales (bn €) Sales (sale) in 2002 Euros Compustat Global
Tobin's Q Total assets (at) plus the market value of common equity (prccd × cshoc) 
minus the book value of common equity (ceq) minus deferred taxes (txdb) 
divided by total assets (at)
Compustat Global
Book-to-market (yearly) The book value of common equity (ceq) divided by the market value of 
common equity at fiscal year-end (prccd × cshoc)
Compustat Global
ROA Operating income before depreciation (oibdp) divided by total assets (at) Compustat Global
OPM Operating income before depreciation (oibdp) divided by sales (sale) Compustat Global
Free cash flow Operating income before depreciation (oibdp) minus interest and related 
expense (xint) minus income taxes (txt) minus capital expenditures (capx) 
divided by total assets (at)
Compustat Global
Cash flow available for 
investments
Income before extraordinary items (ib) plus depreciation and amortization 
(dp) divided by lagged total assets (at)
Compustat Global
Leverage Debt in current liabilities (dlc) plus long-term debt (dltt) divided by the 
market value of total assets. The market value of total assets is the book 
value of total assets (at) minus the book value of common equity (ceq) plus 
the market value of common equity (prccd × cshoc).
Compustat Global
PPE/Sales Property, plant and equipment (ppent) divided by sales (sale) Compustat Global
PPE/Total assets Property, plant and equipment (ppent) divided by total assets (at) Compustat Global
CAPEX/PPE Capital expenditures (capx) divided by property, plant and equipment 
(ppent)
Compustat Global
R&D/Sales Research and development expense (xrd) divided by sales (sale). It is zero 
if research and development expense is missing but sales are reported.
Compustat Global
R&D missing A dummy variable equal to one if research and development expense (xrd) 
is missing but sales (sale) are reported, and zero otherwise.
Compustat Global
Sigma The standard error of the residuals from a market model regression of daily 
stock returns on CDAX returns. It is zero if less than 200 stock returns are 
available during the fiscal year.
Compustat Global, 
Datastream
Sigma missing A dummy variable equal to one if the data to calculate sigma is not 
available, and zero otherwise
Compustat Global, 
Datastream
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Panel A continued 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: M&A characteristics 
 
  
Variables Description Source
Wages (k €) Staff expense (xlr) in 2002 Euros divided by the number of employees 
(emp)
Compustat Global
Labor productivity (k €) Sales (sale) in 2002 Euros divided by the number of employees (emp) Compustat Global
Firm age Current year minus the year of incorporation plus one Company websites
External blockholders Sum of the percentage shareholdings of all blockholders excluding 
shareholdings of the management board and the supervisory board
Hoppenstedt 
company profiles
Executive ownership Percentage shareholdings of the management board Hoppenstedt 
company profiles
CEO age Age of the incumbent CEO BoardEx, 
Hoppenstedt 
company profiles, 
annual reports
Total compensation (mm €) Sum of salary, short-term incentives, long-term incentives, and perquisites Annual reports
Pension costs (mm €) Pension costs for individual executives Annual reports
Short-term incentives / Total 
compensation
Short-term incentives divided by total compensation Annual reports
Long-term incentives / Total 
compensation
Long-term incentives divided by total compensation Annual reports
Pension costs / Total 
compensation
Pension costs divided by total compensation Annual reports
Variables Description Source
Acquisition count The number of acquisitions made by a firm during the fiscal year SDC
Acquisition likelihood A dummy variable equal to one if the firm makes at least one acquisition 
during the fiscal year, and zero otherwise
SDC
CAR(-2, +2) Cumulative abnormal return for the five days around an acquisition 
announcement. Abnormal returns are residuals from a market model 
regression of daily stock returns on CDAX returns. Market model 
parameters are estimated from day -210 to day -11 before the 
announcement date. Abnormal returns are set to missing if less than 200 
stock returns are available during the estimation window.
SDC, Compustat 
Global, Datastream
CAR(-2, +2) > 0 A dummy variable equal to one if CAR(-2, +2) is positive, and zero 
otherwise
SDC, Compustat 
Global, Datastream
CAR(-1, +1) Cumulative abnormal return for the three days around an acquisiton 
announcement. See CAR(-2, +2) above for further details.
SDC, Compustat 
Global, Datastream
Public target A dummy variable equal to one for public targets, and zero otherwise SDC
Private target A dummy variable equal to one for private targets, and zero otherwise SDC
Subsidiary target A dummy variable equal to one for subsidiary targets, and zero otherwise SDC
Diversifying acquisition A dummy variable equal to one if the bidder and the target do not operate 
in the same industry according to the Fama-French 48 industry 
classification, and zero otherwise
SDC
Cross border A dummy variable equal to one for a foreign target, and zero otherwise SDC
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Panel C: Stock market data 
 
  
Variables Description Source
Daily excess returns Daily stock return minus the daily risk-free rate, which is derived from the 
one-month money market rate
Compustat Global, 
Stehle's website
Daily market-adjusted returns Daily stock return minus the daily return on the CDAX index Compustat Global, 
Datastream
Return past 6 months Market-adjusted return over the prior 130 trading days Compustat Global, 
Datastream
Market value (daily) (bn €) Market value of common equity on a given day (prccd × cshoc) Compustat Global
Book-to-market (daily) The book value of common equity (ceq) for the last fiscal year divided by 
the market value of common equity on a given day (prccd × cshoc)
Compustat Global
RMRF (daily) The daily return on the market portfolio minus the daily risk-free rate, which 
is derived from the one-month money market rate
Stehle's website
SMB (daily) Daily size factor: difference in daily returns between small stocks and big 
stocks
Stehle's website
HML (daily) Daily book-to-market factor: difference in daily returns between high and 
low book-to-market stocks
Stehle's website
WML (daily) Daily momentum factor: difference in daily returns between past winners 
and past losers
Stehle's website
Events A dummy variable equal to one on eleven event days, and zero otherwise LexisNexis, Internet 
research
Monthly excess returns Monthly stock return minus the risk-free rate (one-month money market 
rate)
Compustat Global, 
CFR
Portfolio returns: Observable 
pensions
Monthly return on the portfolio of firms, for which pension costs for 
individual executives are observable in a given month, minus the risk-free 
rate (one-month money market rate)
Compustat Global, 
CFR
Portfolio returns: Hidden 
pensions
Monthly return on the portfolio of firms, for which pension costs for 
individual executives are not observable in a given month, minus the risk-
free rate (one-month money market rate)
Compustat Global, 
CFR
Hedge portfolio The monthly return on the portfolio of firms with observable pensions minus 
the monthly return on the portfolio of firms with hidden pensions
Compustat Global
RMRF (monthly) The monthly return on the market portfolio minus the risk-free rate (one-
month money market rate)
CFR
SMB (monthly) Monthly size factor: difference in monthly returns between small stocks and 
big stocks
CFR
HML (monthly) Monthly book-to-market factor: difference in monthly returns between high 
and low book-to-market stocks
CFR
WML (monthly) Monthly momentum factor: difference in monthly returns between past 
winners and past losers
CFR
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Table III.2: Disclosure policy and pension costs 
Panel A of the table shows the number of firms that start disclosing pension costs in each year. Panel B of the 
table presents descriptive statistics for executive compensation in fiscal year 2006. Compensation data are for 
executives that served for the full fiscal year. Total compensation excludes pension costs. The last two 
columns report mean values for firms that do and do not disclose pension costs. ***, **, and * denote 
statistically significant differences in mean values at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level according to t-tests.  
 
 
Panel A: Number of firms with initial disclosure of pension costs by year 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Executive compensation in fiscal year 2006 
 
  
Year of initial disclosure Number of firms
2003 3
2004 1
2005 6
2006 67
2007 16
2008 4
2009 0
Total 97
Variables
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 5th Perc. Median 95th Perc. Hidden Observable
Total compensation (mm €) 423 1.398 1.234 0.232 0.992 3.659 0.835 1.528 ***
Short-term incentives / Total comp. 421 0.402 0.193 0 0.408 0.691 0.353 0.413 ** 
Long-term incentives / Total comp. 423 0.154 0.197 0 0.038 0.527 0.101 0.166 ***
Pension costs (mm €) 344 0.215 0.373 0 0.073 0.774 N/A 0.215
Pension costs / Total comp. 344 0.154 0.535 0 0.074 0.435 N/A 0.154
Descriptive statistics Pension costs
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Table III.3: Industry distribution 
The table shows the industry distribution of the sample firms across Fama-French 12 industry groups. The 
left column shows the industry distribution for all firms. The middle and the right column show the industry 
distribution for the subsamples of firms that do and do not disclose pension costs at some time during the 
sample period from March 2003 to December 2009. 
 
  
Fama-French industry groups Sample Hidden Observable
1 Business Equipment 20% 29% 15%
2 Chemicals and Allied Products 9% 2% 11%
3 Consumer Durables 7% 5% 7%
4 Consumer NonDurables 4% 7% 2%
5 Energy 0% 0% 0%
6 Finance 0% 0% 0%
7 Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs 9% 7% 10%
8 Manufacturing 25% 27% 25%
9 Telephone and Television Transmission 4% 5% 4%
10 Utilities 1% 0% 2%
11 Wholesale, Retail, Laundries, Repair Shops 7% 7% 7%
12 Other 14% 10% 15%
Observations 138 41 97
Pension costs
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Table III.4: Descriptive statistics 
The table presents descriptive statistics for all variables used in the analysis. Panel A shows firm and 
executive characteristics measured for fiscal years 2002 to 2009. Panel B shows deal characteristics for 
mergers and acquisitions that the sample firms completed between March 2003 and December 2009. Panel C 
shows stock market data. Daily returns are measured from October 2008 to July 2009. Table III.1 defines all 
variables. The right columns show mean values of the variables for the subsamples of firm-years in which 
pension costs are hidden and observable. ***, **, and * denote statistically significant differences in mean 
values at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level according to t-tests.  
 
  
Variables
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 5th Perc. Median 95th Perc. Hidden Observable
Panel A: Firm and executive characteristics
Pension disclosure 1,010 0.367 0.482 0 0 1
Market value (yearly) (bn €) 967 4.818 12.086 0.035 0.536 31.078 3.762 6.514 ***
Total assets (bn €) 1,008 11.140 32.341 0.050 0.744 91.555 9.483 13.996 ** 
Sales (bn €) 1,010 7.484 18.810 0.024 0.767 49.666 6.648 8.923 *  
Tobin's Q 960 1.520 0.875 0.804 1.250 3.258 1.503 1.547
Book-to-market (yearly) 960 0.715 0.599 0.164 0.554 1.795 0.759 0.644 ***
ROA 1,007 0.094 0.147 -0.100 0.106 0.263 0.092 0.097
OPM 1,004 -0.074 1.929 -0.121 0.104 0.261 -0.160 0.072 *  
Free cash flow 987 0.010 0.141 -0.154 0.029 0.133 0.009 0.011
Cash flow available for investments 861 0.074 0.116 -0.107 0.080 0.234 0.075 0.072
Leverage 960 0.164 0.142 0.000 0.136 0.430 0.165 0.160
PPE/Sales 1,004 0.297 1.237 0.021 0.166 0.777 0.335 0.230
PPE/Total assets 1,008 0.212 0.155 0.018 0.183 0.526 0.221 0.196 ** 
CAPEX/PPE 999 0.350 0.682 0.078 0.222 0.855 0.312 0.414 ** 
R&D/Sales 1,006 0.173 1.519 0 0.004 0.208 0.234 0.069 *  
R&D missing 1,010 0.448 0.498 0 0 1 0.518 0.326 ***
Sigma 1,010 0.025 0.017 0 0.022 0.050 0.024 0.026
Sigma missing 1,010 0.059 0.237 0 0 1 0.085 0.016 ***
Wages (k €) 706 45.464 29.529 2.019 46.444 72.362 47.811 41.851 ***
Labor productivity (k €) 792 292.337 381.348 63.677 200.920 662.880 274.129 321.880 *  
Firm age 1,010 69.368 54.404 8 57 157 64.405 77.916 ***
External blockholders 954 0.307 0.251 0 0.253 0.820 0.308 0.306
Executive ownership 954 0.069 0.155 0 0 0.489 0.078 0.056 ** 
CEO age 968 52.305 7.508 39 53 63 51.689 53.295 ***
Panel B: M&A characteristics
Acquisition count 886 0.370 0.874 0.000 0.000 2.000 0.390 0.342
Acquisition likelihood 886 0.234 0.423 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.243 0.221
CAR(-2, +2) 358 0.002 0.056 -0.087 -0.001 0.103 0.001 0.002
CAR(-2, +2) > 0 358 0.497 0.501 0 0 1 0.526 0.464
CAR(-1, +1) 358 0.004 0.047 -0.058 0.001 0.069 0.001 0.007
Public target 358 0.059 0.235 0 0 1 0.074 0.042
Private target 358 0.489 0.501 0 0 1 0.484 0.494
Subsidiary target 358 0.439 0.497 0 0 1 0.426 0.452
Diversifying acquisition 358 0.475 0.500 0 0 1 0.505 0.441
Cross border 358 0.654 0.477 0 1 1 0.595 0.720 ** 
Pension costsDescriptive statistics 
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Table III.4 continued 
 
 
  
Variables
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 5th Perc. Median 95th Perc. Hidden Observable
Panel C: Stock market data
Daily excess returns 24,387 0.000 0.047 -0.068 0.000 0.071 0.000 0.000
Daily market-adjusted returns 24,387 0.001 0.041 -0.058 -0.001 0.061 0.000 0.001
Return past 6 months 24,232 0.025 0.289 -0.363 -0.012 0.494 0.021 0.026
Market value (daily) (bn €) 24,442 4.477 11.711 0.039 0.620 31.472 3.518 4.764 ***
Book-to-market (daily) 24,284 1.014 0.811 0.229 0.757 2.810 1.094 0.990 ***
RMRF (daily) 210 0.000 0.024 -0.037 0.001 0.039
SMB (daily) 210 -0.001 0.018 -0.034 0.002 0.026
HML (daily) 210 0.000 0.009 -0.017 0.001 0.014
WML (daily) 210 0.001 0.028 -0.040 0.000 0.035
Events 24,442 0.051 0.221 0 0 1 0.048 0.052
Monthly excess returns 8,357 0.013 0.125 -0.174 0.008 0.210 0.024 -0.004 ***
Portfolio returns: Observable pensions 57 0.003 0.074 -0.147 0.011 0.113
Portfolio returns: Hidden pensions 57 0.004 0.060 -0.148 0.018 0.065
Hedge portfolio 57 0.000 0.049 -0.097 -0.005 0.128
RMRF (monthly) 69 0.008 0.052 -0.096 0.019 0.064
SMB (monthly) 69 -0.001 0.035 -0.050 -0.005 0.069
HML (monthly) 69 0.006 0.027 -0.031 0.002 0.056
WML (monthly) 69 0.008 0.040 -0.048 0.013 0.054
Descriptive statistics Pension costs
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Table III.5: Sample bias 
The table presents mean values of selected variables. The left columns include the sample firms. Their 
shareholders do not vote against pay disclosures for individual executives. The right columns include firms 
that are excluded from the sample. Shareholders of these firms vote against pay disclosures for individual 
executives. ***, **, and * denote statistically significant differences in mean values at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level according to t-tests.  
 
  
No
Variables Obs. Mean Obs. Mean
Market value (yearly) (bn €) 967 4.818 258 1.476 ***
Total assets (bn €) 1,008 11.14 334 1.85 ***
Sales (bn €) 1,010 7.484 334 1.996 ***
External blockholders 954 0.307 295 0.393 ***
Tobin's Q 960 1.52 257 1.673 ** 
ROA 1,007 0.094 334 0.135 ***
OPM 1,004 -0.074 334 0.119 *  
Yes (final sample)
Pay disclosures for individual executives:
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Table III.6: Pension disclosures and firm performance 
The table presents results from OLS regressions for the association between pension disclosures and firm 
performance. The dependent variable is the logarithm of Tobin’s Q in column 1, return on assets (ROA) in 
column 2, and operating profit margin (OPM) in column 3. The main independent variable, Pension 
disclosure, is a dummy variable and equals one if the firm discloses pension costs for individual executives in 
a given year. All variables are described in Table III.1. The dependent variables are measured from 2003 to 
2009. All variables are winsorized at the 5% and 95% levels. t-statistics appear in parentheses. Standard 
errors are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level. 
 
  
Variables                    log(Tobin's Q) ROA OPM
(1)    (2)    (3)    
Pension disclosure  0.033 *  0.007    0.012 *  
                    (1.68)    (1.49)    (1.72)    
log(Sales)          0.004    0.004    0.005 *  
                    (0.37)    (1.38)    (1.89)    
(log(Sales))
2        -0.002    -0.002 ** -0.001 *  
                    (-1.02)    (-2.57)    (-1.81)    
PPE/Sales           0.045    0.002    -0.020    
                    (0.25)    (0.05)    (-0.37)    
(PPE/Sales)
2       -0.213    -0.012    0.062    
                    (-1.00)    (-0.24)    (0.89)    
CAPEX/PPE           0.012    -0.020    -0.020    
                    (0.22)    (-1.64)    (-1.48)    
R&D/Sales           0.081    -0.172 ** -0.092    
                    (0.31)    (-2.41)    (-1.11)    
R&D missing         -0.016    -0.009    -0.007    
                    (-0.70)    (-1.48)    (-1.09)    
Sigma               -1.177    -0.683 *  -0.569 *  
                    (-0.73)    (-1.97)    (-1.85)    
Sigma missing       -0.175 *** -0.007    0.001    
                    (-3.74)    (-0.46)    (0.06)    
Executive ownership 0.511 *  0.096    0.116    
                    (1.69)    (1.08)    (1.43)    
(Executive ownership)
2 -0.818    -0.176    -0.253    
                    (-1.18)    (-0.91)    (-1.48)    
log(CEO age)        0.047    -0.030 ** -0.045 ** 
                    (0.75)    (-2.02)    (-2.58)    
log(Firm age)       -0.010    0.001    0.003    
                    (-0.58)    (0.25)    (0.56)    
log(Tobin's Q)t-1 0.699 ***                               
                    (18.62)                                  
ROAt-1                         0.606 ***                
                                   (12.76)                   
OPMt-1                               0.667 ***
                                                  (12.69)    
Intercept           0.028    0.152 ** 0.202 ** 
                    (0.11)    (2.17)    (2.55)    
Year fixed effects           Yes             Yes             Yes    
Industry fixed effects          Yes             Yes             Yes    
Adjusted R
2 0.661    0.632    0.655    
Observations        809    829    827    
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Table III.7: Pension disclosures and wages 
The table presents results from OLS regressions with the logarithm of Wages as the dependent variable. The 
main independent variable, Pension disclosure, is a dummy variable and equals one if the firm discloses 
pension costs for individual executives in a given year. All variables are described in Table III.1. The 
dependent variable is measured from 2003 to 2009. Consecutive observations, for which the growth rate in 
Wages is above +75% or below -44%, are excluded. All variables are winsorized at the 5% and 95% levels. t-
statistics appear in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
  
Variables                    log(Wages) log(Wages)
(1)    (2)    
Pension disclosure -0.088 ** -0.088 ** 
                    (-1.99)    (-2.06)    
log(Firm age)       0.086 ** 0.092 ***
                    (2.44)    (2.64)    
log(Sales)          -0.027 *  -0.038 ** 
                    (-1.66)    (-2.32)    
Leverage            0.028    0.047    
                    (0.19)    (0.33)    
PPE/Total assets    -0.111    -0.104    
                    (-0.65)    (-0.59)    
R&D/Sales           1.804 *** 1.748 ** 
                    (2.71)    (2.54)    
R&D missing         -0.092 ** -0.089 *  
                    (-1.98)    (-1.92)    
log(Labor productivity) 0.338 *** 0.353 ***
                    (5.49)    (5.94)    
log(Labor productivity)t-1 -0.056    -0.064    
                    (-0.89)    (-1.07)    
Executive ownership                -0.229    
                                   (-1.52)    
External blockholders                -0.041    
                                   (-0.58)    
log(CEO age)                       0.314 ** 
                                   (2.13)    
Intercept           2.145 *** 0.831    
                    (6.00)    (1.18)    
Year fixed effects           Yes             Yes    
Industry fixed effects          Yes             Yes    
Adjusted R
2 0.530    0.543    
Observations        432    432    
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Table III.8: Pension disclosures and acquisitiveness 
The table presents results from a poisson regression in the left column and from a logit regression in the right 
column. The dependent variable in the poisson regression is Acquisition count. The dependent variable in the 
logit regression is Acquisition likelihood. The main independent variable, Pension disclosure, is a dummy 
variable and equals one if the firm discloses pension costs for individual executives in a given year. All 
variables are described in Table III.1. Control variables are winsorized at the 5% and 95% levels. z-statistics 
appear in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
  
Variables                    Acquisition count    Acquisition likelihood    
                    (1)    (2)    
Pension disclosure -0.135    -0.199    
                    (-0.53)    (-0.63)    
log(Total assets)t-1 0.290 *** 0.270 ***
                    (3.64)    (3.16)    
Tobin's Qt-1 -0.132    -0.468 ** 
                    (-0.64)    (-2.03)    
Cash flow available for investments 4.645 *** 5.595 ***
                    (3.29)    (3.38)    
Intercept           -32.634 *** -18.126 ***
                    (-8.36)    (-13.45)    
Year fixed effects           Yes             Yes    
Industry fixed effects          Yes             Yes    
Pseudo R
2 0.231    0.195    
Observations        813    780    
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Table III.9: Pension disclosures and acquirer returns 
The table presents results from OLS regressions in columns 1 to 3 and from a logit regression in column 4. 
The dependent variable is the 5-day cumulative abnormal return around the acquisition announcement in the 
first and the second column, the 3-day cumulative abnormal return in the third column, and a dummy that 
indicates positive 5-day cumulative abnormal returns in the last column. The main independent variable, 
Pension disclosure, is a dummy variable and equals one if the firm discloses pension costs for individual 
executives in a given year. All variables are described in Table III.1. Continuous variables are winsorized at 
the 5% and 95% levels in columns 1, 3, and 4. t-statistics from OLS regressions and z-statistics from the logit 
regression appear in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
  
Variables                    
                    (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    
Pension disclosure 0.019 ** 0.031 ** 0.013 ** 0.891 ** 
                    (2.49)    (2.59)    (2.39)    (2.56)    
log(Total assets)t-1 -0.006 *** -0.006 *** -0.004 *** -0.275 ***
                    (-4.00)    (-2.93)    (-4.16)    (-3.44)    
Tobin's Qt-1 -0.010 ** -0.005    -0.006 ** -0.472 ** 
                    (-2.22)    (-1.09)    (-2.04)    (-2.35)    
Free cash flowt-1 0.300 *** 0.045    0.169 *** 17.710 ***
                    (4.40)    (0.59)    (3.30)    (4.54)    
Leveraget-1 0.004    -0.008    -0.011    1.303    
                    (0.12)    (-0.24)    (-0.47)    (0.79)    
Public target       0.015    0.061    0.011    0.615    
                    (0.66)    (1.32)    (0.59)    (0.48)    
Private target      0.028    0.071    0.018    1.431    
                    (1.38)    (1.65)    (1.12)    (1.34)    
Subsidiary target   0.034    0.083 *  0.022    1.234    
                    (1.60)    (1.88)    (1.33)    (1.15)    
Diversifying acquisition -0.006    -0.011 *  0.000    -0.301    
                    (-1.00)    (-1.68)    (-0.02)    (-1.12)    
Cross border        0.001    0.000    0.000    -0.335    
                    (0.13)    (-0.04)    (0.01)    (-1.05)    
Intercept           0.005    -0.048    -0.014    0.361    
                    (0.09)    (-0.52)    (-0.63)    (0.20)    
Year fixed effects           Yes             Yes             Yes             Yes    
Industry fixed effects          Yes             Yes             Yes             Yes    
Adjusted/Pseudo R
2 0.191    0.180    0.113    0.145    
Observations        358    358    358    335    
CAR(-2, +2) > 0CAR(-1, +1)CAR(-2, +2) CAR(-2, +2)
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Table III.10: Timeline of events 
The table presents events related to enactment of the law on the “Adequacy of management board 
compensation”, which the German parliament approved in summer 2009. Events are days when shareholders 
received news about the content of the law or about political milestones related to enactment of the law. The 
list of events is compiled from three sources. Legal documents come from the website of the German 
parliament. Newspaper articles come from LexisNexis and contain the keywords “Angemessenheit” 
(adequacy) or “Arbeitsgruppe” (task force) in combination with “Vorstandsvergütung” (executive 
compensation). Official press releases related to the law come from the website of the task force “Executive 
compensation”, which the German parliament appointed in summer 2008. 
 
  
Date Event
January 22, 2009 The task force announces preliminary suggestions for a 
draft bill.
January 29, 2009 The task force officially presents some suggestions.
March 5, 2009 Politicial leaders decide to draft a bill, which will be based 
on the suggestions made by the task force.
March 11, 2009 The government outlines the main content of the upcoming 
draft bill.
March 17, 2009 The government officially presents the draft bill.
March 20, 2009 Politicians discuss the draft bill in parliament.
April 23, 2009 The task force outlines additional suggestions.
May 7, 2009 The task force officially presents additional suggestions.
May 25, 2009 Politicians discuss the content of the draft bill with experts.
May 29, 2009 The press reports final adjustments to the draft bill.
June 18, 2009 The German parliament approves the draft bill.
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Table III.11: Market reaction to the corporate governance reform 
The table presents results from OLS regressions with Daily excess returns as the dependent variable in the 
left column, and with Daily market-adjusted returns as the dependent variable in the middle and the right 
column. All regressions include the dummy variable Pension disclosure, the dummy Events, and the 
interaction term between Pension disclosure and Events. Pension disclosure equals one if the company 
disclosed pension costs for individual executives in the prior fiscal year. The Events dummy equals one on 
eleven event days. Control variables are described in Table III.1. Results from Wald tests are presented at the 
bottom. The sample period is from October 1, 2008 to July 31, 2009. t-statistics and F-statistics from Wald 
tests appear in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by day and firm. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
  
Variables                    
(1)    (2)    (3)    
Pension disclosure  0.0005    0.0006    0.0005    
                    (0.903)    (1.074)    (0.923)    
Events              0.0045 *  0.0065 ** 0.0065 ** 
                    (1.699)    (2.326)    (2.309)    
Pension disclosure × Events -0.0044 *  -0.0043    -0.0043    
                    (-1.735)    (-1.599)    (-1.586)    
RMRF (daily)        0.8173 ***                               
                    (11.929)                                  
SMB (daily)         0.2187 ***                               
                    (2.737)                                  
HML (daily)         0.0941                                  
                    (1.466)                                  
WML (daily)         -0.4057 ***                               
                    (-9.130)                                  
log(Market value) (daily)t-1                0    -0.0001    
                                   (-0.086)    (-0.458)    
log(Book-to-market) (daily)t-1                0.0003    0.0006    
                                   (0.734)    (1.126)    
Return past 6 monthst-1                -0.003    -0.0037    
                                   (-1.081)    (-1.276)    
Intercept           0.0002    0.0001    0.0032 ** 
                    (0.266)    (0.075)    (2.164)    
Industry fixed effects           No              No             Yes    
Adjusted R
2 0.247    0.0007    0.0003    
Observations        24,387    23,956    23,956    
Wald test
H0: Events + 0.0001 0.0022 0.0022
Pension disclosure × Events = 0 (0.002) (1.966) (1.940)
Daily market-adjusted returnsDaily excess returns
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Table III.12: Trading strategies  
The table presents results from OLS regressions with monthly portfolio returns as the dependent variables. In 
columns 1 and 4, the dependent variable is the return on a hedge portfolio that is long in firms with 
observable pensions and short in firms with hidden pensions. In columns 2 and 5, the dependent variable is 
the monthly excess return on the portfolio of firms with observable pensions. In columns 3 and 6, the 
dependent variable is the monthly excess return on the portfolio of firms with hidden pensions. Control 
variables are the market factor RMRF, the size factor SMB, the book-to-market factor HML, and the 
momentum factor WML. Columns 4 to 6 additionally include a dummy variable that indicates the time period 
from April 2007 to December 2008. Results from Wald tests are presented at the bottom. The sample period 
is from April 2004 to December 2008. t-statistics and F-statistics from Wald tests appear in parentheses. 
Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level. 
 
  
Variables                    
Hedge Observable 
pensions
Hidden 
pensions
Hedge Observable 
pensions
Hidden 
pensions
(1)    (2) (3)    (4) (5) (6)    
alpha               -0.0030    0.0019    0.0049    -0.0046    -0.0004    0.0042    
                    (-0.376)    (0.229)    (1.489)    (-0.406)    (-0.036)    (1.367)    
April 2007 to December 2008                                              0.0046    0.0063    0.0017    
                                                                 (0.348)    (0.485)    (0.290)    
RMRF (monthly)      -0.0469    1.0381 *** 1.0850 *** -0.0297    1.0618 *** 1.0916 ***
                    (-0.533)    (11.011)    (21.347)    (-0.275)    (9.467)    (21.452)    
SMB (monthly)       0.4925 ** 1.0509 *** 0.5585 *** 0.5067 ** 1.0705 *** 0.5639 ***
                    (2.035)    (4.349)    (6.682)    (2.102)    (4.434)    (7.209)    
HML (monthly)       0.2071    0.4679 *  0.2607 *** 0.2115    0.4739 *  0.2624 ***
                    (0.827)    (1.819)    (2.715)    (0.830)    (1.829)    (2.719)    
WML (monthly)       0.3187 *  0.2442    -0.0745    0.3215 *  0.2481    -0.0734    
                    (1.919)    (1.173)    (-0.671)    (1.930)    (1.226)    (-0.684)    
Adjusted R
2 0.0356    0.5522    0.8958    0.0185    0.545    0.8939    
Observations        57    57    57    57    57    57    
Wald test
H0: alpha + April 2007 to December 2008 = 0  -0.0001 0.0059 0.0059
(0.000) (0.604) (1.017)
Monthly portfolio returns
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Figures 
 
Figure III.1: Abnormal return pattern around the initial disclosure year 
The figure shows average monthly abnormal returns in years around the initial disclosure year (t = 0). 
Abnormal returns are coefficient estimates on dummy variables from a pooled cross-sectional time-series 
regression. The dependent variable is the monthly excess stock return. Independent variables are eleven 
dummy variables that indicate the year relative to the initial disclosure year, the market factor RMRF, the size 
factor SMB, the book-to-market factor HML, and the momentum factor WML. The sample period is from 
April 2003 to December 2008. t-statistics appear in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by month and 
firm. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
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Chapter IV 
 
Inside Debt and Corporate Risk-Taking 
 
1 Introduction 
Pension benefits and deferred compensation make CEOs to creditors of their own firms. 
Similar to other creditors, the CEO who has accumulated pensions or deferred 
compensation has a claim on fixed payoffs in the future as long as the firm is solvent. In 
insolvency, the CEO stands in line with other unsecured creditors because pensions and 
deferrals represent unfunded and unsecured claims. For these reasons, pensions and 
deferrals are forms of “inside debt” (see Jensen and Meckling (1976)). Inside debt gives 
the CEO an incentive to manage the firm conservatively to safeguard the claims on fixed 
payoffs. Consistent with the notion of debt-like incentives I find that firms pursue more 
conservative investment and financing policies when their CEOs have accumulated more 
wealth in the form of pensions and deferrals.  
The empirical results support Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) claims about the role of inside 
debt in executive compensation. In their seminal article, the authors argue that inside debt 
could mitigate the agency costs of debt. Agency costs of debt arise because the CEO who 
holds only equity in a levered firm may inefficiently increase firm risk to increase the 
value of her equity stake at the expense of debt holders. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
speculate that such risk-shifting problems vanish if the CEO holds inside debt and inside 
equity in the same fractions as the firm has debt and equity outstanding. In this case, any 
gains to her equity stake from risk-shifting activities are offset by losses to her inside debt 
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holdings. Edmans and Liu (2011) develop a model that incorporates the ideas of Jensen 
and Meckling (1976). The main variable in their model is the relative debt-equity ratio k, 
which they define as CEO’s debt-equity ratio divided by the firm’s debt-equity ratio. The 
model predicts, among others, that an increase in the relative-debt equity ratio leads to 
more conservative project selection. 
Hypotheses about debt-like incentives and their potential to reduce firm-risk contribute to 
public debates about the role of executive compensation in the recent financial crisis. 
Policy makers and commentators of the crisis commonly assume that pay packages 
encouraged excessive risk-taking and therefore contributed to the financial meltdown. In 
the aftermath of the crisis, several governments passed laws to regulate executive 
compensation and to decrease risk-taking incentives (see Hill (2010) and Conyon et al. 
(2011)). The public debate and regulatory intervention typically focus on bonus payments 
and equity incentives but neglect the role of pensions and compensation deferrals. These 
forms of compensation directly provide incentives to reduce firm risk. 
The role of inside debt has also attracted little attention by academics. Research about 
inside debt was hampered for around thirty years after Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
brought the issue on the agenda because the disclosure requirements were too limited. The 
transparency of inside debt disclosures greatly increased when the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) changed its disclosure requirements in 2006. For fiscal years after 
2005, the SEC requires firms to disclose the present value of pension benefits and the 
aggregate balance in deferred compensation (see also Wei and Yermack (2011)).  
I use these new data to analyze the association between CEOs’ inside debt holdings and the 
riskiness of corporate policies. The sample includes non-financial firms covered in the 
ExecuComp database from 2006 to 2009. The main variable in the analysis is the relative 
debt-equity ratio as discussed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and theoretically justified by 
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Edmans and Liu (2011). I construct this variable using data on pensions and accumulated 
deferrals to proxy for inside debt, and CEO’s stock and option holdings to proxy for inside 
equity. Consistent with Edman and Liu’s (2011) prediction, I find evidence that the relative 
debt-equity ratio is associated with conservative corporate policies. Firms make fewer 
investments in research and development, are more diversified, and have lower book 
leverage if CEO’s debt-equity mix increases relative to the firm’s debt-equity mix. CEOs 
with higher relative debt-equity ratios seem to reduce firm risk through other channels as 
well. I find that higher relative debt-equity ratios are associated with lower equity volatility 
after controlling for R&D investments, firm diversification, and book leverage. All results 
hold after controlling for risk-taking incentives from options and several CEO 
characteristics that proxy for CEO risk aversion.
73
 
This paper contributes to the growing literature about incentives from inside debt. 
Sundaram and Yermack (2007) find that firms have a lower default probability if the 
CEO’s debt-equity ratio exceeds the firm’s debt-equity ratio. Wei and Yermack (2011) 
find that bond prices rise and equity prices fall for firms that disclose large inside debt 
holdings after SEC’s disclosure reform. In both articles, the authors interpret their results 
as consistent with low-risk corporate policies that are implemented by CEOs with debt-like 
incentives. Other papers show that debt-like incentives are negatively related to yield 
spreads and the number of covenants in loan contracts (see Chava, Kumar, and Warga 
(2010), Kabir, Li, and Veld-Merkoulova (2013), and Anantharaman, Fang, and Gong 
(2014)). My paper complements these articles because I identify some channels through 
which the CEO with debt-like incentives decreases firm-risk. Closely related are studies 
that analyze other channels. There is empirical evidence that debt-like incentives are 
                                                 
73
 The negative association between book leverage and the relative debt-equity ratio must be interpreted with 
caution. Book leverage does not fully resolve the negative mechanical relation between leverage and the 
relative debt-equity ratio, which uses the firm’s debt-equity mix in the denominator. 
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negatively related to dividend payouts (see Eisdorfer, Giaccotto, and White (2013)), 
positively related to corporate cash holdings (see Liu, Mauer, and Zhang (2014)), and 
positively related to the incidence that the firm makes diversifying acquisitions (see Phan 
(2013)). Another stream of research shows that debt-like incentives are related to lower 
risk and reduced risk-taking in finance firms (see Bolton, Mehran, and Shapiro (2011), 
Tung and Wang (2012), Srivastav, Armitage, and Hagendorff (2014), and Bekkum 
(2013)).
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The paper’s results are the mirror image of the results in Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) 
who analyze the association between incentives from inside equity and corporate risk-
taking. These authors show that the sensitivity of option values to equity volatility (option 
vega) is positively related to investments in R&D, leverage, and equity volatility, and 
negatively related to firm diversification. Guay (1999), Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002), Low 
(2009), Chava and Purnanandam (2010), and Gormley, Matsa, and Milbourn (2013) 
provide further evidence that more convex payoffs encourage the CEO to increase firm 
risk.
75
 My findings show the reversed pattern. Larger inside debt holdings encourage the 
CEO to decrease firm risk.  
The paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2 I develop hypotheses about the association 
between inside debt and corporate risk-taking. Section 3 describes the sample, data, and the 
research design. I report empirical results in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
                                                 
74
 During the writing process for this chapter, a paper was accepted for publication in the Journal of Financial 
Economics. See Cassell et al. (2012). Cassell et al. (2012) also analyze the association between inside debt 
and the riskiness of corporate policies. Their findings are consistent with the results presented here. I outline 
some differences in the sample design and in the analysis at the end of this chapter. 
75
 Hayes, Lemmon, and Qiu (2012) do not find evidence for a causal relationship between option holdings 
and risk-taking. 
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2 Hypothesis development 
2.1 Theory 
In their seminal article, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that debt-financing causes risk-
shifting problems. The CEO who holds only equity in a levered firm can increase the value 
of her equity stake at the expense of debt holders if she substitutes high-risk projects for 
low risk-projects. If the high-risk project has a lower net present value than the low-risk 
project, total firm value decreases. The decrease in total firm value represents a deadweight 
loss, which Jensen and Meckling (1976) label the agency costs of debt. 
The theory of option pricing illustrates the basic idea. Consider a firm that is only financed 
by equity and debt. Equity is a call option on the firm’s cash flows with a strike price equal 
to the face value of debt (see Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974)). It is 
straightforward to show that the first derivative of this option with respect to asset 
volatility is strictly positive. Hence, the CEO who holds only equity has an incentive to 
select high-risk projects that increase the volatility of the firm’s cash flows. If the increase 
in volatility is sufficiently large, the CEO may gain from selecting a project with a negative 
net present value. Such a project increases the value of equity, although total firm value 
declines.
76
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) speculate that debt holdings by the CEO can eliminate the 
agency costs of debt. In particular, the CEO does not gain from redistributions of wealth 
from debt holders to equity holders if she holds debt and equity in the same proportions as 
the firm has debt and equity outstanding. However, excessive debt holdings could create 
additional problems. If the CEO’s debt-equity ratio exceeds the firm’s debt-equity ratio, 
                                                 
76
 I use the theory of option pricing only for illustrative purposes. The Black and Scholes (1973) model 
cannot explain the decrease in total firm value because firm value and other option parameters, such as 
volatility, are exogenous. In particular, investment decisions and firm value do not depend on leverage (see 
also Modigliani and Miller (1958)). Under these assumptions, any gains to equity holders just balance the 
losses to debt holders, and total firm value does not change. In contrast, Jensen and Meckling (1976) assume 
that investment decisions and firm value depend on leverage (see also Smith and Warner (1979)). 
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the CEO has an incentive to select low-risk projects to redistribute wealth from equity 
holders to bond holders. 
Edmans and Liu (2011) analyze this idea more formally. In their model, a risk-neutral 
manager selects between a high-risk and a low-risk-project. The key variable in their 
analysis is the relative debt-equity ratio k, which is CEO’s debt-equity ratio divided by the 
firm’s debt-equity ratio:77 
 
k = (DCEO / DFirm) / (ECEO / EFirm) = (DCEO / ECEO) / (DFirm / EFirm)      (IV.1) 
 
The variables DCEO and ECEO represent inside debt and inside equity, i.e. the dollar 
holdings of debt and equity by the CEO. The variables DFirm and EFirm represent the firm’s 
total debt and equity. Edmans and Liu (2011) derive, among others, three results. First, if k 
equals one, project selection is optimal (see their equations (9) and (10)). Second, an 
increase in k increases the likelihood that the CEO selects the low-risk project (see 
equation (10)). Third, an increase in k increases the value of debt and decreases the value 
of equity (see Proposition 3.vii).
78
 
 
2.2 Empirical predictions 
There is some empirical evidence consistent with the arguments by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) and the predictions derived by Edmans and Liu (2011). Sundaram and Yermack 
(2007) find that the distance-to-default is larger for firms whose CEOs have a relative debt-
                                                 
77
 The term “relative debt-equity ratio” comes from Wei and Yermack (2011). 
78
 Edmans and Liu (2011) allow the CEO to select the project and to decide about her effort. The optimal 
debt-equity mix is then determined by the trade-off between the effects of debt and equity on project 
selection and effort levels. While k = 1 optimizes project selection, an equity bias (k < 1) or a debt bias (k > 
1) can be optimal after taking the effort decision into account. An equity bias can be optimal because inside 
equity induces effort in good states, in which equity holders control the assets of the firm. A debt bias can be 
optimal because inside debt induces effort in bad states, in which debt holders control the assets of the firm. 
Incorporating such effects is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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equity ratio above the critical value of one. Wei and Yermack (2011) find that bond prices 
rise and equity prices fall for firms that disclose large holdings of inside debt. For these 
firms, debt and equity volatility significantly decreases after the disclosure day. The results 
suggest that investors expect CEOs with large holdings of inside debt to pursue low-risk 
firm policies that decrease the volatility of cash flows, decrease the probability of default, 
and make debt safer. 
It is, however, and open question which firm policies CEOs with inside debt holdings 
actually pursue (see Sundaram and Yermack (2007)). I hypothesize that the relative debt-
equity ratio is related to research and development (R&D) expenditures, firm 
diversification, leverage, and equity volatility. R&D expenditures are a main component of 
the firm’s investment policy and commonly considered as riskier investments than capital 
expenditures (see Bhagat and Welch (1995)). Investments in R&D are riskier for at least 
two reasons (see Hall (2002)). First, R&D investments produce a more volatile cash-flow 
pattern because they represent real options on future growth opportunities. Coles, Daniel, 
and Naveen (2006) find that equity volatility is positively related to R&D expenditures. 
Kothari, Laguerre, and Leone (2002) find that R&D expenditures contribute around three 
times more to future earnings volatility than capital expenditures. Second, R&D 
investments represent intangible assets with a significant part of the value tied to high-
skilled employees. Since intangible assets are more difficult to value than tangible assets 
and are positively related to indirect costs of financial distress, R&D-intensive firms face 
higher distress costs than capital-intensive firms (see, e.g., Frank and Goyal (2009) and 
Opler and Titman (1994)). Therefore, I predict that CEOs with larger inside debt holdings 
invest less in R&D to reduce the volatility of cash flows and to safeguard the value of their 
debt holdings. 
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Hypothesis 1: The relative debt-equity ratio is negatively related to R&D expenditures. 
 
Diversified firms have less volatile cash flows than focused firms if the cash flows of 
different business segments are not perfectly correlated. Moreover, combining such 
segments creates a co-insurance effect that decreases the probability of default (see 
Lewellen (1971), Higgins and Schall (1975), and Kim and McConnell (1977)). There is 
empirical evidence that CEOs with large amounts of inside debt pursue a diversification 
strategy in the market for corporate control. Phan (2013) finds that firms whose CEOs have 
debt-equity ratios above the firm’s debt-equity ratio are more likely to engage in 
diversifying acquisitions. Therefore, I predict that CEOs with larger holdings of inside debt 
run more diversified firms. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The relative debt-equity ratio is positively related to firm diversification. 
 
The association between leverage and the relative debt-equity ratio is not clear ex ante. We 
may observe a positive association because inside debt mitigates risk-shifting problems. 
Debt-financing should be cheaper and, consequently, leverage should be higher for firms 
whose CEOs hold larger amounts of inside debt. Consistent with this view, Anantharaman, 
Fang, and Gong (2014) and Kabir, Li, and Veld-Merkoulova (2013) find that yield spreads 
are decreasing in the relative debt-equity ratio. Sundaram and Yermack (2007) find that 
CEO’s debt-equity ratio is positively related to book leverage. However, we may observe a 
negative association because the CEO can directly reduce the probability of bankruptcy if 
she unlevers the capital structure (see Sundaram and Yermack (2007)). To test these 
contradicting predictions, I use the firm’s book leverage instead of market leverage to 
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mitigate the mechanical negative relation between leverage and the relative debt-equity 
ratio. 
 
Hypothesis 3: The relative debt-equity ratio is negatively (positively) related to book 
leverage. 
 
I use equity volatility to proxy for the firm’s overall cash-flow risk. If the CEO uses other 
channels through which she reduces firm risk, we should observe a negative relation 
between the relative debt-equity ratio and equity volatility after controlling for R&D, firm 
diversification, and leverage.  
 
Hypothesis 4: The relative debt-equity ratio is negatively related to equity volatility after 
controlling for R&D, firm diversification, and leverage. 
 
The associations should be particularly strong if the CEO’s debt-equity ratio exceeds the 
firm’s debt-equity ratio. Therefore, I additionally test all hypotheses using a dummy 
variable that equals one for relative debt-equity ratios above the critical value of one.  
 
3 Sample, data, and research design 
3.1 Sample and data 
I consider all firms included in ExecuComp over the four-year period 2006 to 2009. The 
initial sample covers 7,436 firm-year observations based on 2,065 individual firms and 
2,678 individual CEOs. Following Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) I exclude 1,293 
observations from finance firms (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999) and 362 observations 
from utility firms (SIC codes between 4900 and 4999). To construct the final data set I add 
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data on firm characteristics and business segments from Compustat, data on stock returns 
from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), and data on CEO’s non-firm 
wealth from Dittmann and Maug (2007).
79
 I lose 923 observations because the relative 
debt-equity ratio is not defined for firms with no debt or for CEOs with no equity holdings. 
I lose another 524 observations for which variables to construct the relative debt-equity 
ratio are missing. The final sample includes a maximum number of 4,334 observations 
based on 1,366 individual firms and 1,697 individual CEOs. Table IV.1 outlines the 
construction and the source of all variables used in the analysis. 
Table IV.2 reports descriptive statistics for CEO characteristics in the upper part and for 
firm characteristics in the lower part. All variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% 
levels to mitigate the influence of outliers. The sample firms have mean (median) market 
capitalization of $ 7.6 billion ($ 1.7 billion), mean (median) total assets of $ 7.3 billion ($ 
1.9 billion), and mean (median) sales of $ 6.6 billion ($ 1.8 billion). The typical CEO is 55 
years old and has a mean (median) tenure of more than seven years (five years).  
For the estimation of CEO’s inside debt and equity I follow prior studies about debt-like 
incentives (see, e.g., Sundaram and Yermack (2007) and Wei and Yermack (2011)). 
CEO’s inside debt is the present value of accumulated pension benefits plus the aggregate 
balance in deferred compensation. In virtually all firms, pensions and compensation 
deferrals represent unsecured and unfunded claims in the event of bankruptcy and, thus, 
expose the CEO to the same default risks as other creditors (see Sundaram and Yermack 
(2007)). CEO’s inside equity is the value of her stock and option portfolio. The value of 
the stock portfolio is the number of her shares times the share price at fiscal-year end. I 
                                                 
79
 Dittmann and Maug (2007) make their estimates of CEO’s non-firm wealth publicly available at 
http://people.few.eur.nl/dittmann/data.htm.  
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apply the Black and Scholes (1973) formula to each tranche of options and sum up the 
tranche values to estimate the value of the option portfolio.
80
  
The calculation of inside debt uses the total amount of deferred compensation. The 
inclusion of the total amount may bias the actual debt-like incentives because many firms 
allow the CEO to invest part of the deferred amount in phantom stocks. Such deferrals 
provide equity-like incentives to the CEO (see also Wei and Yermack (2011)). In 
untabulated analysis I find that the results are similar when I only take the present value of 
pensions to calculate inside debt, or when I add the aggregate balance in deferred 
compensation to inside equity.  
The upper part of Table IV.2 shows that more than two thirds of the CEOs in the sample 
hold some form of inside debt. Around 12% have only accumulated pension benefits, 
around 26% have only deferred compensation, and more than 30% hold both forms of 
inside debt. CEOs have mean (median) inside debt holdings of $ 4.9 million ($ 0.8 
million), with similar amounts invested in pensions and deferrals. The value of inside 
equity is much larger. CEOs hold a mean (median) of $ 57.9 million ($ 15.5 million) of 
inside equity, with the majority in the form of stock. The mean (median) ratio of inside 
debt to inside equity is 28% (5%).  
CEO’s relative debt-equity ratio is defined as the ratio of inside debt to inside equity 
divided by the ratio of firm’s debt to firm’s equity. Firm’s debt is the sum of short-term 
and long-term debt. Firm’s equity is the number of shares outstanding times the share price 
at fiscal year-end. The relative debt-equity ratio is heavily skewed with a mean of 3.1 and a 
median of 0.21. The mean value, which is above the theoretical benchmark of one, 
indicates that the average firm in the sample gives the CEO excessive incentives from 
inside debt. The median value, which is below the theoretical benchmark on one, indicates 
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 I follow Guay (1999) and Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier (2009) for the empirical implementation of the 
Black and Scholes (1973) formula. See the Appendix at the end of this chapter for details. 
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that the median firm gives the CEO excessive incentives from inside equity. In the analysis 
I use the logarithm of one plus the relative debt-equity ratio to mitigate the skewness of the 
distribution of the relative debt-equity ratio. I add one to the ratio to preserve the sample 
size because almost one third of the CEOs do not hold inside debt. The log(Relative debt-
equity ratio + 1) has a mean (median) value of 0.57 (0.19) and a standard deviation of 
0.883. The dummy variable for relative debt-equity ratios above one has a mean value of 
28%. This value implies that CEOs have excessive incentives from inside debt for 28% of 
the firm-year observations. 
I follow prior literature to construct the policy variables. Following the innovation 
literature I use R&D scaled by lagged total assets (R&D/Lagged total assets) to proxy for 
investment risk (see, e.g., Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen (2009)). R&D is set to zero if it is 
missing (see, e.g., Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006)). Following the diversification 
literature I use the sales-based Herfindahl index and the logarithm of the number of 
business segments, log(Business segments), to proxy for firm diversification. The 
Herfindahl index measures sales concentration and is calculated as the sum of squares of 
segment sales divided by the square of firm sales. The Herfindahl index is lower for more 
diversified firms (see, e.g., Lang and Stulz (1994)). Following the literature on capital 
structure I define Book leverage as the sum of short-term and long-term debt scaled by 
total assets to proxy for financing risk (see, e.g., Frank and Goyal (2009)). Following the 
literature on the association between inside equity and firm risk I calculate Equity volatility 
as the annualized standard deviation of daily logarithmic stock returns over the fiscal year 
(see, e.g., Guay (1999)). 
The lower part of Table IV.2 shows that the sample firms have mean (median) R&D 
expenditures of 2.6% (0%) relative to lagged total assets. The typical firm has a sales-
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based Herfindahl index of more than 70%, three business segments, and book leverage of 
less than 25%. The mean (median) equity volatility amounts to 50% (44%).  
The results presented in Table IV.3 provide some preliminary evidence that larger inside 
debt holdings are associated with lower corporate-risk-taking and lower firm risk. The left 
column reports Pearson correlations between the policy variables and the logarithmic 
transformation of the relative debt-equity ratio. The correlation coefficients are consistent 
with the predicted associations. The relative debt-equity ratio has a positive and significant 
correlation with the number of business segments and a negative and significant correlation 
with the Herfindahl index and equity volatility. The relative debt-equity ratio is negatively 
correlated with R&D expenditures, as predicted, but the correlation is not statistically 
significant. The correlation with book leverage is negative and significant. 
The right columns of Table IV.3 report mean values of the policy variables for the 
subsamples of firm-years, in which the relative debt-equity ratio does and does not exceed 
one. The differences in mean values are consistent with the hypothesis that ratios above 
one strongly align the interests of the CEO with those of debt holders. Firms make fewer 
investments in R&D, have lower sales concentrated within a few segments, operate in 
more business segments, have lower book leverage, and have lower equity volatility if the 
CEO’s debt-equity ratio exceeds the firm’s debt-equity ratio. 
 
3.2 Research design 
I run cross-sectional time-series regressions to estimate the association between inside debt 
and corporate risk-taking. The regression model has the following general form: 
 
Pi,t = γ0 + γ1 × Di,t-1 + γ2 × Ci,t-1 + γ3 × Fi,t-1 + aj + bt + εi,t         (IV.2) 
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The dependent variable, Pi,t, is either R&D/Lagged total assets, the sales-based Herfindahl 
index, log(Business segments), Book leverage, or Equity volatility for company i in year t. 
The main variable of interest, Di,t-1, is either the logarithm of one plus the relative debt-
equity ratio or a dummy that equals one if the relative debt-equity ratio exceeds one. The 
vectors Ci,t-1 and Fi,t-1 include control variables for CEO and firm characteristics, aj 
denotes industry fixed effects based on 2-digit SIC codes, and bt are year fixed effects. All 
independent variables are lagged to mitigate endogeneity concerns since investment, 
financing, and compensation policies are jointly determined in equilibrium. Standard errors 
are clustered at the firm level. The sample period is from 2006 to 2009. 
The vector Ci,t-1 includes proxies for risk-taking incentives from options and for CEO’s 
risk aversion. I include the logarithm of one plus vega to control for risk-taking incentives 
from options. Vega measures the change in value of the option portfolio for a 0.01 change 
in the annualized volatility of stock returns (see the Appendix for the calculation of option 
vega). Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) find that vega is positively related to R&D, book 
leverage, and equity volatility, and negatively related to firm diversification. The relative 
debt-equity ratio does not capture such risk-taking incentives because the ratio is based on 
levels of debt and equity and not on their sensitivities to changes in volatility.
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Four variables proxy for CEO’s risk aversion: the logarithm of one plus delta, the 
logarithm of one plus CEO’s non-firm wealth, the logarithm of CEO tenure, and the 
logarithm of CEO age. Delta measures the change in the value of CEO’s stock and option 
holdings for a one percent change in stock price (see the Appendix for the calculation of 
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 Another limitation of the relative debt-equity ratio is that it does not capture the sensitivities of debt and 
equity to changes in the stock price. Wei and Yermack (2011) construct a “relative incentive ratio” to take 
these sensitivities into account. For empirical applications, however, the difference between the relative debt-
equity ratio and the relative incentive ratio is minor because the two ratios are almost perfectly correlated 
(see Anderson and Core (2014)). It seems more promising to construct a statistic that takes into account the 
sensitivities of debt and equity to changes in asset volatility. Anderson and Core (2014) provide a first step in 
this direction.  
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option delta)). Higher values of delta indicate that the CEO is less diversified and, thus 
more risk-averse (see Guay (1999)). Chava and Purnanandam (2010) find that delta is 
associated with low-risk corporate policies. 
CEO’s non-firm wealth is a proxy for CEO’s outside wealth. Larger amounts of outside 
wealth indicate that the CEO is more diversified and, thus, less risk-averse (see Guay 
(1999)). The estimates for CEO’s non-firm wealth come from Dittmann and Maug (2007). 
Based on data from ExecuComp, they calculate non-firm wealth as the difference between 
accumulated cash inflows and accumulated cash outflows. Dittmann and Maug (2007) 
assume (1) that the CEO enters ExecuComp with no wealth, (2) that she does not consume 
non-firm wealth, but uses cash to exercise her options and to meet her tax liabilities, and 
(3) that she invests non-firm wealth at the risk-free rate. I set non-firm wealth to zero if the 
estimate is negative or missing, and include a dummy for these observations to preserve 
sample size. Non-firm wealth is not available for around 15% of the observations. 
Following Guay (1999) I include CEO tenure as a second proxy for outside wealth. The 
inclusion of CEO tenure avoids spurious correlations between the relative debt-equity ratio 
and each of the dependent variables. Inside debt is mechanically related to CEO tenure 
because pension values are a positive function of the years of service. Sundaram and 
Yermack (2007) find that CEO’s debt-equity ratio, which is the numerator of the relative 
debt-equity ratio, increases in CEO tenure. 
I include CEO age to control for increases in risk aversion over the life cycle (see also 
Malmendier and Nagel (2011)), and to avoid spurious correlations. Serfling (2014) finds 
that firms invest less in R&D, are more diversified, and have lower equity volatility if their 
CEOs are older. Sundaram and Yermack (2007) find that CEO’s debt-equity ratio 
increases in CEO age. 
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The vector Fi,t-1 includes the logarithm of firm age and other firm-specific control variables 
that are common in regressions of each of the dependent variables. I include firm age to 
avoid spurious correlations. Prior studies find that older firms invest less in R&D (see 
Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen (2009)), are more diversified (see Denis, Denis, and Sarin 
(1997)), have higher leverage (see Frank and Goyal (2009)), and have lower equity 
volatility (see Pastor and Veronesi (2003)). Sundaram and Yermack (2007) find that 
CEO’s debt-equity ratio increases in firm age. I introduce other control variables, many of 
which are regression-specific, in the following sections. 
 
4 Empirical results 
4.1 Investment policy and inside debt 
I use R&D expenditures scaled by lagged total assets (R&D/Lagged total assets) as the 
dependent variable to estimate the association between investment risk and inside debt. 
The vector Fi,t-1 includes the logarithm of sales to control for firm size, a proxy for cash 
flow to control for internal funds available for R&D expenditures, Tobin’s Q to control for 
investment opportunities, and book leverage to control for the riskiness of financial 
policies. The proxy for cash flow is income before extraordinary items plus depreciation 
and amortization plus R&D expenditures minus capital expenditures divided by lagged 
total assets. I add R&D expenditures because R&D is an item on the income statement (see 
also Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen (2009)). I subtract capital expenditures because my 
interest is in the funds available for R&D. Tobin’s Q is the market value of common equity 
plus the book value of total liabilities divided by the book value of total assets (see, e.g., 
Kim and Lu (2011)).  
Sales and cash flow are standard controls in the innovation literature that considers R&D 
as an input factor for innovation. This literature remains inconclusive on whether firm size 
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is positively related to R&D, but has produced consistent evidence for a positive relation 
between R&D and cash flow (see Cohen (2010) for a survey). Tobin’s Q is a standard 
control variable in the literature on capital expenditures. This literature has produced 
consistent evidence that capital expenditures are positively related to Tobin’s Q (see 
Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988)). Since R&D is the risky component of the overall 
investment policy, I expect a positive relation between R&D expenditures and Tobin’s Q.82 
I expect a negative relation between R&D and book leverage because growth opportunities 
from R&D cannot be collateralized (see, e.g., Frank and Goyal (2009)).  
Table IV.4 shows the estimated coefficients. The results indicate that firms whose CEOs 
have larger inside debt holdings pursue a more conservative investment policy. In the left 
column, the logarithm of the relative debt-equity ratio has a coefficient estimate of -0.005 
with a t-statistic, which is significant at the 1% level. The estimate indicates that an 
increase in this variable by one standard deviation is associated with a 0.44 percentage 
point decrease in R&D (0.883 times -0.005). In the right column, the dummy variable for 
relative debt-equity ratios above one has a coefficient estimate of -0.008 with a t-statistic, 
which is also significant at the 1% level. The estimate indicates that R&D decreases by 0.8 
percentage points when CEO’s debt-equity ratio is larger than the firm’s debt-equity ratio. 
The effects are quite substantial given that the average sample firm invests 2.6% in R&D 
relative to lagged total assets. 
Control variables have the expected association with R&D. R&D investments are higher in 
firms whose CEOs have higher vega and more outside wealth, and lower in firms whose 
CEOs are older and have higher delta. Older firms tend to invest less in R&D. Larger firms 
invest less in R&D consistent with findings by Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen (2009). Firms 
with higher cash flows and higher Tobin’s Q invest more in R&D consistent with 
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 Tobin’s Q is not a common control variable in the innovation literature. One exception is Himmelberg and 
Petersen (1994) who find a positive association R&D and Tobin’s Q. 
144 
 
Himmelberg and Petersen (1994). As expected, the coefficient on book leverage is 
negative and significant.  
 
4.2 Firm diversification and inside debt 
I use the sales-based Herfindahl index and the logarithm of the number of business 
segments as the dependent variables to estimate the association between firm 
diversification and inside debt. The vector Fi,t-1 includes the logarithm of sales because 
Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1997) find that larger firms are more diversified. I include book 
leverage to control for the riskiness of financial policies. Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) 
find that more diversified firms have higher book leverage consistent with the co-insurance 
effect of diversification. I include Tobin’s Q because there is some evidence that more 
diversified firms are associated with lower Tobin’s Q (see Lang and Stulz (1994)).83  
The left columns of Table IV.5 show coefficient estimates from regressions with the sales-
based Herfindahl index as the dependent variable. The results provide some evidence that 
CEOs with more inside debt run more diversified firms. In the first column, the logarithm 
of the relative debt-equity ratio has a coefficient estimate of -0.0132. The estimate 
indicates that an increase in this variable by one standard deviation reduces the sales-based 
Herfindahl index by 1.2 percentage points (0.883 times -0.0132). The t-statistic, however, 
misses significance, and the economic effect is quite low. The average firm in the sample 
has a sales-based Herfindahl index of 72%. 
In the second column, the dummy variable for relative debt-equity ratios above one has a 
coefficient estimate of -0.0359 with a t-statistic, which is significant at the 5% level. The 
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 Later studies, such as Campa and Kedia (2002) and Villalonga (2004), do not find a diversification 
discount, but a premium in some specifications after controlling for the self-selection of diversifying firms. 
Campa and Kedia (2002) include many variables in their first-stage regression to determine the probability of 
a firm to be diversified. They point out that the diversification decision is effectively driven by industry 
characteristics and not by firm characteristics. I control for industry fixed effects in the regressions. 
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estimate implies that the sales-based Herfindahl index decreases by 3.59% percentage 
points when CEO’s debt-equity ratio is above the firm’s debt-equity ratio. 
Most coefficient estimates on control variables have the expected signs. CEOs with higher 
vega and more outside wealth run less diversified firms while CEOs with higher delta and 
older CEOs run more diversified firms. Older and larger firms are more diversified 
consistent with Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1997). Firm diversification is associated with 
lower Tobin’s Q consistent with Lang and Stulz (1994). Surprisingly, book leverage has a 
positive coefficient, but the t-statistic is not significant. 
The right columns of Table IV.5 show coefficient estimates from regressions with the 
logarithm of the number of business segments as the dependent variable. The results 
confirm the positive association between inside debt and firm diversification. In the third 
column, the logarithm of the relative debt-equity ratio has a positive coefficient, which is 
statistically significant at the 10% level. In the last column, the dummy variable for relative 
debt-equity ratios above one also has a positive coefficient with a t-statistic, which is again 
significant at the 10% level. The estimates indicate that CEOs with larger inside debt 
holdings run firms with more business segments. The conclusions for the association 
between each of the control variables and firm diversification remain unchanged. 
 
4.3 Debt policy and inside debt 
I use book leverage as the dependent variable to estimate the association between debt 
policy and inside debt. The vector Fi,t-1 includes standard controls from the literature on 
capital structure. This literature suggests that leverage is positively associated with firm 
size, asset tangibility, and tax rates, and negatively associated with growth opportunities 
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and profitability.
84
 I include the logarithm of sales to control for firm size. Larger firms 
should have higher leverage because they are more diversified and are less likely to go 
bankrupt. I include the ratio of fixed assets to total assets (PPE/Total assets) to control for 
asset tangibility. Firms with more fixed assets should have higher leverage because they 
can issue collateralized debt. Collateralized debt retains value in the event of liquidation 
and reduces risk-shifting problems between equity holders and debt holders. I include the 
firm’s marginal tax rate before interest expense estimated by Blouin, Core, and Guay 
(2010) to control for tax effects. Firms with higher marginal tax rates should have higher 
debt because debt has a beneficial tax treatment. I include R&D scaled by total assets to 
control for growth opportunities. Fast growing firms should have lower leverage because 
growth opportunities cannot be collateralized. I do not use market-to-book. Market-to-book 
includes the book value of debt in the nominator and is therefore mechanically related to 
book leverage (see also Chava and Purnanandam (2010)). I include return on assets (ROA) 
to control for profitability. More profitable firms should have lower leverage because they 
can use retained earnings to finance the investments.  
Table IV.6 shows the estimated coefficients. The results indicate that firms whose CEOs 
have larger inside debt holdings pursue a less risky debt policy. In the left column, the 
logarithm of the relative debt-equity ratio has a coefficient estimate of -0.0507 with a t-
statistic, which is significant at the 1% level. The estimate indicates that an increase in this 
variable by one standard deviation reduces book leverage by 4.5 percentage points (0.883 
times -0.0507). In the right column, the dummy variable for relative debt-equity ratios 
above one has a coefficient estimate of -0.077 with a t-statistic, which is also significant at 
the 1% level. The estimate implies that book leverage decreases by 7.7 percentage points 
when CEO’s debt-equity ratio exceeds the firm’s debt-equity ratio. The estimates are 
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 See Harris and Raviv (1991), Titman and Wessels (1988), Frank and Goyal (2009) for an overview of 
capital structure theories and empirical findings. 
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economically meaningful given that the sample mean for book leverage amounts to 24.5%. 
The results, however, must be interpreted with caution. Book leverage and the relative 
debt-equity ratio, which uses firm’s debt-equity ratio in the denominator, have a 
mechanical negative association.  
Coefficient estimates on control variables have the predicted signs. Book leverage is higher 
for firms whose CEOs have higher vega and more outside wealth, and lower for firms 
whose CEOs have higher delta. Firms with older CEOs have lower leverage, but the 
association is not statistically significant. Older firms, larger firms, and firms with more 
fixed assets have higher book leverage while firms with more growth opportunities have 
lower book leverage. The coefficients for ROA and the marginal tax rate have the 
predicted signs, but their t-statistics are not significant.  
 
4.4 Equity volatility and inside debt 
I use equity volatility as the dependent variable to estimate the association between firm 
risk and inside debt. The vector Fi,t-1 includes the logarithm of sales to control for firm size 
and the policy variables R&D/Total assets, the sales-based Herfindahl index, and Book 
leverage. These variables represent channels through which inside debt holdings affect 
equity volatility. If CEOs with inside debt holdings use other channels, we should observe 
a negative association between the relative debt-equity ratio and equity volatility. 
Table IV.7 shows the estimated coefficients. The results indicate that the relative debt-
equity ratio is associated with lower equity volatility. In the first column, the logarithm of 
the relative debt-equity ratio has a coefficient estimate of -0.0197 with a t-statistic, which 
is significant at the 1% level. The estimate indicates that an increase in this variable by one 
standard deviation is associated with a 1.7% percentage point decrease in equity volatility 
(0.883 times -0.0197). In the second column, the dummy variable for relative debt-equity 
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ratios above one has a coefficient estimate of -0.0441 with a t-statistic, which is also 
significant at the 1% level. The estimate implies that equity volatility decreases by 4.4 
percentage points when CEO’s debt-equity ratio exceeds the firm’s debt- equity ratio. This 
decrease is economically meaningful for the average sample firm, which has equity 
volatility of 50%.  
Among the control variables, vega has an unexpected negative coefficient. Coles, Daniel, 
and Naveen (2006) find a positive association between vega and equity volatility for the 
time period from 1992 to 2002. Anderson and Core (2014) find a negative association for 
the time period from 2006 and 2010. The different results suggest that the association 
between vega and risk-taking changes over time.
85
 Coefficient estimates on other control 
variables have the expected signs, but only the coefficients on CEO tenure and book 
leverage are statistically significant. Since the association between the relative debt-equity 
ratio and equity volatility is significant after controlling for R&D, firm diversification, and 
leverage, there must be other channels through which CEOs with inside debt holdings 
reduce firm risk. 
 
5 Conclusion 
In this paper, I find that firms invest more in R&D, have lower sales concentrated within a 
few business segments, report more business segments, have lower leverage and lower 
equity volatility when CEO’s relative debt-equity ratio increases. The results are consistent 
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 One potential explanation is that managerial risk aversion increased during the financial crisis. 
Theoretically, CEO’s preference toward equity volatility increases in the wealth effect of vega and decreases 
in her risk aversion, and both effects are correlated (see, ,e.g., Guay (1999)). Options reduce risk-taking 
incentives if the risk aversion effect dominates the wealth effect (see, e.g., Lewellen (2006)). Given that my 
proxies for risk aversion do not fully capture the risk aversion effect, the negative coefficient on vega for the 
time period after 2005 is consistent with a sharp increase in managerial risk aversion. Guiso, Sapienza, and 
Zingales (2014) provide evidence that risk aversion increased during the financial crisis. The positive 
association of vega with R&D and book leverage and the negative association with firm diversification 
during the sample period then suggests that the CEO cannot change these corporate policies in the short-run.  
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with Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) claim that debt-like incentives could mitigate the 
agency costs of debt.  
The results are of interest for policy makers who seek to reduce risk-taking incentives in 
executive compensation. Recent reforms typically addressed incentives from equity 
holdings but not from debt holdings. Interestingly, in some countries, such as Germany, 
executive pensions are secured claims in the event of bankruptcy. Such a securitization 
reduces the board’s flexibility to balance equity-like incentives with debt-like incentives. 
While deferrals could provide debt-like incentives in such a regulatory environment, new 
laws that require executives to defer compensation in the form of equity further reduce the 
potential of debt-like incentives (see Hill (2010)).  
The results must be interpreted with caution. Compensation, investment and financing 
policies are determined endogenously in equilibrium. While my research design mitigates 
endogeneity concerns, it remains an open question whether inside debt causes low-risk 
corporate policies. Another limitation is that the relative debt-equity ratio is based on levels 
of debt and equity. The ratio does not capture the value changes of inside debt and equity 
to changes in asset volatility. Anderson and Core (2014) develop a statistic that takes these 
sensitivities into account.  
My results for the association between the relative debt-equity ratio and equity volatility 
indicate that there are other channels through which debt-like incentives reduce firm risk. 
For example, inside debt may influence the firm’s hedging decisions (see Knopf, Nam, and 
Thornton (2002)). The analysis about the association between inside debt and book 
leverage does only provide preliminary evidence for the impact of inside debt holdings on 
financing polices because the relative debt-equity ratio is mechanically related to leverage. 
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It seems fruitful to analyze whether firms are less likely to issue debt than equity when the 
CEO holds larger amounts of inside debt.86  
                                                 
86
 The analysis is close to Cassell et al. (2012). In addition to my results, they find that the relative debt-
equity ratio is positively related to working capital. They further confirm that all results hold for the “relative 
incentive ratio” as suggested by Wei and Yermack (2011) and for a “cash-adjusted” relative incentive ratio 
that accounts for expected salary and bonus payments. Note that the relative debt-equity ratio as suggested by 
Edmans and Liu (2011) and the relative incentive ratio are almost perfectly correlated. Table 2 in Cassell et 
al. (2012) reports a correlation coefficient of 0.96. Note further that bonus payments provide short-term 
incentives and are not claims on fixed payments in the future.  
As a robustness check, Cassell et al. (2012) show that the results hold for a 2-stage least squares regression. 
They carefully point out that these regressions cannot fully address endogeneity concerns. Instruments are 
several CEO and firm characteristics. They use CEO age, among others. In the last paragraph (4.3.3), they 
raise concerns that the relative debt-equity ratio may capture horizon effects and run regressions with “age-
adjusted” dependent variables to rule out this explanation. I use CEO age as a direct control variable to 
capture any life-cycle effects on risk aversion. I find that firms with older CEOs invest significantly less in 
R&D and are significantly more diversified. The results suggest that CEO age proxies for risk aversion and, 
thus, impacts corporate policies. CEO age is not a valid instrument for the relative debt-equity ratio. 
The papers also differ in the sample construction. Cassell et al. (2012) exclude firms that do not grant inside 
debt. I do not exclude these firms. Since younger and smaller firms are less likely to grant pensions (see 
Sundaram and Yermack (2007)), Cassell et al.’s (2012) sample is biased toward older and larger firms. 
Cassell et al. (2012) do not exclude finance firms. I exclude finance firms because some variables, such as 
leverage, have a different meaning for finance and non-finance firms (see Fama and French (1992)).  
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Tables 
 
Table IV.1: Variable definitions 
The table defines all variables used in the analysis and reports their sources. The upper part defines CEO 
characteristics. The lower part defines firm characteristics. Dittmann and Maug (2007) make their estimates 
of CEO’s non-firm wealth available at http://people.few.eur.nl/dittmann/data.htm. 
 
  
Variables Description and source
CEO characteristics
CEO age Age of the incumbent CEO (ExecuComp)
CEO tenure Number of years the CEO has this position in the firm 
(ExecuComp)
Only pensions (1/0) A dummy variable equal to one if the CEO has only 
accumulated pension benefits (ExecuComp)
Only deferred comp. (1/0) A dummy variable equal to one if the CEO has only deferred 
compensation (ExecuComp)
Pensions & deferred comp. (1/0) A dummy variable equal to one if the CEO has accumulated 
pension benefits and deferred compensation (ExecuComp)
Inside debt (1/0) A dummy variable equal to one if the CEO has either 
accumulated pension benefits, deferred compensation, or 
both (ExecuComp)
Pension value (mm) The present value of accumulated pension benefits 
(ExecuComp)
Deferred comp. value (mm) Value of the aggregate balance in deferred compensation 
(ExecuComp)
Inside debt (mm) Pension value plus deferred compensation value 
(ExecuComp)
Stock value (mm) Shares held by the CEO times the share price at fiscal year-
end (ExecuComp)
Option value (mm) Total value of CEO's option portfolio (ExecuComp)
Inside equity (mm) Stock value plus option value (ExecuComp)
CEO's debt-equity ratio Inside debt divided by inside equity (ExecuComp)
Relative debt-equity ratio CEO's debt-equity ratio divided by firm's debt-equit ratio. 
Firm's debt is short-term debt plus long-term debt. Firm's 
equity is the number of common shares outstanding times the 
share price at fiscal year-end (ExecuComp, Compustat)
Relative debt-equity ratio > 1 A dummy variable equal to one if the relative debt-equity ratio 
is above one (ExecuComp, Compustat)
log(Relative debt-equity ratio + 1) The logarithm of the relative debt-equity ratio plus one 
(ExecuComp, Compustat)
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Table IV.1 continued 
 
  
Variables Description and source
CEO characteristics
Vega (000s) Sensitivity of CEO's option portfolio with respect to a 0.01 
change in stock return volatility (ExecuComp)
Delta (000s) Sensitivity of CEO's equity portfolio with respect to a 1% 
change in stock price (ExecuComp)
Non-firm wealth (mm) CEO's accumulated cash inflows minus cash outflows. 
Negative values and missing observations are set to zero. 
(Dittmann and Maug (2007))
Non-firm wealth missing A dummy variable equal to one if non-firm wealth is negative 
or missing (Dittmann and Maug (2007))
Firm characteristics
Market cap (bn) The number of common shares outstanding times the share 
price at fiscal year-end (Compustat)
Total assets (bn) Book value of total assets (Compustat)
Sales (bn) Firm sales (Compustat)
Firm age Difference between the current year and the first year the firm 
appears in CRSP (CRSP)
R&D/Lagged total assets Research and development expenditures divided by lagged 
total assets (Compustat)
Business segments Number of reported business segments (Compustat)
Sales-based Herfindahl index Sum of squares of segment sales divided by the square of 
firm sales (Compustat)
Book leverage Short-term and long-term debt divided by the book value of 
total assets (Compustat)
Equity volatility Annualized standard deviation of daily logarithmic stock 
returns (CRSP)
Cash flow Income before extraordinary items plus depreciation and 
amortization plus R&D expenditures minus capital 
expenditures divided by lagged total assets (Compustat)
Marginal tax rate Marginal tax rate before interest expense estimated by 
Blouin, Core, and Guay (2010) (Compustat)
R&D/Total assets Research and development expenditures divided by total 
assets (Compustat)
PPE/Total assets Property, plant and equipment divided by total assets 
(Compustat)
ROA Operating income before depreciation divided by total 
assets (Compustat)
Tobin's Q The market value of common equity plus the book value of 
total liabilities divided by the book value of total assets 
(Compustat)
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Table IV.2: Descriptive statistics 
The table presents descriptive statistics for all variables used in the analysis. The upper part shows CEO 
characteristics. The lower part shows firm characteristics. Table IV.1 defines all variables. All variables are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The sample period is from 2006 to 2009.  
 
  
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. 5th Perc. Median 95th Perc.
CEO characteristics
CEO age 4,248 55.151 6.744 44 55 67
CEO tenure 4,270 7.372 6.64 0.863 5.418 22.014
Only pensions (1/0) 4,334 0.116 0.32 0 0 1
Only deferred comp. (1/0) 4,334 0.256 0.436 0 0 1
Pensions & deferred comp. (1/0) 4,334 0.307 0.461 0 0 1
Inside debt (1/0) 4,334 0.678 0.467 0 1 1
Pension value (mm) 4,334 2.68 5.89 0 0 14.769
Deferred comp. value (mm) 4,334 2.112 5.699 0 0.153 10.149
Inside debt (mm) 4,334 4.885 9.811 0 0.8 22.558
Stock value (mm) 4,334 43.583 152.795 0.145 6.7 177.979
Option value (mm) 4,334 13.936 23.213 0 5.347 58.789
Inside equity (mm) 4,334 57.898 157.719 1.032 15.531 234.794
CEO's debt-equity ratio 4,334 0.28 0.607 0 0.051 1.243
Relative debt-equity ratio 4,334 3.094 13.312 0 0.207 9.896
Relative debt-equity ratio > 1 4,334 0.282 0.45 0 0 1
log(Relative debt-equity ratio + 1) 4,334 0.574 0.883 0 0.188 2.388
Vega (000s) 4,334 124.295 191.394 0 50.068 511.154
Delta (000s) 4,334 686.172 1627.688 12.494 212.545 2739.789
Non-firm wealth (mm) 4,334 26.19 53.892 0 8.613 109.088
Non-firm wealth missing 4,334 0.151 0.358 0 0 1
Firm characteristics
Market cap (bn) 4,334 7.638 19.466 0.135 1.714 34.357
Total assets (bn) 4,334 7.315 17.381 0.207 1.918 31.777
Sales (bn) 4,334 6.622 14.594 0.189 1.799 30.423
Firm age 4,310 27.052 20.19 5 20 79
R&D/Lagged total assets 3,113 0.026 0.047 0 0 0.131
Business segments 3,644 2.707 1.679 1 3 6
Sales-based Herfindahl index 3,644 0.716 0.277 0.264 0.745 1
Book leverage 4,334 0.245 0.171 0.005 0.228 0.564
Equity volatility 4,165 0.503 0.259 0.206 0.437 1.026
Cash flow 3,104 0.051 0.122 -0.178 0.061 0.239
Marginal tax rate 4,172 0.312 0.072 0.113 0.342 0.35
R&D/Total assets 4,334 0.025 0.045 0 0 0.127
PPE/Total assets 4,329 0.27 0.222 0.03 0.196 0.753
ROA 4,328 0.132 0.093 -0.016 0.131 0.279
Tobin's Q 4,334 1.722 0.878 0.863 1.476 3.41
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Table IV.3: Correlations and differences in means 
The left part of the table shows Pearson correlation coefficients for policy variables and the logarithm of the 
relative debt-equity ratio plus one. The right part of the table shows mean values of policy variables for firm-
years, in which the relative debt-equity ratio is and is not above one. All variables are described in Table 
IV.1. All variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The sample period is from 2006 to 2009. ***, 
**, and * denote statistically significant Pearson correlations and statistically significant differences in mean 
values based on t-tests at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.  
 
  
Variables
No Yes
Obs
R&D/Lagged total assets 3,113 -0.0145    0.0274 0.024 *  
Sales-based Herfindahl index 3,644 -0.1313 *** 0.7469 0.6384 ***
log(Business segments) 3,644 0.1373 *** 0.7109 0.9694 ***
   
Book leverage 4,334 -0.3013 *** 0.2693 0.1836 ***
   
Equity volatility 4,165 -0.1373 *** 0.5266 0.4413 ***
log(Relative debt-equity ratio + 1) Relative debt-equity ratio > 1:
Pearson correlations Mean values
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Table IV.4: Investments in R&D and inside debt  
The table presents results from OLS regressions with research and development expenditures divided by 
lagged total assets as the dependent variable. In the left column, the main independent variable is the 
logarithm of the relative debt-equity ratio plus one. In the right column, the main independent variable is a 
dummy variable that equals one if the relative debt-equity ratio is above one. All variables are described in 
Table IV.1. All variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Independent variables are lagged. The 
sample period is from 2006 to 2009. t-statistics appear in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the 
firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
  
Variables                    
                    (1)    (2)    
log(Relative debt-equity ratio + 1) -0.005 ***                
                    (-3.520)                   
Relative debt-equity ratio > 1                -0.008 ***
                                   (-3.719)    
log(Vega + 1)           0.0032 *** 0.0032 ***
                    (3.597)    (3.582)    
log(Delta + 1)          -0.0057 *** -0.0055 ***
                    (-3.965)    (-3.870)    
log(Non-firm wealth + 1) 0.0029 *** 0.0028 ***
                    (2.680)    (2.638)    
Non-firm wealth missing 0.0166 *** 0.0165 ***
                    (4.299)    (4.249)    
log(CEO tenure)     0.0033 ** 0.0033 ** 
                    (2.552)    (2.572)    
log(CEO age)        -0.0187 *  -0.0196 ** 
                    (-1.957)    (-2.048)    
log(Firm age)       -0.0017    -0.0016    
                    (-1.272)    (-1.219)    
log(Sales)          -0.0045 *** -0.0046 ***
                    (-3.393)    (-3.491)    
Cash flow 0.0783 *** 0.0789 ***
                    (4.843)    (4.848)    
Tobin's Q           0.0085 *** 0.0083 ***
                    (3.294)    (3.219)    
Book leverage       -0.0199 *** -0.017 ** 
                    (-2.726)    (-2.436)    
Intercept           0.0951 ** 0.0976 ** 
                    (2.462)    (2.512)    
Year fixed effects           Yes             Yes    
Industry fixed effects          Yes             Yes    
Adjusted R
2   0.4145    0.4129    
Observations        2,810    2,810    
            R&D/Lagged total assets
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Table IV.5: Firm diversification and inside debt 
The table presents results from OLS regressions with proxies for firm diversification as the dependent 
variables. In columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable is the sales-based Herfindahl index. In columns 3 and 
4, the dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of business segments. In columns 1 and 3, the main 
independent variable is the logarithm of the relative debt-equity ratio plus one. In columns 2 and 4, the main 
independent variable is a dummy variable that equals one if the relative debt-equity ratio is above one. All 
variables are described in Table IV.1. All variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Independent 
variables are lagged. The sample period is from 2006 to 2009. t-statistics appear in parentheses. Standard 
errors are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level. 
 
  
Variables                    
                    (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    
log(Relative debt-equity ratio + 1) -0.0132                   0.0375 *                 
                    (-1.500)                   (1.750)                   
Relative debt-equity ratio > 1                -0.0359 **                0.078 *  
                                   (-2.131)                   (1.915)    
log(Vega + 1)           0.0085 *  0.0088 *  -0.0314 ** -0.0317 ** 
                    (1.661)    (1.711)    (-2.498)    (-2.506)    
log(Delta + 1)          -0.0278 *** -0.0287 *** 0.0715 *** 0.0719 ***
                    (-3.656)    (-3.754)    (3.806)    (3.800)    
log(Non-firm wealth + 1) 0.0124    0.0129 *  -0.0167    -0.0173    
                    (1.602)    (1.681)    (-0.900)    (-0.932)    
Non-firm wealth missing 0.03    0.0306    -0.0848    -0.0844    
                    (0.990)    (1.010)    (-1.171)    (-1.167)    
log(CEO tenure)     0.0246 *** 0.0247 *** -0.0677 *** -0.068 ***
                    (2.727)    (2.742)    (-3.124)    (-3.138)    
log(CEO age)        -0.1643 ** -0.1619 ** 0.4692 *** 0.4714 ***
                    (-2.451)    (-2.421)    (2.908)    (2.929)    
log(Firm age)       -0.0492 *** -0.0476 *** 0.1119 *** 0.1094 ***
                    (-4.644)    (-4.476)    (4.350)    (4.221)    
log(Sales)          -0.0499 *** -0.0491 *** 0.1244 *** 0.1242 ***
                    (-4.247)    (-4.196)    (4.492)    (4.490)    
Book leverage       0.0601    0.0586    -0.1197    -0.1314    
                    (1.218)    (1.221)    (-1.003)    (-1.138)    
Tobin's Q           0.0486 *** 0.0492 *** -0.1269 *** -0.1267 ***
                    (5.610)    (5.739)    (-5.917)    (-5.973)    
Intercept           1.312 *** 1.3048 *** -1.1826 *  -1.1922 *  
                    (5.034)    (5.027)    (-1.863)    (-1.873)    
Year fixed effects           Yes             Yes             Yes             Yes    
Industry fixed effects          Yes             Yes             Yes             Yes    
Adjusted R
2   0.2648    0.2661    0.265    0.2652    
Observations        2,334    2,334    2,334    2,334    
            Sales-based Herfindahl index             log(Business segments)
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Table IV.6: Book leverage and inside debt 
The table presents results from OLS regressions with book leverage as the dependent variable. In the left 
column, the main independent variable is the logarithm of the relative debt-equity ratio plus one. In the right 
column, the main independent variable is a dummy variable that equals one if the relative debt-equity ratio is 
above one. All variables are described in Table IV.1. All variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
Independent variables are lagged. The sample period is from 2006 to 2009. t-statistics appear in parentheses. 
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level. 
 
  
Variables                    Book leverage
                    (1)    (2)    
log(Relative debt-equity ratio + 1) -0.0507 ***                
                    (-12.828)                   
Relative debt-equity ratio > 1                -0.077 ***
                                   (-8.120)    
log(Vega + 1)           0.0072 *** 0.007 ***
                    (2.717)    (2.665)    
log(Delta + 1)          -0.0234 *** -0.0222 ***
                    (-5.389)    (-5.038)    
log(Non-firm wealth + 1) 0.006    0.0054    
                    (1.387)    (1.236)    
Non-firm wealth missing 0.0546 *** 0.0543 ***
                    (3.307)    (3.229)    
log(CEO tenure)     0.0146 *** 0.0153 ***
                    (2.879)    (2.978)    
log(CEO age)        -0.029    -0.0376    
                    (-0.766)    (-0.977)    
log(Firm age)       0.0113 *  0.0115 *  
                    (1.957)    (1.917)    
log(Sales)          0.0174 *** 0.0165 ***
                    (2.949)    (2.738)    
PPE/Total assets    0.1223 *** 0.1163 ***
                    (3.576)    (3.375)    
Marginal tax rate   0.0913    0.0803    
                    (1.008)    (0.878)    
R&D/Total assets    -0.2527 ** -0.2635 ** 
                    (-2.034)    (-2.126)    
ROA                 -0.0474    -0.0695    
                    (-0.720)    (-1.047)    
Intercept           0.2104    0.2438    
                    (1.311)    (1.497)    
Year fixed effects           Yes             Yes    
Industry fixed effects          Yes             Yes    
Adjusted R
2   0.2718    0.2526    
Observations        2,720    2,720    
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Table IV.7: Equity volatility and inside debt 
The table presents results from OLS regressions with equity volatility as the dependent variable. In the left 
column, the main independent variable is the logarithm of the relative debt-equity ratio plus one. In the right 
column, the main independent variable is a dummy variable that equals one if the relative debt-equity ratio is 
above one. All variables are described in Table IV.1. All variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
Independent variables are lagged. The sample period is from 2006 to 2009. t-statistics appear in parentheses. 
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level. 
 
  
Variables                    Equity volatility
                    (1)    (2)    
log(Relative debt-equity ratio + 1) -0.0197 ***                
                    (-3.281)                   
Relative debt-equity ratio > 1                -0.0441 ***
                                   (-3.984)    
log(Vega + 1)       -0.0173 *** -0.0171 ***
                    (-4.756)    (-4.693)    
log(Delta + 1)      -0.0548 *** -0.0552 ***
                    (-9.697)    (-9.729)    
log(Non-firm wealth + 1) 0.0021    0.0026    
                    (0.401)    (0.506)    
Non-firm wealth missing 0.0312    0.0314    
                    (1.534)    (1.546)    
log(CEO tenure)     0.0281 *** 0.0282 ***
                    (4.289)    (4.327)    
log(CEO age)        -0.0388    -0.0383    
                    (-0.887)    (-0.878)    
log(Firm age)       -0.0074    -0.006    
                    (-0.991)    (-0.803)    
log(Sales)          -0.0105    -0.0103    
                    (-1.493)    (-1.471)    
R&D/Total assets    0.1214    0.12    
                    (0.864)    (0.850)    
Sales-based Herfindahl index 0.0272    0.0255    
                    (1.351)    (1.268)    
Book leverage       0.1273 *** 0.1316 ***
                    (3.590)    (3.813)    
Intercept           1.1593 *** 1.1591 ***
                    (6.679)    (6.680)    
Year fixed effects           Yes             Yes    
Industry fixed effects          Yes             Yes    
Adjusted R
2   0.4625    0.4636    
Observations        2,287    2,287    
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Appendix 
 
Calculating option value, option vega, and option delta 
Calculations of stock option values, option delta, and option vega are based on the Black 
and Scholes (1973) formula, as adjusted by Merton (1973) to account for dividend payouts. 
The notation follows Core and Guay (2002). The empirical implementation follows Guay 
(1999) and Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier (2009). 
 
Calculation of option values 
                         ( )             (         ),       (IV.3) 
 
where 
    [  (  ⁄ )      (  –       ⁄ )]       ⁄              (IV.4) 
N = cumulative probability function for the normal distribution. 
S = stock price at fiscal year-end (source: Compustat). 
X = exercise price (source: ExecuComp). 
σ =  annualized standard deviation of daily log returns calculated over the last 120 days 
of the fiscal year. I replace missing observations with the median value in the sample 
for the respective year. For each year, stock return volatilities are winsorized at the 
5th and 95th percentile (source: CRSP). 
T = time to maturity, calculated as the difference between the option expiration date and 
the fiscal year end date. I assume that CEOs early exercise their options. The 
exercise date is 70% of the time to maturity (source: ExecuComp, Compustat). 
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r = logarithm of (1 + risk-free interest rate). The risk-free rate is on US treasury bonds 
whose maturity matches the time to maturity of the option (source: Compustat). 
d = logarithm of (1 + expected dividend yield). The dividend yield is calculated as 
dividends per share divided by the share price at fiscal year-end. I replace missing 
observations with the median value in the sample for the respective year. For each 
year, dividend yields are winsorized at the 95th percentile (source: Compustat). 
 
Option vega: Option vega is the sensitivity of the option value with respect to a 0.01 
change in stock return volatility: 
[ (            )  ( )⁄ ]                    ( )                    (IV.5) 
where N´ is the normal density function. 
 
Option delta: Option delta is the sensitivity of the option value with respect to a 1% 
change in stock price:  
[ (            )  ( )⁄ ]   (    ⁄ )             ( )  (    ⁄ )     (IV.6) 
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